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ﻞﻘﻌﻟﺍ ﻊﻓﺭ ﺪﻘﻓ ﺏﺎﺒﺳﻷﺍ ﻊﻓﺭ ﻦﻤﻓ  . ﺕﺎﺒﺒﺴﻣ ﻭ ﺎﺑﺎﺒﺳﺃ ﺎﻨﻫ ﺎﻫ ﻥﺃ ﺎﻌﺿ ﻭ ﻊﻀﺗ ﻖﻄﻨﳌﺍ ﺔﻋﺎﻨﺻﻭ  ,   ﻭ
ﺎﻬﺑﺎﺒﺳﺃ ﺔﻓﺮﻌﲟ ﻻﺇ ﻡﺎﻤﺘﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻥﻮﻜﺗ ﻻ ﺕﺎﺒﺒﺴﳌﺍ ﻚﻠﺘﺑ ﺔﻓﺮﻌﳌﺍ ﻥﺃ  .   ﻮﻫ ءﺎﻴﺷﻷﺍ ﻩﺬﻫ ﻊﻓﺮﻓ
ﻪﻟ ﻊﻓﺍﺭ ﻭ ﻢﻠﻌﻠﻟ ﻞﻄﺒﻣ  . ﺎﻴﻘﻴﻘﺣ ﺎﻤﻠﻋ ﻼﺻﺃ ﻡﻮﻠﻌﻣ ءﻲﺷ ﺎﻨﻫ ﺎﻫ ﻥﻮﻜﻳ ﻻﺃ ﻡﺰﻠﻳ ﻪﻧﺈﻓ  ,   ﻥﺎﻛ ﻥﺇ ﻞﺑ
ﻤﻓ ﻥﻮﻨﻈ  ! ﻼﺻﺃ ﺪﺣ ﻻﻭ ﻥﺎﻫﺮﺑ ﺎﻨﻫ ﺎﻫ ﻥﻮﻜﻳ ﻻ ﻭ  , ﻊﻔﺗﺮﺗ ﻭ     ﺎﻬﻨﻣ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺗﺍﺬﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﻮﻤﶈﺍ ﻑﺎﻨﺻﺃ
ﲔﻫﺍﱪﻟﺍ ﻒﻠﺗﺄﺗ  ! ﻱﺭﻭﺮﺿ ﺪﺣﺍﻭ ﻢﻠﻋ ﻻ ﻭ ﻪﻧﺃ ﻊﻀﻳ ﻦﻣ ﻭ  ,   ﺍﺬﻫ ﻪﻟﻮﻗ ﻥﻮﻜﻳ ﻻ ﺃ ﻪﻣﺰﻠﻳ
ﺎﻳﺭﻭﺮﺿ !  
 ﺖﻓﺎﻬﺘﻟﺍ ﺖﻓﺎﻬﺗ 






“ […] he who denies causes must deny the intellect. Logic implies the existence of 
causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be rendered perfect 
through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of knowledge, 
and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and 
that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor 
definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. 
The man who denies the necessity of any item of knowledge must admit that even 
this, his own affirmation, is not necessary knowledge.” 
 
The incoherence of incoherence  
Averroes (1126 –1198) 
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Silent gratitude isn't much use to anyone 
Gladys Bronwyn Stern (1890 - 1973)  
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Preface 
R&D and innovation foster economic growth and hence, the innovative 
capacity of economic actors has become a key asset in current economic systems, 
next to the traditional input factors labour and capital. Both on the public as well as 
on the private level, incentive structures have been introduced to stimulate 
innovative activity. The natural question which forces itself in this respect, sounds 
out to the effectiveness of these measures since, unlike the often widespread 
confidence in their merit, there are indications that in the end they may not bring 
about the desired added value. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate the actual 
effectiveness of these measures.  
This doctoral thesis attempts to advance the literature on evaluation 
economics both on the level of methodology as well as content. This research 
question entails one very specific problem, i.e. the issue of selectivity. Typically, 
the measure (or more formally ‘treatment’) does not apply randomly to all subjects. 
Moreover, what is even worse in the framework of evaluation economics, the 
treatment is often expected to be highly correlated with the impact the measure is 
intended to generate. This introduces endogeneity in the evaluation model and 
requires econometric correction. Different econometric methods have been 
developed to take the potential endogeneity in evaluation research into account, 
each with specific advantages and disadvantages. As many techniques will be 
employed in this dissertation, Chapter 1 provides a concise summary of these 
econometric methods.  
The main part of this work, covering chapters two to five, focuses on the 
perspective of public policy and evaluates the impact of public funding on private 
R&D activity. The so-called crowding-out hypothesis is assessed: do R&D grants 
crowd out private R&D activity? The last part of this dissertation, chapter six, 
zooms in on a particular corporate remuneration strategy: profit-sharing. The 
introduction of this incentive scheme, in addition to the going wage, is related to 
companies’ innovative performance. In the remaining of this preface, a brief 
introduction to both parts is provided.  Essays on the economics of evaluation  2
Public innovation policy 
There are three main reasons why the market for R&D fails. First, the 
outcome of a company’s R&D activities is always uncertain. Increased R&D 
expenditures increase the likelihood of obtaining successful R&D output, but 
nevertheless, the level of uncertainty remains significant (Dasgupta and Maskin, 
1987). Second, if a company generates a positive outcome from its R&D activities, 
it will never be able to appropriate all returns, as other companies may use some of 
this knowledge, which is intangible and therefore diffuses very quickly and easily 
into the public domain (Arrow, 1962). Next to these negative externalities, 
companies may experience difficulties in raising external capital, due to moral 
hazard and asymmetric information (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994).  
These theoretical arguments predict that the actual level of R&D spending 
will be lower than what would be socially desirable. Hence, this argument justifies 
government intervention in the market for R&D. A strong education system, 
generating a large pool of highly skilled researchers, constitutes the ideal foundation 
for effective and efficient knowledge generation. Another essential publicly 
regulated measure to alleviate imperfections in the market for R&D is the protection 
of intellectual knowledge through the patent system. In the first part of this 
dissertation, I zoom in on yet another public measure, i.e. public funding of private 
R&D activity. There are two main intervention modes, i.e. direct funding through 
subsidies and indirect funding through tax credits. In this work, the attention is 
focused on the direct intervention tool: public R&D grants. An R&D subsidy 
reduces the price of an R&D project and may render its expected net profit positive, 
despite the market imperfections. Firms are expected to behave rationally and as a 
result, the firm is expected to conduct this socially valuable R&D project, which 
would never be undertaken in the absence of the subsidy. 
However, companies behave rationally in another way as well: they may 
always apply for a subsidy, even when it would not be necessary. The government 
is disadvantaged by asymmetric information and may approve to fund this project. 
In that case, the company’s R&D expenditure would not increase, although exactly 
this was the aim of the government. Hence, it is crucial to assess the effectiveness of 
public innovation policy. In the first part of this dissertation, the impact of public Preface    3
R&D funding is looked into, assessing the crowding-out hypothesis: “Do companies 
replace (part of) their private R&D budget with the public R&D grant?”.  
This calls for a treatment effects analysis and entails a potential danger of 
selectivity. Subsidy receipt may be highly correlated with R&D activity, which 
would render the treatment endogenous. On the one hand, the government provides 
money and may try to maximize the rate of return on its investment. Therefore, it 
may cherry-pick companies performing well in R&D, as this will increase the 
expected net value from the R&D subsidy. On the other hand, also at the company 
side, selectivity may play. Very R&D active firms may be better aware of the public 
measures they qualify for, or they may be able to write better project proposals, both 
increasing the likelihood of receiving a public R&D grant. Obviously, the risk of 
endogeneity is significant and has to be addressed properly. Chapter 1 concisely 
guides the reader through a selection of approaches which allow correcting for this 
potential selectivity. In part one, covering chapters two to five, the Flemish R&D 
funding system will be the main public intervention tool to be evaluated. Therefore, 
Chapter 2 first provides an introduction into public innovation policy in general 
and more specifically, it also sketches the details of the policy framework in 
Flanders. 
Additionality research has been undertaken in many countries in recent years, 
but the results remain unclear. Some reject, while others accept the crowding-out 
hypothesis. An important explanation can be found in the use of different datasets 
(David and Hall, 2000). Data are collected in different set-ups and periods, cover 
different observation windows and use different definitions. Different data call for 
different techniques to take potential selectivity into account, which implies caveats 
on the comparability of different research results. In Chapter 3 of this thesis, 
together with my co-author, dr. Tobias Schmidt, I employ an identical methodology, 
using identical firm-level data for Flanders and Germany. We first employ the 
commonly used matching technique and then extend this methodology with the 
conditional difference-in-differences approach for repeated cross-sections, which 
has, until now, been unexplored in the domain of additionality research. R&D 
expenditure and R&D intensity, measured as R&D expenditure over sales, are our 
outcome variables of interest. Essays on the economics of evaluation  4
However, as David and Hall (2000) suggest: ‘the more the better’ is a 
questionable statement when it comes to R&D expenditure. Mere R&D 
expenditures may not constitute a sufficiently adequate measure to evaluate the 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies. The lack of qualified personnel is amongst the key 
factors hampering innovative activity (Mohnen et al., 2008). Moreover, mobility of 
R&D personnel is one of the main factors explaining (un)desired spillovers between 
companies (Mansfield, 1985). An adequate remuneration system may attenuate 
failure in the market for R&D as it may enable companies to attract, motivate and 
maintain a strong R&D workforce. Earnings are an important determinant in the 
remuneration system and researcher wages consume the lion’s share of the total 
R&D expenditure. Therefore, it is highly relevant to introduce the close 
interconnectivity between scientific labour markets and R&D investment decisions 
in the evaluation process of public R&D policy. Goolsbee (1998) concluded that 
R&D subsidies are primarily translated into researcher wage increases, inflating 
positive additionality effects by 30% to 50%. Therefore I empirically analyze the 
effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D investment, employment and wages 
in Flanders in Chapter 4. I employ parametric treatment effects models and 
instrumental variable methods for a sample of R&D active companies, and now, in 
contrast to the third chapter, also use information on the grant size. This allows a 
more profound testing of the crowding-out hypothesis: the existence of full as well 
as partial crowding-out effects can be assessed.  
In addition to a high level of uncertainty and negative externalities, also 
capital market constraints may hamper private R&D effort (Himmelberg and 
Petersen, 1994). As Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) prove, especially companies 
depending on external finance are burdened by asymmetric information and moral 
hazard motives and may experience serious obstacles in raising adequate R&D 
budgets (see also Hall, 2005). Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are possibly less 
subject to these threats. Moreover, they are expected to have stronger capabilities in 
controlling knowledge flows and, as a consequence, keep uncertainty and 
externality risks to a minimum (see e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 2004). This may 
decrease the likelihood that MNEs apply for or receive public R&D subsidies. On 
the other hand, evidence suggests that a significant performance gap exists between 
foreign-owned and domestic firms, to the benefit of the former (see Bellak, 2004 for Preface    5
a survey). The government’s desire to maximize the expected rate of return on 
public R&D funding may therefore conversely justify why governments would also 
provide public R&D funding to MNEs. MNEs expand their foreign activities 
especially in R&D intensive industries (Markusen, 1998). Flanders is a small, open 
economy and hosts a large share of foreign-owned MNE activity. Research on 
Flemish data learns that these foreign-owned companies are less likely to receive a 
subsidy (see e.g. Aerts et al., 2007). But then again, they harvest larger R&D grants 
and, aggregated, the lion’s share of the total subsidy amount in Flanders. Chapter 5 
investigates whether these firm-specific characteristics introduce heterogeneity in 
additionality effects. First, the direct impact on R&D expenditure and intensity is 
estimated. Subsequently, the publicly induced R&D expenditure is disentangled 
from the privately financed R&D expenditure and their productivity with respect to 
innovative performance and economic return is estimated. I distinguish according to 
ownership to evaluate potential differences in additionality.  
In this first part, on public innovation policy, the view on additionality effects 
from R&D subsidies is broadened. Different techniques are employed: matching, 
the conditional difference-in-differences estimator, treatment effects models and IV 
regressions. Both discrete and continuous treatment are assessed. Moreover, also the 
content is deepened, as the matter is looked into from different angles. First, we take 
an international perspective, comparing two countries. Second, the traditional 
indicators to be evaluated, R&D expenditure and R&D intensity, are extended with 
measures of R&D personnel and wages at the input side as well as innovative and 
economic performance at the output side. Third, firm heterogeneity is introduced, 
based on the ownership structure of the company.  
Corporate strategies in innovation 
Knowledge creation is a time and money consuming process, with an 
uncertain outcome (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). Optimal staff motivation is to the 
benefit of the expected success. On the other hand, knowledge transpires relatively 
quickly into the public domain once it has been created, allowing other companies 
to take advantage of the originating company’s investments. A significant share of 
knowledge created in companies leaks out through employees (Mansfield, 1985). Essays on the economics of evaluation  6
Therefore, it is all the more important to attract valuable employees and curtail the 
staff turnover and, additionally, to motivate this highly qualified workforce. One 
important aspect here is employee remuneration. In Chapter 6, together with my 
co-author Prof. dr. Kornelius Kraft, I zoom in on a specific remuneration system, 
i.e. profit-sharing, and link it to companies’ innovative performance. This area has 
been unexplored until now.  
The direct aim of companies introducing profit-sharing in their remuneration 
policy is to stimulate staff performance. As profit maximization becomes a win-win 
strategy to all parties involved, i.e. both the employees and the firm owners, their 
mutual interests become aligned. If the incentive system works in an efficient way 
and if employees behave rationally, they increase their efforts, which should 
subsequently raise the company’s performance.  
This direct link between profit-sharing and output explains why traditionally 
productivity has by far been the most often investigated issue in this research 
domain. Scholars typically find positive to neutral impacts of profit-sharing on a 
firm’s output. However, productivity measures only show part of the picture, as 
they merely reflect the result, without illuminating possible reasons explaining this 
productivity increase. An efficient incentive system is expected to affect workers’ 
performance, but may additionally strengthen a company’s innovative capabilities 
as theoretical arguments predict that potential resistance against innovative activity 
can be offset and, even more, employees may actively cultivate the company’s 
innovative capabilities. We employ two variations of the conditional difference-in-
differences technique on a panel dataset of German companies and empirically 
investigate the relationship between profit-sharing and innovative performance. 
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For every measure which is introduced, the following question should 
naturally rise: “Does this measure actually generate the impact it was intended to 
generate?”. Even when theoretical arguments justify the introduction of the 
measure, there are indications that some measures may not always succeed in 
realizing the added value they are accredited with. Therefore, an appropriate impact 
assessment is primordial.  
The economics of evaluation entails one very specific issue, namely 
selectivity. Participation in the measure is often not determined randomly. 
Therefore, the effectiveness can not be assessed by just comparing subjects which 
do and do not participate. Participation is potentially endogenous and this has to be 
incorporated in evaluation models to assure a correct assessment of the measure. 
Different econometric methods have been developed for this purpose, each with 
specific advantages and disadvantages. As many techniques will be used in this 
dissertation, this section provides a concise summary of these econometric methods.  
We enter the research domain of so-called treatment effects. Participation in a 
measure is labelled as receiving a treatment. This treatment can either be discrete 
(yes / no participation) or continuous (measuring the extent of the participation). 
Most common in the literature is the evaluation of discrete treatment. Therefore, this 
summary starts with such methodologies, and then briefly mentions possible 
extensions for multiple or continuous treatments. 
Treatment effects analysis relies on compliance with the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA): the treatment of one subject should not 
affect the treatment effect on another subject (Rubin, 1990). Unfortunately, this 
cannot be tested. In the following sections compliance with the SUTVA is assumed. 
                                                             
1 This chapter heavily draws from Aerts, K., Czarnitzki, D., Fier, A., 2007. Capítulo 3: Evaluación econométrica de las 
políticas públicas de I+D: situación actual, 79-104, in: Heijs, J., Buesa, M., (Eds.), La cooperación en innovación en España y 
el papel de las ayudas públicas, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. 
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1. Discrete Treatments 
In this subsection, we focus on methods that are applicable to cross-sectional 
data, and second those that require panel data. Different kinds of treatment effects 
can be estimated: the average treatment effect, the local average treatment effect, 
the marginal treatment effect, the average treatment effect on the treated and the 
treatment effect on the untreated (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2001, for a discussion of 
treatment effects commonly used in program evaluation literature). Here, we focus 
on the treatment effect αTT on the participating subjects, which targets the basic 
evaluation question: “What is the impact of the measure on the outcome variable in 
the group of treated subjects?”, or expressed as the following equation
3: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − = = S Y E S Y E
C T
TT α , (1) 
where Y
T represents the outcome of subjects that participate (T = treated), and Y
C 
refers to the situation where they do not participate (C = counterfactual). S refers to 
the treatment status (S = 1: treated; S = 0: untreated). Thus, αTT results from 
comparing the actual outcome of participating subjects with their outcome in case of 
not participating. The approach of measuring potential outcomes goes back to Roy 
(1951). The outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
T  can be derived from the sample mean of Y in the 
group of treated subjects. In order to identify  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  further assumptions have 
to be made.  
The outcome variable Y is modelled as follows: 
0 S
1 S











=  ,   (2) 
where X represents a set of exogenous variables and β their respective parameters. 
U is the error term with zero mean and U is assumed to be uncorrelated with X. In 
an experimental setting, without any selection bias and random participation in the 
measure, U and S are not correlated. However, in many program set-ups, it is not 
unlikely that U is correlated with S. This endogeneity would imply a selection bias 
in the estimation of the treatment effect, as the following equation does not hold: 
                                                             
3 All variables are measured at the level of the subjects i (with i = 1,...,N), but we omit the index i for convenience. Chapter 1. The issue of selectivity    11
) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = = S Y E S Y E
C C . (3) 
As a result, standard econometric methods, regressing Y on X and S by OLS, are 
not valid and other approaches, taking this potential endogeneity properly into 
account, should be employed. Econometric literature covers a range of methods to 
this end (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 
2000, 2002; Aerts et al., 2007). Examples are selection models and instrumental 
variable (IV) estimations, matching techniques and difference-in-differences 
estimations. In the remainder of this chapter, we briefly explain these methods. 
The treatment allocation is modelled by the following selection equation: 
V Z S + = γ * , (4) 
where S* is an index, measuring the probability to participate in the measure, 
depending on a set of subject characteristics Z and their respective parameters γ, as 
well as an error term V. When S* is positive, the subject participates in the measure:  
.    otherwise
0  S* if









1.1. The Heckman Selection Estimator 
The two-step selection model estimates two equations. A discrete choice 
model predicts the probability of being treated (S*) (the selection equation) and the 
outcome variable is regressed linearly on the treatment variable, controlling for 
observable exogenous characteristics (the outcome equation). Theoretically, the 
outcome equation is defined through the nonlinearity of the hazard parameter (also 
labelled as the inverse Mills ratio). However, in practice, most observations are 
located within the quasi-linear range of the hazard parameter (Puhani, 2000). Hence, 
to identify the treatment effect, an exclusion restriction is imposed. This requires the 
existence of at least one variable, which is insignificant in the outcome equation, but 
at the same time significant in the selection equation. This regressor should not be 
correlated with the error term V of the selection equation. The selection model 
directly controls for the part of the error term U which is correlated with S. It is Essays on the economics of evaluation  12
commonly assumed that U and V follow a joint normal distribution
4, resulting in the 
following conditional outcome equations: 
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where the last term in each equation represents the error term conditional on S. An 
important strength of this methodology lies exactly here: by separating the impact of 
S from the selection process, any correlation with unobserved variables is corrected 
for.  
This model has often been criticized as it is quite demanding on assumptions 
about the structure of the model. Several generalizations of the fully parametric 
model have been suggested in the literature. Among others, semi-parametric 
variations on the Heckman model include Gallant and Nychka (1987), Cosslett 
(1991), Newey (1999), or Robinson's (1988) partial linear model. Note, however, 
that in such models the intercept in the outcome equation is no longer identified. A 
precise estimate of the intercept is required for deriving αTT. Heckman (1990) and 
Andrews and Schafgans (1998) developed estimators to identify αTT. See Hussinger 
(2008) for applications of such estimators in an evaluation of public innovation 
policy. 
1.2. Instrumental variable (IV) regressions 
In the IV regression set-up, an instrument Z* is defined and a transformation g 
is applied, satisfying the requirement that g(Z*) is uncorrelated with U, conditional 
on X, and Z* is not completely determined by X. Unlike the selection model, IV is a 
simpler estimator as it omits the selection equation estimation. However, its major 
drawback lies in the identification of the instrument Z*: it has to be valid as well as 
relevant. Only in that case, the estimates are consistent. Overidentifying restrictions 
are tested by the Hansen-Sargan test. Its joint null hypothesis claims that the 
instruments Z* are valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term U, and that the 
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excluded instruments are rightfully excluded from the estimated equation. The 
identification of the equation, i.e. whether the excluded instruments are relevant, is 
tested in the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test. Its null 
hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Consequently, the potential 
endogeneity is adequately corrected for, if the Hansen-Sargan test holds and the 
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test is rejected.  
1.3. The matching estimator 
The matching estimator is a non-parametric method and has one main 
advantage: no particular functional form of equations has to be specified. The 
disadvantages are strong assumptions and heavy data requirements.  
The main purpose of the matching estimator is to re-establish the conditions 
of an experiment. The matching estimator attempts to construct a correct sample 
counterpart for the treated subjects' outcomes if they had not been treated, by 
pairing each treated subject with members of a comparison group. Under the 
matching assumption, the only remaining difference between the two groups is the 
actual participation in the measure. 
Rubin (1977) introduced the so-called conditional independence assumption 
(CIA) to comply with the equality of the two arguments in equation (3). This 
condition implies that the treatment and the potential outcome are independent for 
subjects with the same set of exogenous characteristics (X = x): 
x X S Y Y
C T = ⊥ , . (7) 
The CIA helps to overcome the problem that  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  is unobservable. If 
the conditional independence assumption is valid,  ) , 0 ( x X S Y E
C = =  acts as a 
measure of the potential outcome for the treated subjects. However, the CIA is only 
fulfilled if all variables influencing both the outcome Y and the selection status S 
are known and available in the dataset. In that case, the equation  
) , 0 ( ) , 1 ( x X S Y E x X S Y E
C C = = = = =  (8) Essays on the economics of evaluation  14
holds. The average outcome of treated subjects in the absence of the measure can be 
calculated from a sample of comparable, i.e. matched, subjects.  
Note, however, that matching requires a further assumption, namely: 
  () 0P r 1 | 1 SX <=< . (9) 
The probability of participating in the measure is restricted between zero and one, to 
guarantee that all treated subjects have a similar counterpart in the population of 
non-treated subjects, and that every subject constitutes a possible participant in the 
measure. This is not ensured in any sample. If the samples of treated and non-
treated subjects would have no or only little overlap in the exogenous characteristics 
X, matching does not deliver consistent estimates. Therefore, matching requires a 
common support restriction, which excludes subjects for which no suitable 
matching partner can be found. 
If the CIA holds and common support is given, the treatment effect on the 
treated can be estimated using the sample means of both groups: 
) , 0 ( ) , 1 ( x X S Y E x X S Y E
C T M
TT = = − = = = α . (10) 
Usually vector X contains a large number of variables. However, the high 
dimensionality of X can significantly complicate the matching. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983 and 1984) have shown that conditioning the matching on a single 
index, i.e. the propensity score, which measures the probability to receive a 
treatment Pr(X), instead of the vector of exogenous characteristics X, is a valid 
procedure. This reduces the curse of dimensionality and makes matching a feasible 
approach. Lechner (1998) suggested a method of hybrid matching, where one 
conditions on Pr(X) and a subset of X. For example, when matching is employed on 
pooled cross-sectional data, including a variable indicating the year of observation 
in addition to Pr(X) ensures that a matched control observation is observed in the 
same wave as the treated subject. 
The comparison group for each treated subject is selected on a predefined 
criterion of proximity. After the definition of the neighbourhood for each treated 
subject, the next issue is the choice of appropriate weights for non-treated Chapter 1. The issue of selectivity    15
observations h within the neighbourhood. The impact of the treatment on subject i is 











TT i Y w Y
1
, α . (11) 
A common procedure is nearest neighbour matching, i.e. the weight is set to 
unit value for the closest match, and zero otherwise. So, the matching result is one 
single non-treated twin for each treated subject. The nearest neighbour can be 
selected with or without replacement. To obtain the best possible match, a large 
pool of controls is required. Therefore, matching with replacement is common 
practice. However, this introduces a bias in the ordinary t-statistic on mean 
differences, which has to be corrected for (Lechner, 2001). Also more than one 
neighbour may be selected, giving different weights to different control 
observations, depending on their proximity to the treated subject. Kernel matching 
uses all subjects in the control group for each participant, and assigns Kernel 
weights according to proximity in X or Pr(X) to each control observation. 
Stratification matching divides the observations into strata and eliminates the 
within-stratum differences in X to obtain an adequate control stratum for each 
treated observation. 
1.4. The difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator 
The difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator is based on the idea that a good 
approximation for the outcome in the absence of a treatment would be an 
observation of a treated subject in an earlier period where it did not participate in the 
measure. In order to control for macro-economic changes over time, DiD relates the 
development of treated subjects over time to a control group of non-participants. 
Hence, the DiD estimator compares participants i and a control group of non-
participants h before (t0) and after (t1) the treatment: 
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The obvious disadvantage of this estimator is that panel data are required. 
Often it is very hard to satisfy this heavy data requirement, as not only at least two 
periods have to be available, but more in particular, the treated subjects should be 
observed in the previous period in a situation where they did not participate in the 
measure. As participation is typically for a longer time, and subjects may participate 
in multiple measures over time, the construction of a database, suitable for an 
appropriate application of DiD turns out to be very difficult in practice.  
1.5. The conditional difference-in-differences (CDiD) estimator 
One underlying assumption in the DiD estimator is that treated and non-
treated subjects react similar to shocks occurring over time (independently of the 
treatment). However, as evidence shows, treated and non-treated subjects often 
exhibit very different characteristics. This suggests that they may also react 
differently to macro-economic shocks. The conditional difference-in-differences 
estimator (CDiD) allows countering this potential bias. This approach combines 
matching and DiD techniques. Instead of using a general control group, a group of 
subjects h is selected, which is comparable to the treated subjects i in the period 
before participation in the measure. The treatment effect is then deducted from 
comparing the evolution of these two comparable groups over time: 
. ) 0
0 , ,
0 , 0 , ( ) 0
1 , ,
1 , 1 , (
) 0
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= = − = = = α  (13) 
Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggest employing CDiD for repeated cross-
sections (CDiDRCS) if panel data are not available. Three matching algorithms are 
required. For every treated subject i in period t1, a non-treated twin subject h has to 
be found in the same period t1. In the next step, a control group has to be compiled: 
for each treated subject i and each selected non-treated subject h in period t1 a twin 
observation, i.e. k and j respectively, has to be found in period t0. The average 
treatment effect on the treated subjects can then be estimated as follows: 
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2. Continuous Treatments 
As mentioned earlier, the previous estimators focus on binary treatments, i.e. 
one merely distinguishes between participation and non-participation. However, the 
size of the treatment may have an important impact on the treatment effects. 
Extensions of the binary treatment case are only briefly referred to in this chapter. 
Lee (1994) and Honoré et al. (1997) provide semi-parametric selection 
models when the treatment is not limited to a binary variable, but follows a tobit 
distribution, i.e. the treatment variable is zero for non-treated subjects but takes on 
positive continuous values for treated subjects, reflecting the extent to which 
subjects participate in the measure. 
IV regressions are not limited to discrete treatment. The same procedure is 
valid if continuous treatment information is available. See e.g. Wooldridge (2002) 
for a comprehensive discussion on how to obtain treatment effects with IV 
regressions. 
Imbens (2000) has introduced a treatment effects estimator that allows 
accounting for heterogeneous but still discrete treatments. The multiple treatments 
can either reflect participation in different programs, or the size of the treatment can 
be grouped into different classes, e.g. low, medium and high. Similarly, Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002) present a matching approach for heterogeneous treatments.  
Recently, Hirano and Imbens (2004) suggested estimating dose-response 
functions using a generalized propensity score method. Like the matching approach, 
this also is a non-parametric method, which is suitable for continuous treatment, 
though. 
3. Estimator selection 
As this chapter shows, many different techniques exist to correct for the 
potential selection bias in evaluation economics. The most important methods are 
selection models, IV regressions, matching techniques and difference-in-differences 
estimations. Each approach has its advantages but definitely also disadvantages. For 
the application of selection models and IV estimators valid instruments are required, 
which often is not straightforward. The matching approach offers the advantage that Essays on the economics of evaluation  18
no distributional assumptions have to be made, neither for the outcome equation 
itself, nor for the error terms of the selection and the outcome equation. Its 
disadvantage is that it only controls for observed heterogeneity among treated and 
untreated subjects. Any unknown or unobserved variable driving the participation 
decision will disturb the estimates. A rich dataset can offset this problem. The 
difference-in-differences method requires panel data with observations before and 
after the treatment, imposing a change of treatment status for the participating 
subjects. The conditional difference-in-differences method combines the advantages 
of DiD and matching and is applicable to panel data as well as repeated cross-
sections. However, again, this approach requires a dataset which is suitable for its 
application.  
The aim of every researcher in the domain of the economics of evaluation 
obviously should be to exclude any influence from the participation decision in the 
assessment of the impact of the measure. Therefore, he should use the most 
appropriate technique to control for this endogeneity. However, in practice, this 
choice is usually made ad hoc, due to data availability, and often the researcher’s 
choice to employ a specific technique is driven by data constraints and a 
deliberation about the most accurate versus the most appropriate technique. This 
introduces considerable caveats when comparing various research results, stemming 
from different research set-ups and different methodologies.  
In this dissertation different approaches are used to offset the potential 
selection bias which is inherent to participation in the measures we evaluate. Taken 
together, they offer a rich but nuanced view on the assessment of intervention tools 
in the market for R&D. In the first part, we look into the impact of public R&D 
funding on private R&D activity. To this end, we assess discrete treatment and 
apply the matching technique (the fifth chapter), and its extension in the CDiD 
approach (third chapter). In the fourth chapter, discrete as well as continuous 
treatment is evaluated in treatment effects and IV regression models. In the second 
part, a specific corporate measure, i.e. profit-sharing, is related to innovative 
performance. Here, the matching approach is employed in a panel dataset: we 
employ two variations of the conditional difference-in-differences technique. Chapter 1. The issue of selectivity    19
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This chapter introduces the reader in the domain of public innovation policy 
and illustrates the relevance of assessing the impact of public R&D funding on 
private R&D activity. First, the Science and Technology policy is discussed, with a 
focus on public R&D funding. We explain the rationale behind public R&D funding 
and briefly review the outcome of evaluation exercises which have been undertaken 
in the past. As in the following chapters the main focus will be on the Flemish R&D 
policy, the details of the Flemish subsidy system will be illuminated in the second 
section. 
1. Science and Technology policy 
The failure of the market for R&D results in underinvestment and this justifies 
government intervention. Governments design a Science and Technology policy to 
optimize the conditions for conducting research and development activities. A 
strong education system, generating a large pool of highly skilled researchers, 
constitutes the ideal foundation for effective and efficient knowledge generation. An 
important publicly regulated measure is the protection of intellectual knowledge in 
the patent system. In this dissertation, we zoom in on yet another public measure, 
i.e. public funding of R&D activities.  
Public authorities can opt between two modes of transferring public money to 
the private R&D sector: either directly or indirectly. The main advantage of direct 
funding, i.e. R&D subsidies, is that governments are able to control the money 
flows and impose their own preferences (for example socially highly valuable 
projects), as they directly decide which companies and which projects receive 
public support. Indirect funding, i.e. tax credits, applies to all companies, ruling out 
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preferential behaviour of the government, but at the same time offering certainty to 
applying companies, as this measure remains relatively stable over time. Van 
Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) add that direct subsidies offer the advantage that public 
authorities have more control over their budget. Conversely, fiscal measures are 
more accessible and the administrative costs can be very low. We now briefly 
discuss the main findings on the returns to both incentive measures. 
1.1. Direct public R&D funding: subsidies  
There is a vast body of literature on the additionality effects of direct R&D 
grants. Only relatively recently, the issue of selectivity is explicitly taken into 
account in this domain. So far, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Flanders, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the US have been 
subject to an evaluation exercise of their public R&D funding system and different 
estimators have been employed. However, the results on the effectiveness of public 
R&D funding remain ambiguous. Key reasons for these diverging conclusions are 
the use of different estimators, as well as the application for a broad range of 
countries, each with their own specific S&T policy (David and Hall, 2000).  
Different impacts are evaluated. The predominant research question assesses 
the crowding-out hypothesis, i.e. do companies replace private R&D budgets with 
public R&D grants? The numerous studies estimating the impact on R&D 
expenditure excited the criticism that positive additionality may still hide a 
substantial level of crowding-out (see e.g. David and Hall, 2000). This would be the 
case if increased R&D expenditures are translated in increased R&D wages and not, 
or only to some extent, in real additional R&D effort. For example, Goolsbee (1998) 
calculates that this potential disorder may inflate positive additionality effects by 
30% to 50%. Therefore, research on input additionality is completed by not only 
looking at the impact on R&D expenditure, but also on R&D personnel and the 
R&D wage structure.  
While investigating potential crowding-out effects of public R&D funding on 
private R&D expenditure and personnel is indisputably highly relevant for 
innovation policy evaluation, a rejection of such effects does not necessarily imply 
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subsequently economic value creation. As hinted before, subsidies may just increase 
R&D wages instead of the real R&D effort. Or, subsidies can be used to finance 
duplicate R&D, which may induce inefficiency in the national innovation system 
(Irwin and Klenow, 1996). Moreover, an actual reinforcement of private R&D 
activities may be directed towards more risky and consequently potentially less 
successful projects (Setter and Tishler, 2005). Hence, extending additionality 
research on R&D inputs to an analysis of the induced innovative and economic 
output is imperative to get a full understanding of the impact of R&D subsidies. 
Klette et al. (2000) survey the literature on evaluation studies, also measuring firm 
growth, firm value, patents, etc. Since then, researchers also have been evaluating 
measures on product and process innovations. More recent research extends the 
crowding-out question by linking privately financed R&D and publicly induced 
R&D to innovative activity (see e.g. Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). A two equation 
model is considered: first, a treatment effects analysis on R&D expenditure is 
conducted using the matching approach. In the second equation, a knowledge 
production function is estimated, relating a measure of innovative output to the 
firms’ R&D spending and other covariates. The first step allows disentangling total 
R&D spending into two components: first, that part of R&D that would have been 
conducted in the absence of subsidies, i.e. the estimated counterfactual situation. 
Second, the other part of R&D expenditure that has been induced by the receipt of 
subsidies, which comprises the amount of the subsidy itself, and the additionally 
stimulated privately financed R&D (the treatment effect). The two components add 
up to the total observed R&D spending, but the decomposition allows analyzing the 
productivity of privately financed versus additional, publicly induced R&D 
expenditure.  
A recent stream of additionality research extends the evaluation criteria 
beyond the directly measurable input and output indicators and evaluates how 
subsidies affect companies’ behaviour, e.g. the setting-up of collaborative R&D 
projects, changes in the nature and sustainability of such networking, changes in 
companies’ R&D management, etc. This concept of behavioural additionality was 
introduced by Buisseret et al. (1995). Falk (2004) for example finds that supported 
companies enhance their innovative capabilities, improve competence building in 
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she refers to a major problem inherent to the concept of behavioural additionality, 
which is the lack of appropriate measures for the mostly intangible merits of 
behavioural additionality. 
1.2. Indirect public R&D funding: tax credits 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) survey the literature on the effectiveness of R&D 
tax credits (see also Van Pottelsberghe et al., 2003). The pioneering research in this 
domain was initiated in the early eighties with US data (Eisner et al., 1983). The 
main explanation is that the US were among the first to introduce an R&D tax 
scheme (in 1981). Firm-level evaluations in other countries like Australia, Canada, 
France, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden followed, but are less frequent. 
Furthermore, research was conducted at the macro level (see e.g. Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe, 1999). Different approaches can be found in the literature, but 
especially the estimation of the marginal cost of R&D to evaluate the impact of tax 
credits has become very popular in recent years. Although different methods and 
different datasets are employed and different schemes apply in different countries 
(see e.g. Van Pottelsberghe et al., 2003), the conclusions from empirical research 
leave little ambiguity: R&D tax credits stimulate private R&D spending. One 
crucial critique on the analysis of the impact of R&D tax credits is the relabeling 
issue, though. Firms eligible for R&D tax allowances can be expected to label any 
investment (slightly) related to the area of R&D as R&D expenditure. This may 
seriously distort the estimates of potential additionality effects.  
2. Public R&D funding in Flanders 
IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through Science and 
Technology in Flanders, is a government institution, established in 1991 by the 
Flemish government, to support technological innovation projects in Flanders. It is 
an important player in the redistribution of Flemish funds for R&D and innovation. 
IWT grants financial support to companies and research institutions and other 
services in the area of technology transfer, partner search, preparation of projects in 
European programs, etc. IWT fosters close collaboration between all innovative 
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IWT acts as the single counter in Flanders where companies can submit a 
dossier and apply for a subsidy. This implies that all corporate subsidies, at the 
Flemish and Belgian level, as well as certain EU-funded projects
7 are evaluated and 
granted through IWT. The funding is project-based. Once the decision is made that 
a project will be funded, the percentage of the grant is fixed according to the 
schedule in Figure 1. First, the qualification for basic, prototype or mixed research 
funding is evaluated. Next, the project is evaluated on its eligibility for additional 
funding through the SME (Small and Medium Sized Company) or EUREKA 
(European) program and other possible specific actions. Next to this funding 
procedure especially SMEs can apply for a so-called ‘subordinated loan’ as 
additional financing resource when the grant application is approved
8. The total 
funding (subordinated loan and subsidy) amounts to a minimum of 15% and a 
maximum of 80% of the total project costs and the yearly total amount of public 
funding is limited to 8 million EUR. These costs are based on the personnel costs. 
Other additional costs are a percentage of the personnel costs. 
Figure 1: The subsidy procedure in Flanders 
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The so-called ICAROS database contains data on all projects that have been 
submitted to obtain a grant from IWT for an innovative company project since 
1992, when IWT became active. In the following paragraphs the main 
                                                             
7 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
engaging in these programs is very limited. 
8 Since the launch of VINNOF, the Flemish Innovation Fund, in 2006, subordinated loans are no longer provided by IWT. The 
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characteristics of public R&D funding in Flanders are presented
9, based on the 
ICAROS data.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of project applications over time. 
Approved and rejected projects are disentangled. The general trend is that the 
number of project applications is rising; the number of project approvals and 
rejections follow this trend. On average, the project duration is about 20 months.  




























Source: Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006a
 
Overall, the total amount of subsidies granted by IWT (see Figure 3) is rising. 
At the start of IWT in 1992, the number of approved projects was 35; 28 companies 
received a total of 13 million EUR and together with the subordinated loan the 
amount was 14 million EUR. In 2004 IWT approved 425 projects and supported 
335 companies with 76 (78 including loans) million EUR. The total funding budget 
is rising, but this is largely due to the increase in applications: the average funding 
per project and per company has remained the same or has even decreased a little. 
In 2004, the average subsidy per project amounted to about 0.18 million EUR. 
In an international context, this amount varies significantly. The average subsidy 
per project was 0.089 million EUR in Germany in 2004 (BMBF Ministry only) 
(OECD, 2006), 0.6 million EUR in France in 1997 (Duguet, 2004) and 0.14 million 
                                                             
9 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006a) for a more elaborate overview of public R&D funding in 
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EUR in Finland in 2008 (TEKES, 2008).The main explanation for this divergence is 
the size of the receiving company as well as the sector affiliation. Moreover, the 
Science and Technology policy significantly differs between countries: different 
measures apply, work directly or indirectly, and fall under the responsibility of 
different agencies. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to make estimations on the 
average R&D grant companies receive from public institutions. This implies 
considerable caution in international comparisons. 
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Source: Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006a
 
Both SMEs and large enterprises qualify for IWT funding. Large enterprises 
absorb the lion’s share of the total public R&D budget allocated to the private 
sector, but the total number of projects submitted by SMEs is larger. Over the years, 
the proportion of SME funding has increased, relative to the share of the large 
enterprises, partially due to the lowering of barriers for SMEs to apply for subsidies. 
Moreover, a special SME program has been launched. As mentioned, also 
EUREKA projects are granted through IWT. After the project has been approved, 
the necessary eligibility criteria for EUREKA funding are evaluated. Only a small 
proportion of all Flemish innovation projects is funded through EUREKA. For 
example, in 2004, 34 out of 425 projects received EUREKA funding in addition to 
the basic grant.  Essays on the economics of evaluation  32
In the submitted projects proposals, IWT distinguishes between technology 
domains: basic technologies, materials and chemistry, micro-electronics and 
systems, information technology and software, biotechnology and nourishment, 
energy and environment, use-diffusion-support and finally human sciences. In terms 
of the number of projects, basic technologies as well as materials and chemistry are 
important fields. On the other hand, the average funding amount is relatively highest 
in use-diffusion-support, micro-electronics and systems as well as in biotechnology 
and nourishment.  
In addition to direct R&D support, mainly provided by the Flemish 
government, the Belgian government provides some fiscal measures. Until recently 
very few Belgian companies actually made use of these fiscal measures (Van 
Pottelsberghe et al., 2003). Main reasons are a low level of acquaintance with the 
system, complexity and high administration costs
10 and the fact that the measures 
are not significantly substantial
11. However, after recent changes in the set-up of the 
measures, they are becoming increasingly popular, especially tax reduction 
measures for R&D employees. For this dissertation, these fiscal measures were not 
yet relevant; they will become so, however, in the future. 
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Chapter 3. Two for the price of one? Additionality effects of R&D 
subsidies: A comparison between Flanders and Germany 
 
Joint work




Especially against the background of the knowledge economy, innovation 
nowadays is deemed to be the main driving force of a country’s competitive 
strength (see e.g. Griliches, 1986). The European Union aspires to become the most 
competitive economy in the world and proclaims innovation as one of the key 
pillars in its policy to achieve this (Commission of the European Communities, 
2000). In the 2000 Lisbon Strategy an ambitious plan was initiated to leverage the 
EU R&D expenditure to 3% of the GDP by 2010; of which 2% should be privately 
financed. However, an intermediate evaluation revealed that instead of rising, the 
EU R&D expenditure is currently even declining. Recent statistics show that the 
EU25 spent 1.77% of its GDP on R&D activities in 2005. In the US the R&D 
expenditure amounted to 2.62% of the GDP and in Japan this number rose to 3.33% 
(OECD, 2007). Therefore, the European Commission recently launched an 
integrated innovation/research action plan, which calls for a major upgrade of the 
research and innovation conditions in Europe. Mobilizing EU funds and instruments 
to support research and innovation is one of the objectives formulated in this plan.  
Government intervention in the domain of private R&D activities is justified 
by the argument of market imperfection and is since long time common practice in 
most industrialized countries. R&D entails the non-excludability characteristic of a 
public good (see e.g. Samuelson, 1954). Arrow (1962: 615) states that “No amount 
of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something as 
intangible as information. The very use of the information in any productive way is 
bound to reveal it, at least in part. Mobility of personnel among firms provides a 
                                                             
12 In a shorter version, this chapter has been published in Research Policy: Aerts, K. and Schmidt, T., 2008. Two for the price 
of one? Additionality effects of R&D subsidies: A comparison between Flanders and Germany, Research Policy 37(5), 806–
822. 
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way of spreading information. Legally imposed property rights can provide only a 
partial barrier, since there are obviously enormous difficulties in defining in any 
sharp way an item of information and differentiating it from similar sounding 
items.”  
Private investments in R&D can never be fully appropriated because other 
companies have the opportunity to free ride. This leads to underinvestment in R&D 
activities: the level of R&D expenditure will be below the socially desirable 
optimum. Public funding reduces the price of socially valuable R&D projects for 
private investors to a level at which it becomes profitable for companies to invest.  
The big challenge for governments obviously is to allocate public funding 
only to those projects that are socially beneficial and would not be carried out in the 
absence of a subsidy. This is however not straightforward as companies always 
have an incentive to apply for public funding. It could be the case that a subsidy 
merely replaces, i.e. crowds out, private money and does not generate additional 
R&D investments. The key question in this evaluation problem is: “How much 
would a firm that has received a subsidy, have spent on R&D if it would not have 
been subsidized?”. Several methods are developed to tackle this question. Examples 
are the so-called matching estimator and the conditional difference-in-differences 
method.  
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the relationship between public 
R&D funding and private R&D efforts in Flanders and Germany. In a survey of the 
literature on additionality effects of R&D subsidies, David and Hall (2000) 
conclude that the results of evaluation studies in this field are inconclusive as some 
report crowding-out effects while others reject them. They attribute this to the fact 
that researchers use very different databases and econometric methods resulting 
from differences in information availability in different countries. Therefore it is 
useful to compare the impact of funding in different countries using similar methods 
and datasets. 
After this brief introduction the reader is guided through the relevant 
literature. The selection bias and the methodology that we employ to circumvent 
this problem are explained in the subsequent section. The fourth section entails the 
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which will be used. In the fifth section the empirical evidence is presented. The last 
section contains some concluding remarks. 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper is situated in the domain of input additionality and addresses the 
issue of crowding-out effects of subsidized R&D. David and Hall (2000) conclude 
in their review of evaluation studies on innovation input that the results on potential 
crowding-out effects are ambiguous, and they criticize that most existing studies 
neglect the problem of sample selection bias. That is, R&D intensive firms may 
well be more likely to apply for a subsidy. Moreover, the government may just as 
well be more inclined to grant them a subsidy. This makes R&D funding an 
endogenous variable, which should be tackled in an adequate way. We will 
extensively come back to this problem in the next section. Consequently, in more 
recent research the potential sample selection bias is taken into account through 
selection models, instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous 
equation systems), difference-in-differences estimations and matching techniques. 
Although recent studies correcting for a potential selection bias tend to reject 
full crowding-out effects, the results remain ambiguous: Ali-Yrkkö (2004), Aerts 
and Czarnitzki (2004 and 2006a), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Clausen (2007), 
Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), Duguet 
(2004), Ebersberger (2005), Fier (2002), González and Pazó (2006), González et al. 
(2005), Görg and Strobl (2007), Hussinger (2008), Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), 
Lööf and Heshmati (2005) and Streicher et al. (2004) reject full crowding-out 
effects, while Busom (2000), Heijs and Herrera (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lach (2002), 
Suetens (2002) and Wallsten (2000) find indications that public R&D funding 
replaces private R&D investments to some extent. Key reasons for these diverging 
conclusions are the use of different estimators, as well as the application for a broad 
range of countries, each with their own specific S&T policy. So far, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the US have been subject to an R&D input evaluation analysis of their 
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All studies on German data reject the full crowding-out hypothesis. Different 
subsets are analyzed: the service sector (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002), the 
manufacturing sector (Fier, 2002; Hussinger, 2008) or more specifically East-
German manufacturing firms (Czarnitzki, 2001; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; 
Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006), using nearest neighbour matching approaches (Almus 
and Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki, 2001; Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Czarnitzki and 
Licht, 2006; Fier, 2002) as well as parametric and semi-parametric two-step 
selection models (Hussinger, 2008).  
The results for Flanders are less clear. Suetens (2002) applies an IV 
framework on a panel of Flemish firms, but the results are by and large not 
significant and full crowding-out cannot be rejected. Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) 
address the additionality issue with the nearest neighbour matching technique on a 
cross-section of Flemish manufacturing and selected service companies and extend 
their research in an IV framework adding information on the amount of subsidy 
(Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2006a). They find evidence that both full and partial 
crowding-out effects can be rejected.  
The work of Görg and Strobl (2007) is of particular relevance for our 
research. They employ the conditional difference-in-differences technique using a 
rich panel data set of Irish manufacturing plants. They allow for a certain degree of 
heterogeneous treatment effects, distinguishing between small, medium and large 
grants and add the dimension of foreign ownership, given the importance of foreign 
multinational companies in Ireland. They reject crowding-out of small/medium 
grants and find additionality effects of small grants. However, they cannot reject 
crowding-out for foreign plants. 
We now briefly review the remaining relevant literature. Streicher et al. 
(2004) conduct fixed effects panel regressions and conclude that the private R&D 
expenditure increases due to subsidies in their set of Austrian companies. Kaiser 
(2004) employs a simultaneous probit model and Kernel matching for Denmark and 
does not find significant proof to reject the crowding-out hypothesis. Ali-Yrkkö 
(2004) employs simultaneous equation models and finds no evidence to support 
crowding-out effects in his sample of Finnish firms. Also Ebersberger (2005) 
investigates the effectiveness of Finnish R&D subsidies. From his matching 
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(2004). Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) explore the relationship between R&D 
expenditure and R&D subsidies in Finland with a series of tobit estimates and 
conclude that the overall effects are positive, but that R&D subsidies are 
disproportionately to the benefit of companies in industries which are highly 
dependent on external finance. Duguet (2004) positively evaluates the French R&D 
subsidy system in a matching framework, with a large panel of manufacturing and 
service firms. Lach (2002) applies different estimators, such as difference-in-
differences and dynamic panel data models and finds large additionality effects in 
small Israeli manufacturing firms, but none for large firms. Clausen (2007) employs 
an IV approach on a sample of Norwegian manufacturing and service firms and 
distinguishes between the impact of research versus development funding. He finds 
that research subsidies have a significant additionality effect on research 
expenditure, but that development subsidies are subject to crowding-out effects. 
Busom (2000), González et al. (2005), González and Pazó (2006) as well as Heijs 
and Herrera (2004) analyze Spain. Busom (2000) applies an econometric selection 
model on a cross-sectional sample of manufacturing firms and concludes that public 
funding induces more effort for the majority of firms in her sample, but for 30% of 
the participants, complete crowding-out effects cannot be ruled out. Heijs and 
Herrera (2004) also analyze a cross-section of manufacturing firms and although 
they find positive treatment effects, the overall additionality effect is small when the 
amount of subsidy is taken into account. González et al. (2005) and González and 
Pazó (2006) investigate subsidies in an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms, 
employing nearest neighbour matching and a simultaneous equation model with 
thresholds. Their analysis rejects full crowding-out effects but does not confirm that 
public R&D subsidies stimulate private R&D expenditure. Lööf and Heshmati 
(2005) evaluate the Swedish subsidy policy with nearest neighbour and Kernel 
matching and reject crowding-out effects. Wallsten (2000) uses a simultaneous 
equations model and finds that US SBIR grants crowd out private investment dollar 
for dollar. However, he points out that the program still could have positive effects 
as the recipient firms might have been able to keep their innovation activities 
constant while in the absence of a subsidy they might have had to reduce them.  Essays on the economics of evaluation  40
3. Methodology  
As the literature overview shows, a range of econometric methods is available 
to correct for the selection bias. In the following subsections we first expound on 
this endogeneity problem and then we elaborate on the methods employed here, i.e. 
the matching estimator and the ordinary and conditional difference-in-differences 
method. 
3.1. Selection bias 
We empirically evaluate the effect of public R&D funding. The average 
impact of a subsidy can be computed as follows:  
 , S Y E S Y E
C T
TT ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − = = α  (15) 
where Y is the outcome variable (e.g. R&D expenditure) of the firm
14 in the so-
called treated (T) and counterfactual (C) situation, S is the treatment status (S=1: 
treated; S=0: untreated – treatment is the receipt of a subsidy in our case). So  TT α , 
the average impact of the treatment on the treated firms, results from comparing the 
actual outcome of subsidized firms with their potential outcome in case of not 
receiving a grant. The approach of measuring potential outcomes goes back to Roy 
(1951). The actual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
T  can be estimated by the sample mean of 
the outcome in the group of subsidized firms.  
The counterfactual situation  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  can however never be observed and 
has to be estimated. In a hastily analysis a researcher could compare the average 
R&D spending of subsidized and non-subsidized companies to compute the 
treatment effect on the treated, assuming that:  
.   S Y E S Y E
C C ) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = =  (16) 
However, subsidized companies may well have been more R&D active than 
non-subsidized companies even without the subsidy program, which would imply a 
selection bias in the estimation of the treatment effect. Firms that already are 
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innovative and very R&D active may be more likely to receive an R&D subsidy, as 
governments want to maximize the probability of success and therefore may well 
cherry-pick proposals of companies with considerable R&D expertise. Moreover, it 
is also quite possible that only particular companies apply for public R&D grants 
because they have an information advantage and are acquainted with policy 
measures they qualify for. Expression (16) only holds in an experimental setting 
where there would be no selection bias and subsidies are granted randomly to firms. 
This is most likely not to be the case in current innovation policy practice.  
As the highest expected success is correlated with current R&D spending, the 
subsidy receipt (treatment) becomes an endogenous variable. To estimate treatment 
effects while taking this potential endogeneity problem into account, econometric 
literature has developed a range of methods (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 
1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, 2002). Examples of these methods are 
selection models, instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous 
equation systems), difference-in-differences estimations and matching. For the 
application of IV estimators and selection models, valid instruments for the 
treatment variables are needed. In the case of R&D additionality analysis it is very 
difficult to find valid instruments, as these should determine the treatment (subsidy 
receipt) but not the outcome (R&D activities). The difference-in-differences method 
requires panel data with observations before and after (or during) the treatment. The 
matching estimator offers the advantage over IV and selection models that no 
assumptions have to be made, neither on the functional form of the outcome 
equation nor on the distribution of the error terms of the selection and outcome 
equation. The disadvantage is that it only allows controlling for observed 
heterogeneity among treated and untreated firms. To counter this problem and 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, the conditional difference-in-differences 
method was developed, which combines the ordinary difference-in-differences 
estimation with matching. In the following subsection we will expound the 
matching estimator, the difference-in-differences estimator and the combination of 
these two
15.  
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3.2. Matching estimator 
The matching estimator is a non-parametric method and its main advantage is 
that no particular functional form of equations has to be specified. The 
disadvantages are strong assumptions and heavy data requirements. The main 
purpose of the matching estimator is to re-establish the conditions of an experiment. 
The matching estimator attempts to construct a correct sample counterpart for the 
treated firms' outcomes if they had not been treated, by pairing each treated firm 
with members of a comparison group. Under the matching assumption, the only 
remaining difference between the two groups is the actual subsidy receipt. The 
difference in outcome variables can then be attributed to the subsidy. 
Rubin (1977) proved that the receipt of subsidies and the potential outcome 
are independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics X=x: 
x X S Y Y
C T = ⊥ , . (17) 
This crucial conditional independence assumption (CIA) helps to overcome 
the problem that the counterfactual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  is unobservable. If the 
CIA holds, the expected outcome  ) , 0 ( x X S Y E
C = =  can be used as a measure of 
the potential outcome of the subsidy recipients. However, the CIA is only fulfilled if 
all variables X influencing the outcome Y and selection status S are known and 
available in the dataset. This imposes heavy requirements on the richness of the 
dataset. If the relevant variables are known and available and the CIA holds, the 
equation  
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C C = = = = = , 0 , 1  (18) 
is valid and the average outcome of subsidized firms in the absence of a subsidy can 
be calculated from a sample of comparable, i.e. matched, firms.  
Another feature the matching procedure relies on, is the compliance with the 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the 
potential outcome for each treated firm is stable: it should take one single value (and 
not follow a distribution) and the treatment of one firm should not affect the 
treatment effect on another firm (Rubin, 1990). Unfortunately this cannot be tested. Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    43
In the matching process, for all treated firms a valid counterpart should be 
found in the non-treated population and every firm should represent a potential 
subsidy recipient. Therefore, we impose a so-called common support restriction. If 
the samples of treated and non-treated firms would have no or only little overlap in 
the exogenous characteristics X, matching is not applicable to obtain consistent 
estimates. If the assumptions hold, the average treatment effect on the treated would 
consequently amount to 
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C T M
TT = = − = = = , 0 , 1 α , (19) 
which can be estimated using the sample means of both groups.  
In the ideal case, the matching procedure includes as many matching 
arguments X as possible to find a perfect twin in the control group of non-treated 
firms for each treated firm. However, the more dimensions that are included, the 
more difficult it becomes to find a good match: the so-called curse of 
dimensionality enters. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that it is valid to 
reduce the number of matching dimensions X to a single index: the propensity 
score ) ( ˆ X P , which is the probability to receive a subsidy. Lechner (1998) suggested 
a hybrid matching, where the propensity score  ) ( ˆ X P and a subset of X condition the 
matching procedure. This increases the accurateness of the matching procedure, 
since the equivalence of these extra variables is explicitly imposed, in addition to 
their value in the propensity score. 
Having defined the neighbourhood of similar non-treated firms h for each 
treated firm i, the next issue is the choice of appropriate weights  ih w  for non-treated 
observations h within the neighbourhood, so that the impact on firm i, i.e.  TT i, α , can 











TT i Y w Y
1
, α . (20) 
Two commonly used procedures are Kernel-based matching and nearest 
neighbour. In the Kernel-based matching, a treated firm is matched to all non-
treated firms in the control group, but the controls are weighted according to the 
Mahalanobis distance between the treated firm and each non-treated firm. We will Essays on the economics of evaluation  44
employ nearest neighbour matching. This technique matches a treated firm i to the 
non-treated firm h in the control group that is closest in terms of the Mahalanobis 
distance between the respective propensity scores and possible other matching 
arguments. The nearest neighbour can be selected with or without replacement. To 
obtain the best possible match, a large pool of controls is required. Therefore, we 
employ matching with replacement and allow different treated firms to be matched 
to the same non-treated firm. This will cause a bias in the ordinary t-statistic on 
mean differences, which has to be corrected for (Lechner, 2001). The detailed 
matching protocol is depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Matching protocol (Nearest Neighbour matching) 
 
Step 1  Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the propensity scores  ( ) ˆ PX.  
Step 2  Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the 
maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. This step is also performed for other 
covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as matching arguments. 
Step 3  Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool. 
Step 4  Calculate the Mahalanobis distance MD between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the most 
similar control observation. 
  ) ( )' (
1
i h i h ih Z Z Z Z MD − Ω − =
−
 
  In the Flemish case, Z contains the estimated propensity score and the firm size (lnEMP) as additional arguments in 
the matching function. In the German case, also the dummy that indicates location in East Germany is an additional 
argument. Ω is the empirical covariance matrix of these arguments, based on the sample of potential controls. 
Step 5  Select the observation with the minimum distance from the remaining sample. Do not remove the selected control 
from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again. 
Step 6  Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized firms. 
Step 7  Using the matched comparison group, the average treatment effect on the treated can thus be calculated as the mean 
















ˆ 1 ˆ α  
with 
C
i Y ˆ being the counterfactual for firm i and n
T is the sample size (of treated firms). Note that the same 
observation may appear more than once in that group. 
Step 8  As we perform sampling with replacement to estimate the counterfactual situation, an ordinary t-statistic on mean 
differences is biased, because it does not take the appearance of repeated observations into account. Therefore, we 
have to correct the standard errors in order to draw conclusions on statistical inference. We follow Lechner (2001) 
and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors. 
3.3. Difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator 
In the difference-in-differences (DiD) model the estimation of the treatment 
effect is based on the idea that the counterfactual outcome of a subsidized firm i in 
period t1 can be approximated by the outcome of that treated firm in an earlier 
period t0 where it did not receive a subsidy. To control for macro-economic changes Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    45
over time DiD relates the development of subsidized firms i to a control group of 
non-subsidized firms h and compares them before (t0) and after (t1) the treatment 
moment:   
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⎛ = − = = α    (21) 
Figure 4 depicts the DiD methodology. Evolutions B and C are evaluated over 
time. The DiD technique allows controlling for both common macro-economic 
trends and constant individual-specific unobserved effects. Besides the outcome and 
treatment variables, additional covariates X enter equation (21) to account for the 
possibility that the treated and non-treated samples have systematically different 
characteristics in t0 and t1 (see Wooldridge, 2002). Neither functional form nor 
regressor is required for the outcome measure. However, a big disadvantage is that 
panel data are necessary, including observations before and after (or while) the 
treatment. As subsidies often target longer term research projects, and firms may 
receive multiple grants over time, it is difficult to construct a database that is suited 
for an appropriate application of DiD. Another shortcoming of DiD is that strategic 
behaviour of firms to enter the subsidy program would lead to biased estimates. 
Moreover, if the companies that do and do not receive subsidies react differently to 
macro-economic changes, the estimates are biased. 
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3.4. Conditional difference-in-differences estimator (CDiD) 
The CDiD estimator combines the advantages of matching and DiD and 
eliminates some of their respective disadvantages. DiD controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity between treated and non-treated companies and the matching 
technique controls for potentially different reactions to macro-economic changes in 
the treated and the non-treated group. Heckman et al. (1998) show that CDiD based 
on a non-parametric matching provides an effective tool in controlling for selection 
on both observables and unobservables.  
The control group used in the CDiD model is not general as in the ordinary 
DiD, but is a sample of non-treated firms h which is matched to the treated firms i in 
the period (t0) before receiving the treatment (in period t1). The effect of the 
treatment on the treated is estimated from the evolution of the two comparable 
groups over time. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggest employing CDiD
16 for 
Repeated Cross-sections (CDiDRCS) if panel data are not available. However, the 
estimation of the treatment effect may be inconsistent if repeated cross-sectional 
data are used in a situation where the composition of the groups of treated and non-
treated firms changes over time (due to some unknown and unobservable rule) and 
is affected by the treatment. In this case, the company-specific effect is no longer 
constant over time, causing a bias in the estimation. This bias adds to the potential 
residual problem of unobserved effects which is induced even when panel data are 
used (see Görg and Strobl, 2007). This imposes extra constraints on the data that 
can be employed. Nevertheless, Blundell and Costa Dias (2000: 437) indicate that 
“there is a clear trade-off between the available information and the restrictions 
needed to guarantee a reliable estimator”. As there were no significant changes in 
the S&T policy between the years under investigation and we have a relatively rich 
dataset at our disposal, we feel confident in applying the CDiDRCS methodology 
here. As we will point out later, additional robustness checks support our audacity.  
In the CDiDRCS three matching algorithms are required, as depicted in 
Figure 5. For every treated firm i in period t1, a non-treated twin firm h has to be 
found in the same period t1 (matching A). In the next step, a control group has to be 
compiled: for each treated firm i and each non-treated firm h in period t1 a twin 
                                                             
16 In Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), CDiD is referred to as MMDiD: method of matching with difference-in-differences. Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    47
firm, i.e. k and j respectively, has to be found in period t0 (matching algorithms B 
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4. The data  
Before we come to the data which is employed in the empirical part of this 
article, we first go into the details of the public funding system in Flanders and 
Germany and sketch the innovation landscape in which this policy is embedded.  
4.1. Public funding of R&D in Flanders and Germany 
Germany conducts its Science and Technology (S&T) policy at the national 
level while policy makers in Flanders, the largest region in Belgium, operate at the 
regional level. However, a comparison between Germany and Flanders seems to be 
a reasonable choice. First, the Belgian S&T policy is highly regionalized: the 
Flemish Science and Technology policy falls entirely under the responsibility of the 
Flemish government and the impact of public R&D funding should therefore also be 
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evaluated at the regional Flemish level. Moreover, the Flemish and German R&D 
policy do not differ substantially. In the following paragraphs we present the main 
characteristics of the German and Flemish innovation system and their respective 
Science and Technology policy.  
German innovation system and Science and Technology policy 
The European Union attaches high importance to innovative performance and 
extensive data collection is undertaken to assess this performance on a number of 
key indicators. Different dimensions are evaluated: innovation drivers, knowledge 
creation as well as innovation and entrepreneurship at the input side and application 
and intellectual property at the output side. A country level assessment is published 
yearly in the so-called European Innovation Scoreboard country reports. The 2007 
report (PRO INNO EUROPE, 2007a) reveals that Germany is among the top 
performers in the EU27 (see Figure 6). The high level of R&D expenditure, a strong 
innovation orientation and efficient production processes strengthen the country’s 
competitive position. Some main concerns, however, are the low quality of the 
innovation system, difficulties for start-ups and SMEs to find sufficient funding for 
innovation, decreasing propensity to perform R&D among small firms and the 
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Figure 6: Innovation scoreboard: Germany 
 
Source: PRO INNO EUROPE, 2007a.  
 
The German context in which science policy is set and research is produced, 
is complex due to both the diverse and fragmented research provider base, and the 
federal system, which results in a split in responsibility for the Science and 
Technology policy between the federal government and the states (Länder).  
The main actors in the public sector are presented below (all information as of 
2000; BMBF, 2000 and 2004).  
INPUT – Innovation drivers
Science and engineering graduates (per 1000 population aged 20-29): 9% 
Population with tertiary education (per 100 population aged 25-64): 24.6% 
Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per 100 population): 10.2 
Participation in life-long learning (per 100 population aged 25-64): 8.2% 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education): 71%
 
INPUT – Knowledge creation
Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP): 0.76%
Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP): 1.76%
Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D (% of manufacturing R&D expenditure): 92.3% 
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation: 9.2%
INPUT – Innovation & entrepreneurship   
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs): 43.4%
Innovative SMEs co-operating with others (% of all SMEs): 8.6%
Innovative expenditures (% of total turnover): 2.93%
Early-stage venture capital (% of GDP): 0.015%
 ICT expenditures (% of GDP): 6.2%
SMEs using non-technological change (% of all SMEs): 53.2%
OUTPUT – Application
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce): 3.36%
Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports: 15.4% 
Sales of new-to-market products (% of total turnover): 7.5%
Sales of new-to-firm not new-to-market products (% of total turnover): 10% 
 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce): 10.43% 
OUTPUT – Intellectual property
EPO patents per million population: 311.7
USPTO patents per million population: 123
Triadic patent families per million population: 85.2
New community trademarks per million population: 140.5
New community designs per million population: 186.5
low  Performance (relative to EU):  average medium-high highEssays on the economics of evaluation  50
•  Universities and “Fachhochschulen” (polytechnic colleges, or sometimes 
referred to as “Universities of Applied Sciences”): Germany hosts 344 
institutions of higher education; among those, 75 are private. 
•  Max-Planck Society: The MPG (Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der 
Wissenschaften) comprises 74 research institutes covering several research 
fields. The research undertaken in this institution is mostly viewed as basic 
research complementary to university research. Researchers employed at 
MPG have a high degree of scientific and organizational autonomy. The MPG 
is funded 50% by the Federal Government, and 50% by the Länder. 
•  Fraunhofer Society: The FhG (Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft) maintains 48 
research institutes with a budget over 500 million EUR. Their mission is a) 
contract research for the business sector including collaborative research, b) 
contract research for the Federal Government and the Länder in order to foster 
key technologies and innovation in fields of public interest, and c) defence 
research on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Defence research is funded 
100% by the Federal Government, and the rest is financed as follows: 64% 
own returns from contract research, 36% success-independent basic 
institutional funding, where 90% is funded by the Federal Government and 
10% by the Länder. The research carried out at FhG clearly has an applied 
focus. 
•  Helmholtz Society (also referred to as “Großforschungseinrichtungen” = Big 
Science): The HGF (Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren) 
comprises 16 large research institutions that cover basic research and the 
investigation of key technologies. In 1998, the total budget was more than 2 
billion EUR, and the HGF employed more than 21 thousand researchers. 
About one fourth of the employees is funded through contract research. 
Institutional funding is shared by the Federal Government (90%) and the 
Länder (10%).  
•  Blue List (also referred to as the name of the umbrella organization, the 
“Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz” = WGL): The WGL 
consists of 84 research institutions. The financing is shared by the Federal 
Government and the Länder (50%:50%). The WGL has more than 11 Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    51
thousand employees in total, and a budget of more than 600 million EUR. The 
research fields covered are humanities, economics and social sciences, life 
sciences, mathematics, natural sciences and engineering, environmental 
sciences, and others. 
•  Other institutions:  
a) Federal institutions with research tasks: besides the main R&D-performing 
institutions, the federal government maintains a number of institution (or 
departments of ministries and similar entities) that are concerned with R&D 
tasks. In total those are more than 50 entities. The share of R&D in those 
institutions varies considerably: in some, R&D accounts only for 10% of the 
budget, but in others 100%. On average, the R&D expenses in total budgets 
amount to 43%. The total R&D budget is more than 600 million EUR, and is 
financed by the federal government.   
b) “Central information institutions” and scientific libraries: these institutions’ 
mission is the collection and dissemination of literature and other information, 
development and supply of databases, and related tasks. In 2000, there were 
29 such entities.  
c) Other institutions with research tasks. 
 
The German public R&D funding largely relies on direct funding of R&D 
projects of firms and on institutional funding of more basic research. Fiscal 
measures, like R&D tax credits, do not exist. There is no single, central body that 
determines research and funding policies. The responsibility for education, 
including higher education and research, lies solely with the Länder. They provide 
basic funding and institutional support for universities as well as a number of 
independent research institutes. The federal government (jointly with the Länder) 
provides R&D funding to companies as well as institutional funding for major 
players aside of universities in the innovation system, such as the Max-Planck 
Gesellschaft, the Helmholtz Association, and the Blue List. The most important 
federal agencies concerned with research funding are the Ministry for Education and 
Research (BMBF) and the Ministry for Economics and labour (BMWA). In 
addition, the Ministry for Defence (BMVg) also funds research.  Essays on the economics of evaluation  52
Public R&D funding of private R&D activity is project-based, acts on a cost-
sharing basis and depends on the technology field. Different agencies, at the 
national and at the Länder level, provide funding through different programs, each 
with specific eligibility criteria and application procedures. German companies 
obviously also qualify for European R&D funding. 
Flemish innovation system and Science and Technology policy 
The Flemish innovation system is embedded in the Belgian context. The 
country level assessment in the European Innovation Scoreboard country reports 
reveals that Belgium performs among the TOP10 in the EU27. However, it is also 
clear that the country lags behind in several indicators, which expose Belgium’s 
weak competence in capitalizing the full benefits of above average levels of R&D 
and innovation expenditure in terms of innovative output. The main strength of the 
Belgian innovation system lies in its strong relative performance on human 
resources in innovation. However, there is a skill mismatch to some extent, and also 
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Figure 7: Innovation scoreboard: Belgium 
 
Source: PRO INNO EUROPE, 2007b.  
 
The Belgian innovation system is highly regionalized. The main actors in the 
Flemish innovation system took up an engagement in the so-called Innovation Pact, 
which translates the Barcelona targets into the Flemish context. The Flemish 
Science Policy Council selected 11 key indicators to assess Flanders’ innovative 
performance and the progress towards the targets which were stipulated. These 
indicators are presented in Table 2, including figures for Flanders and Belgium.  
 
INPUT – Innovation drivers
Science and engineering graduates (per 1000 population aged 20-29): 11.2% 
Population with tertiary education (per 100 population aged 25-64): 30.4% 
Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per 100 population): 14.0 
Participation in life-long learning (per 100 population aged 25-64): 9.5% 
Youth education attainment level (% of population aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education): 80.3%
 
INPUT – Knowledge creation
Public R&D expenditures (% of GDP): 0.57%
Business R&D expenditures (% of GDP): 1.29%
Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D (% of manufacturing R&D expenditures): 79.5% 
Share of enterprises receiving public funding for innovation: 11.7%
 
INPUT – Innovation & entrepreneurship
SMEs innovating in-house (% of all SMEs): 38.3%
Innovative SMEs co-operating with others (% of all SMEs): 16.6%
 
Innovative expenditures (% of total turnover): 1.96%
Early-stage venture capital (% of GDP): 0.019%
ICT expenditures (% of GDP): 6.3%
SMEs using non-technological change (% of all SMEs): 38.1%
OUTPUT – Application
Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce): 3.73%
Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports: 7.1%
Sales of new-to-market products (% of total turnover): 4.8%
 
Sales of new-to-firm not new-to-market products (% of total turnover): 8.2% 
 
 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (% of total workforce): 6.51% 
 
OUTPUT – Intellectual property
EPO patents (per million population): 144.5
USPTO patents (per million population): 52.4
Triadic patent families (per million population): 32.0
New community trademarks (per million population): 92.2  
New community designs (per million population): 124.6  
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Table 2: Key indicators: Flanders and Belgium 
Source: Debackere and Veugelers, 2007 
 
The main actors in the Flemish innovation system are (Debackere and 
Veugelers, 2007):  
•  Universities: Flanders has six universities: K.U.Brussel, K.U.Leuven, 
UHasselt, U. Antwerpen, UGent and V.U.Brussel; they are the main 
conductors of fundamental research. 
•  Flemish research institutions: 4 large research centres (Interuniversitair 
Micro-elektronica Centrum (IMEC), Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch 
Onderzoek (VITO), Vlaams Instituut voor Biotechnologie (VIB), Instituut 
voor Breedbandtechnologie (IBBT)) and a number of smaller institutions; 
these centres conduct research in strategic domains and complement the 
research conducted in the universities. 
•  The collective centres: 11 centres, founded by Belgian business federations, 
with a priority to conduct applied research which is relevant for the companies 
in their sector. 
•  The Business sector: Flemish companies conduct about 70% of the Flemish 
R&D activity, which makes them a vital component in the innovation system. 
   Flanders  Belgium  year 
I. GERD (in % GDP)  2.09  1.82  2005 
II. GBOARD (in % GDP)  0.71  0.57  2005 
III. Total R&D personnel (in % of the workforce)  1.25  1.18  2005 
IV. Science and engineering graduates (per 1000 population aged 20-29)  11.80  11.20  2004 
V. Total number of innovating companies (in % of the total number):      2005 
 all  0.59  0.51   
 industry  0.64  0.58   
 services  0.54  0.45   
 SMEs  0.57  0.50   
 large  companies  0.88  0.83   
VI. Early-stage venture capital (in % of GDP)    0.04  2005 
VII. EPO patents (per million population) 169.20  144.50  2003 
VIII. Sales of new products (in % of total turnover)  0.24  0.07   
IX. Employment (in % of the workforce):       
  in medium high-tech and high-tech industries  0.08  0.07  2006 
  in high-tech services  0.04  0.04  2006 
X. Regional domestic product growth (in current prices; reference year 1997)  1.42    2006 
XI. Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports    7.10  2004 Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    55
•  The Hogescholen (polytechnic colleges): they are stimulated to combine 
their first priority, i.e. education, with applied research. 
•  Redistribution mechanisms: IWT-Vlaanderen manages Flanders’ 
technology policy and, more specifically, also the public funding of research 
with economic affinity; FWO-Vlaanderen distributes the resources for 
fundamental research in universities; Hercules finances medium-heavy and 
heavy research infrastructure and finally, the Bijzonder Onderzoeksfonds 
(BOF) provides further funding for academic scientific research. 
•  The Flemish Department of Economy, Science and Innovation: the 
department of the Flemish government with the main authority in conducting 
the Flemish Science and Technology policy. 
•  The Flemish Science Policy Council: formulates recommendations to the 
Flemish government and the Flemish Parliament, in the area of Science and 
Technology policy. 
•  Advisory Bodies: a.o. the Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor 
Wetenschappen en Kunsten, Flanders Social and Economic Council (SERV) 
and the Stichting Technology Vlaanderen (STV). 
•  Steunpunten Beleidsrelevant Onderzoek: these 14 Steunpunten provide 
stability in policy supporting research and support the development of 
knowledge indicators around key policy topics. 
•  Specific actions to foster technology transfer and diffusion.  
 
In Flanders, IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through 
Science and Technology in Flanders, is the single counter where companies can 
apply for a subsidy. This implies that corporate R&D subsidies, at the Flemish and 
Belgian level, as well as certain EU-funded projects
17 are evaluated and granted 
through IWT. Accelerated depreciation for R&D capital assets and R&D tax 
allowances are available through the federal Belgian government. In contrast to 
most countries, the Belgian R&D tax allowances are fixed and not granted as a 
                                                             
17 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
engaging in these programs is very limited. 
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percentage: for each additional employee employed in scientific research, the 
company is granted a tax exemption for a fixed amount, in the year of recruitment. 
However, as Van Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) indicate, very few Belgian companies 
actually make use of these fiscal measures
18. Main reasons are a low level of 
acquaintance with the system, complexity and high administration costs
19 and the 
fact that the measures are not significantly substantial
20. Direct R&D funding 
through IWT remains the largest source of public R&D grants in the private sector 
in Flanders
21. 
Public R&D funding in Germany and Flanders 
Table 3 presents some numbers on the public budgets for R&D in Germany 
and Flanders. First, it is obvious that there is a significant difference in size. The 
German GBAORD (Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays for R&D) 
amounts to almost a 15-fold of the Flemish GBAORD. A similar scale difference 
can be found in the GERD (Gross Expenditure for R&D) and BERD (Business 
Expenditure for R&D). When the R&D budgets are normalized by the GDP, the 
statistics reveal that in terms of R&D expenditure Germany is still far from the 
Barcelona Target of 3%, but Flanders is even further away. In terms of public 
funding of the R&D expenditure (which should be about one third according to the 
Barcelona Target), Germany stood at 28% and Flanders at 25% in 2005. When we 
also take the indicator reflecting the share of the BERD financed by the government 
into account, it becomes apparent that the Flemish government has a higher share, 
which has grown slightly over the years (to about 6.5% in 2006), while on the other 
hand, this share has been reduced over time in Germany (to a level of 4.5% in 
2005). Although there is no information enabling a direct comparison of the amount 
of public funding in the private sector between the two countries, Table 3 seems to 
indicate that Flemish firms receive a larger share of direct public R&D funding. 
This is also confirmed in the dataset we will use to assess the impact of public 
                                                             
18 Due to recent changes in the Science and Technology Policy, this situation has changed, though. In the current system, 
fiscal measures, and more specifically tax credits for R&D personnel, are becoming increasingly popular. However, this is not 
relevant in the current chapter, as our data was collected before the change. 
19 First, each year the company has to deliver a certificate. Second, the researcher should be full time employed in the research 
department of the same company to qualify. Third, the tax allowance is nominative, inducing a burden to keep track of all 
employees who benefited from the measure in the past. 
20 First, the amount of the exemption is not sufficiently significant. Second, the definition of highly qualified personnel is too 
strict, so that only very few employees qualify for the measure. Third, the tax exemption is a short term measure (it only 
relates to the first year of recruitment) while R&D typically is a long term process. 
21 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006a) for a detailed overview of the public R&D funding system 
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funding in both countries: in Flanders, about 20% of the firms indicated to have 
received R&D grants, while in Germany this number is somewhat lower, i.e. 14%. 
Table 3: Public R&D budgets in Germany and Flanders 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Germany                  
  GBAORD (in mio EUR)  16461  16009  16017  16322  16253  16460  16737  17101  16943  17221  17810 
  GERD (in mio EUR)  41168  42859  44649  48191  50619  52002  53364  54539  54967  55739  58231 
  GERD  (in  %  GDP)  2.19 2.24 2.27 2.40 2.45 2.46  2.49  2.52  2.49  2.48  2.51 
  GERD financed by the 
government (in % GERD)  38.1 35.9 34.8 32.1 31.4 31.4  31.6  31.2  30.5  28.4  .. 
  BERD  (in  mio  EUR)  27211 28910 30334 33623 35600 36332  36950  38029  38363  38651  40531 
  BERD financed by the 
government (in % GERD)  10.5 9.2 8.5 7.0 6.9 6.7  6.2  6.1  5.9  4.5  .. 
Flanders                  
  GBAORD*  (in  mio  EUR)  636 700 747 801 831 865  947  1023  1070  1132  1219 
  GERD (in mio EUR)  1979  2190  2427  2602  2875  3234  3525  3317  3276  3347  3569 
  GERD (in % GDP)  1.83  1.92 1.99 2.11 2.24 2.38  2.17  2.09  2.03  2.09  .. 
 
GERD financed by the 
government (in % 
GERD)** 
23.0 22.2 23.8 23.5 22.9 22.0  23.2  23.6  24.4  24.7  .. 
  BERD  (in  mio  EUR)  1472 1614 1804 1897 2119 2426  2659  2412  2332  2313  2441 
 
BERD financed by the 
government (in % 
GERD)** 
5.1 5.1 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.9  5.4  5.4  6.0  6.2  6.5 
* R&D budget of the Government of Flanders + the Flemish share in the federal government R&D funds + the Flemish share in the funds for the EU 
research programmes (Framework Programmes). 
** As these time-series indicator was not available for Flanders, we used information for Belgium as the best available approximation. 
Source: OECD, 2007 and Debackere and Veugelers, 2007. 
 
So, despite the fact that the funding schemes are very similar in the two 
countries, the different scale of the economy and corresponding science policy 
budget may induce different impacts of R&D funding.  
4.2. Variables 
The potential crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies is addressed empirically 
with data from the Flemish and German
22 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). 
The CIS covers most EU countries using a largely harmonized questionnaire
23. 
First, a cross-sectional dataset, i.e. the CIS IV wave covering the years 2002 to 
2004, is used. In a second step, data from the CIS III wave, referring to the years 
1998 to 2000, is additionally plugged in into the analysis. Our sample covers the 
Flemish and German manufacturing sector and computer services, R&D services as 
                                                             
22 Note that the German Community Innovation Survey data are part of the Mannheim Innovation Panel, the annual German 
innovation survey. 
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well as business related services. In accordance with the OECD/Eurostat (1997) 
guidelines for the CIS survey, the sample is restricted to companies with ten or 
more employees. The total sample consists of 4566 (1665) German (Flemish) 
observations on 3903 (1471) companies: the overlap between the two waves is very 
limited: only 663 (194) German (Flemish) firms are observed twice. These 
innovation data are supplemented with patent application data of German and 
Flemish firms from the European Patent Office, covering all applications from 1978 
to 2004. 
The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable (FUN) indicating 
whether the firm, observed in the CIS IV (III)
24, received public R&D funding in 
the period 2002 to 2004 (1998 to 2000). On average 22% of the Flemish companies 
received public funding in the observation period. The Flemish government 
provided 68% of these firms with R&D funds; the national and European 
governments were to a lesser, but nevertheless significant extent, sources of public 
R&D funding of Flemish companies (40% and 19% respectively). In the period 
2002-2004 14% of German enterprises with innovative activities received public 
funding. 55% of these companies were funded by local or regional authorities. The 
national government financially supported 54% of these innovative companies and 
the EU government provided 29% of them with financial support for R&D 
activities.  
We did not distinguish between the different funding sources; the funding 
impact is an average effect over the different funding schemes. We would also like 
to stress that the restriction to a dummy variable (instead of using full information 
on the amount of the subsidy) imposes a limitation on the interpretation of the 
results. We can only analyze whether there is full crowding-out, i.e. the subsidy 
fully replaces private money. In this case the actual and counterfactual R&D 
spending of funded firms would be equal. Partial crowding-out would mean that the 
subsidy partially replaces private money: the funded companies spend more on 
R&D, but the additional amount of R&D spending is smaller than the amount of the 
subsidy. In the case of additionality, funded companies spend their budgeted R&D 
expenditure and all additional public money or even more (the subsidy might help 
                                                             
24 In the description of the variables, we always refer to two years, i.e. the year of the CIS-wave. For the ordinary matching 
approach, only the CIS IV is used. In the CDiDRCS approach, the CIS III wave adds a time dimension (two years earlier). 
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the company to bridge some threshold level and enable it to set up a larger R&D 
project than initially possible). Nor the hypotheses of partial crowding-out and 
additionality nor potentially heterogeneous size effects can be tested in the 
framework presented in this chapter. Moreover, the dummy variable implies a 
drawback on the comparability between the two countries: the effect of the subsidy 
may be heterogeneous in country size.  
As the subsidy dummy covers a three year period, we use, whenever possible, 
values of the covariates measured at the beginning of the reference period, 
2002(1998) in order to avoid endogeneity problems in the selection equation. 
We test the hypothesis of input additionality on two outcome variables. First, 
R&D expenditure
25 at the firm level in 2004(2000), RD, is evaluated. However, as 
the distribution of this indicator is very skewed in the economy, we also investigate 
the R&D intensity, RDint (R&D expenditure / turnover * 100). Also due to the 
skewness of RD and RDint, some extreme values might affect the mean of the 
distribution significantly, so that a few observations may determine the estimation 
results. Using the logarithmic transformation scales down the large values and 
reduces the problem with these skewed distributions. Therefore, the logs
26 of RD 
and RDint are additionally evaluated as outcome variables. All outcome variables 
refer to the year 2004(2000). 
We use several control variables in our analysis which may affect both the 
probability to receive subsidies as well as R&D expenditure, respectively. Including 
the number of employees at the beginning of the period allows controlling for size 
effects, which are empirically often found to explain innovativeness (see e.g. 
Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Moreover, both the Flemish and German S&T 
policy put high value on R&D activities performed by small and medium sized 
companies. Therefore, the size variable is also expected to influence the subsidy 
receipt. Again, the logarithmic transformation (lnEMP) is used to avoid potential 
estimation biases caused by skewness of the data. 
Another important variable in our analysis is the firms' patent stock (PATST). 
As we use data from two cross-sectional datasets which do not include time-series 
information, the patent stock enables us to control for previous (successful) R&D 
                                                             
25 In the CIS survey, R&D expenditure is defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 1993).  
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activities. Obviously, not all innovation efforts lead to patents, which Griliches 
(1990: 1669) formulated nicely as “not all inventions are patentable, not all 
inventions are patented”. Likewise, not all patented innovations result from R&D 
activities; the R&D process is only part of a company’s innovative activity, which 
includes, according to the Oslo Manual, the international handbook for conducting 
innovation surveys worldwide (OECD/Eurostat, 1997: 10), “all those scientific, 
technological, organisational, financial and commercial steps which actually, or 
are intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved 
products or processes”. Moreover, the propensity to patent may be heterogeneous 
among firms. However, as data on previous R&D expenditure are not available, the 
patent stock is the best approximation of past innovation activities we have at our 
disposal. We use all patent information in the EPO database and generate the stock 
of patents for each firm as the depreciated sum of all patents filed at the EPO from 
1978 until 2001(1997):   
t t t PATA PATST PATST + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ ,   (23) 
where PATST is the patent stock of a firm in period t and t-1, respectively, PATA 
are the number of patent applications filed at the EPO and δ  is a constant 
depreciation rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15 as common in the literature (see 
e.g. Jaffe, 1986; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). On the one hand, firms that exhibit 
previous successful innovation projects indicated by patents, are more likely to 
receive public R&D funding, because public authorities may follow the ‘picking-
the-winner’ principle in order to minimize the expected failure rates of the 
innovation projects, and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the society. On 
the other hand, the patent stock controls for the past average innovative engagement 
of the firms, because it is expected that firms that were highly innovative in the past 
will continue this strategy. The patents are counted only until 2001(1997), to ensure 
that the stock definitely refers to past innovation activities, in order to avoid a 
simultaneous equation bias in the regression analysis. The patent stock enters into 
the regression as patent stock per employee to reduce the potential multicollinearity 
with firm size. 
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a group (GROUP) 
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more likely to receive subsidies because they presumably have better access to 
information about governmental actions due to their network linkages. In contrast, if 
firms belong to a group with a foreign parent (FOREIGN), it may be the case that 
the group tends to rather file subsidy applications in its home country. 
The export quota (EXQU = exports / turnover) measures the degree of 
international competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be 
more innovative than others and, hence, would be more likely to apply for subsidies. 
In the German analysis we also include the variable EAST, indicating whether the 
firm is located in East Germany. There are strong indications that the innovation 
behaviour of East and West German firms may still be different (see e.g. Aschhoff 
et al., 2006; Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). Furthermore, special policy programs apply 
for East German firms, which is obviously important in the framework of 
additionality effects of R&D subsidies. Typically, companies in East Germany are 
younger and smaller. Again, we have to point out that the potential ‘mismatch’ 
between innovation and R&D activities induces that EXQU and EAST are an 
indication of a firm’s R&D activity.  
Finally, some industry dummies (BR) are included to allow for differences 
between different sectors in the economy. The relationship between size and R&D 
activities is often found to depend on industry characteristics. Acs and Audretsch 
(1987), amongst others, conclude that large firms are more innovative when they 
operate in capital-intensive and highly concentrated sectors, while smaller firms 
expose a higher degree of innovative activity in industries which are highly 
innovative and dependent on skilled labour. Moreover, some funding schemes are 
directly targeted at specific industries or groups of industries, like Biotech 
programs. Therefore, interaction terms between the industry dummies and lnEMP 
(BR_lnEMP) are included as well.  
All variables described until now, are available in both the German and 
Flemish dataset (except for the EAST variable which is obviously only included for 
the German data) to enable a certain degree of comparison of the results. However, 
as was stressed in the methodological part of this chapter, the matching procedure 
crucially relies on the fulfilment of the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA). Only in that case, the average outcome of subsidized firms in the absence of 
a subsidy can be estimated based on a sample of comparable, i.e. matched, firms. It Essays on the economics of evaluation  62
is arguable that relevant values are missing in the analysis. Therefore, we add some 
variables in additional robustness analyses, which are unfortunately not available or 
perfectly comparable for both datasets. Four Flemish and three German variables 
are generated separately, in addition to the comparable variables described above. 
PROJ_PAST5YR is a count variable, reflecting the total number of project 
proposals each Flemish company submitted in order to obtain an R&D subsidy in 
the preceding five years. It is obtained by merging the firm level CIS/patent 
information with the project level ICAROS database, in which IWT keeps track of 
all subsidy applications by Flemish companies. This is a very important control 
variable (unfortunately only available in the Flemish dataset) since it is very likely 
highly correlated with both the probability to receive a subsidy and the outcome 
variable. Companies which submitted many projects in the past are on the one hand 
more experienced in applying for a subsidy and therefore possibly more ‘eligible’ 
for a grant. On the other hand, they may be more innovative and therefore more 
likely to apply for a subsidy to support their extensive R&D activities. Next, 
variables reflecting the technological and financial quality of the company might be 
important. In the Flemish dataset, these characteristics are proxied by capital 
intensity (CAPint) as the value of fixed assets per employee and cash-flow 
(CASHF) (both in million EUR) respectively. Both variables are obtained from 
balance sheet records provided by the National Bank of Belgium (through the 
Belfirst database). CASHF is also divided by the number of employees to avoid 
multicollinearity with firm size. In the German dataset, information on factors 
hampering the innovative activity was used to construct measures of a company’s 
technological and financial profile. TECHCONSTR is a four-point-Likert-scale 
variable (0: not relevant to 3: very important) indicating whether a lack of 
technological information hindered the company in its innovative activities; 
FINCONSTR is a four-point-Likert-scale variable reflecting whether the firm faced 
financial difficulties in its innovative activities, both internally (innovation activities 
were too expensive) and externally (difficulties to find external financing of the 
innovative activities). Finally, we were able to construct a variable SCOMNACE 
for both datasets, signalling to which extent information from competitors is 
absorbed by the company. To avoid potential endogeneity with the outcome 
variables, this variable was rescaled on the three digit (NACE3) industry level. Chapter 3. Two for the price of one?    63
5. Estimates 
We test the additionality hypothesis with two techniques. First, we employ the 
matching estimator, as common in the literature on the evaluation of R&D 
subsidies. In the second step, we control for unobserved heterogeneity effects by 
using the CDiDRCS estimator. This is new in the domain of R&D additionality 
research. A third section provides additional robustness checks to validate our 
results. 
5.1. The matching estimator 
In this subsection the matching estimator is applied to the data of the CIS IV 
cross-section to estimate the additionality effect of subsidies that were granted to 
Flemish and German companies between 2002 and 2004. Table 4 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the samples, which consist of 2374 (883) German (Flemish) 
companies, of which 503 (171) received public funding. A comparison between the 
two countries reveals three important differences: German firms tend to be larger, 
foreign ownership is less prevalent in Germany and German firms export more. In 
absolute terms (RD), German firms spend a much larger budget on R&D activities. 
However, when the scale difference is eliminated in the indicators measuring the 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the Flemish and German sample 
Potential control group  Subsidized companies   
Non-subsidized companies 
    Variable 
Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev.   
 p-values of two-sided t-
test on mean equality 
Flemish sample 
lnEMP  4.198  1.630    3.645  1.273    p = 0.0000 
PATST  0.800  2.592    0.043  0.325    p = 0.0002 
GROUP  0.602  0.491    0.449  0.498    p = 0.0003 
FOREIGN  0.263  0.442    0.222  0.416    p = 0.2685 
EXQU 0.026  0.092    0.018  0.086    p = 0.2916 
) (X P
)
  0.336  0.241    0.159  0.120    p = 0.0000 
RD  2.002  4.972    0.228  1.166    p = 0.0000 
RDint  8.046  14.425    1.096  3.783    p = 0.0000 
lnRD  -1.200  3.513    -7.213  3.694    p = 0.0000 
lnRDint  0.175  2.762    -3.855  2.806    p = 0.0000 
Number of obs.:  171    712     
German sample  
lnEMP  4.443  1.679    4.206  1.468    p = 0.0041 
PATST  0.806  2.127    0.298  1.245    p = 0.0000 
GROUP  0.660  0.474    0.569  0.495    p = 0.0002 
FOREIGN  0.127  0.334    0.094  0.291    p = 0.0393 
EXQU 0.303  0.271    0.166  0.232    p = 0.0000 
EAST  0.491  0.500    0.280  0.449    p = 0.0000 
) (X P
)
  0.351  0.190    0.173  0.145    p = 0.0000 
RD  8.062  62.051    1.135  6.756    p = 0.0127 
RDint  7.227  6.710    1.217  3.445    p = 0.0000 
lnRD  -0.937  2.697    -4.521  3.054    p = 0.0000 
lnRDint  0.376  2.914    -4.278  3.694    p = 0.0000 
Number of obs.:  503    1871     
Note: the industry dummies BR and interaction terms BR_lnEMP are not reported here. 
 
The two-sided t-tests indicate significant differences between the subsidized 
companies and the potential control group of non-subsidized companies. Flemish 
and German subsidized firms are larger, have a larger patent stock and are more 
likely to belong to a group. The dummies for foreign ownership and the export 
quota do not differ significantly between the Flemish groups. German subsidized 
firms are more likely to be foreign and have a significantly higher export quota. As 
expected, also the dummy for companies located in East Germany differs between 
the two groups. The industry dummies BR and interaction terms BR_lnEMP (not 
presented in Table 4) are significantly different both in the Flemish and German 
sample. The outcome variables show that the subsidized companies are significantly 
more R&D active. However, we cannot simply assign this difference to the subsidy 
receipt, due to the potential selection bias, which we already described before. 
Therefore, we have to select a control group that has similar characteristics 
compared to the group of funded companies.  
This control group is selected in accordance with the matching procedure 
which was outlined in the methodological section of this chapter. The first step 
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results for the Flemish and German sample in Table 5 show that the most important 
variables are -as expected- size, the patent stock, the group and foreign dummy, the 
export quota and the East Germany dummy. Further tests show that the interaction 
terms BR_lnEMP are jointly significant (χ²(11) = 31.51 and p = 0.0009 for the 
German and χ²(11) = 36.50 and p = 0.0001 for the Flemish sample). As a result, 
these interaction terms are also included in the propensity score (this probit model is 
not presented in the chapter). In the second step, for each subsidized firm i a twin-
firm h is selected from the control group of non-subsidized companies with the 
hybrid nearest neighbour matching technique. In both the Flemish and German S&T 
policy, size is an important determinant of the probability to receive a subsidy (e.g. 
given the subsidy programs especially designed for small and medium sized 
enterprises). Therefore it is explicitly taken into account, next to its implicit value in 
the propensity score. As mentioned before, this increases the accurateness of the 
matching. For the matching in the German sample, the dummy indicating whether 
the company is located in East Germany is included as an additional explicit 
matching variable. Due to the common support
27 requirement 4 (4) German 
(Flemish) non-funded firms and 25 (20) funded observations had to be deleted from 
the sample (CIS III and IV together). The likelihood to receive public funding (the 
propensity score, obtained from the probit model), firm size and for the German 
sample also the East Germany dummy, are used as arguments in the matching 
procedure. Table 4 shows that the propensity score is significantly different too 








                                                             
27 As this matching procedure within the CIS IV is the starting point for the CDiDRCS in section   5.2 where matches to the 
CIS III are added for the treated and selected non-treated firms from this section   5.1, we impose the simultaneous common 
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Table 5: Probit estimates and marginal effects 
  -------------------------Flemish sample-------------------------    -----------------------German sample----------------------- 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects    Probit estimates  Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err.  dy/dx  Std. Err. 
lnEMP  0.168  ***  (0.046)   0.042 ***  (0.011)   0.048 *  (0.025)  0.012  *  (0.006) 
PATST  0.373  ***  (0.101)   0.092 ***  (0.025)   0.061 ***  (0.210)  0.015  ***  (0.005) 
GROUP°  0.089    (0.134)   0.022   (0.033)   0.106   (0.072)  0.027    (0.018) 
FOREIGN°  -0.300  **  (0.151)  -0.068 **  (0.031)  -0.130   (0.107)  -0.031    (0.024) 
EXQU -0.141    (0.623)    -0.035   (0.154)   1.091 ***  (0.150) 0.275  ***  (0.038) 
EAST°              0.787 ***  (0.070)  0.223  ***  (0.021) 
constant  -1.844  *** (0.187)          -1.954 *** (0.130)       
BR  χ²(11) = 26.66 
p = 0.0052           χ²(11) = 103.19 
p = 0.0000      
Log-Likelihood -379           -1019       
Pseudo R²   0.076            0.147       
Number of obs.:   866            2348       
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%).  
The marginal effects on subsidies are calculated at the sample means for continuous variables and for a discrete change of dummy variables 
(indicated by °) from 0 to 1. Their standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
The propensity score used in the matching algorithm takes the interaction terms between size and industry additionally into account. The 
coefficients change only marginally and are not reported in this chapter. 
 
When we only take the selected control group into account in the t-tests (see 
Table 6) we no longer observe significant differences in the control variables size, 
patent stock, group, foreign ownership, export quota, location in East Germany, 
industry dummies and the propensity score. However, the differences in the 
outcome variables remain significant: the funded companies are more R&D active; 
they spend more on R&D both in absolute terms and proportionally to the turnover. 
We can conclude that for both the Flemish and German sample the crowding-out 
hypothesis can be rejected: the average R&D expenditure and the average R&D 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the Flemish and German matched samples 
Subsidized companies    Selected control group 
Non-subsidized companies     Variable 
Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev.   
 p-values of two-sided t-test 
on mean equality* 
Flemish sample               
lnEMP  4.129  1.517    4.121  1.493    p = 0.969 
PATST  0.228  0.788    0.135  0.577    p = 0.283 
GROUP  0.573  0.496    0.567  0.497    p = 0.921 
FOREIGN  0.248  0.433    0.197  0.399    p = 0.340 
EXQU 0.024  0.087    0.015  0.064    p = 0.396 
  ) (X P
)
  0.289  0.175    0.285  0.170    p = 0.864 
RD  1.287  3.070    0.450  1.184    p = 0.002 
RDint  7.240  13.415    2.534  6.278    p = 0.000 
lnRD  -2.283  3.484    -5.211  4.243    p = 0.000 
lnRDint  -0.007  2.792    -2.341  3.265    p = 0.000 
Number of obs.:  157    157     
German sample                   
lnEMP  4.453  1.647    4.451  1.609    p = 0.985 
PATST  0.695  1.777    0.522  1.548    p = 0.164 
GROUP  0.659  0.475    0.688  0.464    p = 0.418 
FOREIGN  0.126  0.332    0.145  0.352    p = 0.480 
EXQU 0.291  0.263    0.302  0.300    p = 0.626 
EAST  0.486  0.500    0.486  0.500    p = 1.000 
  ) (X P
)
  0.338  0.177    0.335  0.174    p = 0.834 
RD  4.982  20.587    1.750  7.744    p = 0.002 
RDint  7.033  9.662    1.707  4.002    p = 0.000 
lnRD  -0.987  2.686    -3.667  3.457    p = 0.000 
lnRDint  0.312  2.942    -3.486  3.899    p = 0.000 
Number of obs.  484    484     
Note: the industry dummies BR and interaction terms BR_lnEMP are not reported here. 
* t-statistics to test the mean equality between the sample of funded firms and the selected control group are based on 
Lechner's (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the 
selected control group 
 
The average treatment effects can be calculated from the sample means in 
Table 6 and are presented in Table 7. The absolute difference in RD in million EUR 
and RDint in % is converted into a relative difference, based on the values for RD 
and RDint of the treated group. Strictly speaking, the treatment effect which is 
calculated in the matching procedure can only be evaluated at the averages of the 
samples (see equation (19)). However, as the distribution of both R&D expenditure 
and intensity is very skewed, we also calculated the median differences. These 
results should be interpreted with caution, though. On average, a Flemish company 
that receives a subsidy, spends 0.837 million EUR (65%) more on R&D, compared 
to the situation where it would not have received the subsidy. The German 
subsidized firms spend, on average, 3.232 millions EUR (65%) more. The R&D 
intensity in absolute terms increases with about 5% in Flanders and Germany due to 
the subsidy. It would be interesting to test the presence of heterogeneous treatment 
effects: large subsidies could induce other effects than small subsidies. 
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Table 7: Average treatment effects on the treated companies 
   ------------------Flanders------------------    ----------------Germany---------------- 
Absolute Relative Absolute  Relative    
mean median  mean median    mean median    mean median 
RD (in mio EUR)   0.837  0.211   65%  89%   3.232  0.401  65%  100% 
RDint (in %)   4.669  1.484   64%  91%   5.327  3.219  76%  100% 
5.2. The CDiDRCS Estimator 
The matching estimator indicates that crowding-out effects can be rejected in 
the Flemish and German case. However, one critique to the matching approach is 
that it only controls for observed heterogeneity between the subsidized and non-
subsidized companies. Therefore, we apply the CDiDRCS estimator, which 
combines matching with the DiD approach for a set of pooled cross-sectional data. 
The starting point is the matching result of section   5.1 (A in Figure 5). In the 
CDiDRCS approach, two additional matching algorithms (B and C in Figure 5) are 
conducted. For the treated (i) and selected non-treated (h) firms, twin firms (k and j 
respectively) are selected from the firms observed in the CIS III. The treatment 
effect is then calculated from the mean difference between the treated and non-
treated firms over time. In this way, both unobserved heterogeneity and potentially 
different reactions to macro-economic changes in the treated and the non-treated 
group are more explicitly controlled for.  
The two additional matching algorithms entail exactly the same procedure as 
the one conducted in section   5.1. However, when firms were present in the two 
waves of the CIS survey, they were matched to their own past observation. These 
firms were observed in the same (18 Flemish and 82 German non-treated firms) or 
opposite (26 Flemish and 36 German firms, non-treated in t0, but treated in t1) 
treatment status in the two surveys. The same outcome and control variables are 
analyzed in the same hybrid matching procedure as before. Therefore, the 
intermediate matching results are not reported in this chapter. The t-tests after the 
matching show that the selected control groups constitute a reliable match.  
First, the final treatment effect estimates are presented for each matching 
separately (see Table 8). Estimation A is the result of the matching of treated (i) to 
non-treated (h) firms within CIS IV (period t1); thus estimation A corresponds to the 
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CIS IV (period t1) to non-treated firms (k) in CIS III (period t0). Finally, estimation 
C indicates the difference in outcome variables between non-treated firms (h) in CIS 
IV and non-treated firms (j) in CIS III. The treatment effects A and B are always 
significant. The treatment effect over time (t1 versus t0) is in line with the treatment 
effect in the same period (t1). The correction for different reactions to macro-
economic shocks between non-treated firms (h and j; estimation C) is never 
significant. The structure of the results is very similar in the Flemish and German 
sample.  
Table 8: Treatment effect estimates in the three matching algorithms 
(difference in group means) 
  ------------A------------  ------------B------------  ------------C------------ 
Flemish sample 
0.837  ***   0.900 ***   0.050   
RD 
(0.273)  (0.288)  (0.178) 
4.669  ***   5.017 ***   0.203   
RDint 
(1.246)  (1.429)  (1.190) 
2.923  ***   2.530 ***   -0.480   
lnRD 
(0.512)  (0.832)  (0.854) 
2.334  ***   2.065 ***   -0.242   
lnRDint 
(0.400)  (0.635)  (0.646) 
German sample 
3.232 ***    2.432 *    -0.262  
RD 
(1.049)  (1.433)  (2.027) 
5.327  ***   5.717 ***   0.201   
RDint 
(0.503)  (0.544)  (0.939) 
2.680  ***   2.956 ***   0.165   
lnRD 
(0.245)  (0.344)  (0.823) 
3.798  ***   4.052 ***   0.125   
lnRDint 
(0.274)  (0.386)  (0.935) 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%)  
The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent and the t-statistics are based on Lechner's (2001) 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
 
Second, we use the differences (graphically relation B in Figure 5 for the 
treated and relation C for the non-treated firms) in the variables as input in an OLS 
regression as we would do in an ordinary DiD approach, with the extra feature that 
we condition on the exogenous variables mentioned before
28. The difference in each 
of the outcome variables over time is regressed on the difference over time in 
funding (FUNdif=0 for the non-treated/non-treated matched firms (h  and  j) and 
FUNdif=1 for the treated/non-treated matched firms (i and k)). As a time dimension 
                                                             
28 As the coefficients for relationship C are not significant in our first outcome presentation (see Table 8), it is not possible to 
merely subtract coefficient C from coefficient B for each outcome variable to obtain a corrected coefficient; the difference-in-
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is included in the analysis, the monetary variables (RD and lnRD) are deflated 
(EconStats, 2007).  
As the regression is performed on matched samples, the t-statistics may be 
biased downwards and result in misleading conclusions (see e.g. Heckman et al., 
1998). In order to obtain unbiased standard errors we employ the bootstrap 
methodology (see e.g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). We used 200 replications of the 
procedure to estimate the bootstrapped standard errors. 
Table 9 shows that the treatment effect (FUNdif) is always significantly 
positive, with one exception for the R&D expenditure in the Flemish sample; this 
insignificance however may be due to the skewed distribution of R&D expenditure 
and the relatively small sample size. When the R&D intensity or the logarithmically 
rescaled variable is evaluated, the additionality effect is again significantly positive. 
The coefficients are in line with the results that only take the evolution over time of 
the treated firms into account (estimate B in Table 8). Taking relationship C into 
account results in minor corrections. As a further robustness analysis we also 
include the difference in the other continuous variables
29. For the German sample 
we can take the EAST dummy into account as well, as this dummy was included in 
the hybrid matching: only companies with the same value for EAST are matched. 
Although these extra variables add to the explanatory power of the model, they are 
not significant in the regression. The positive impact of public funding remains 
strongly significant, even if we control for the differenced exogenous variables. The 
difference in outcome variables is due to the receipt of a grant. In the German 
sample, some differenced exogenous variables are significant, but the main impact 
on outcome variables comes from the strongly significant relationship with the 
subsidy receipt. The funding systems in Flanders and Germany are very similar, 
with a main focus on direct R&D funding. Here we find that the additionality 




                                                             
29 Through the triple matching procedure, we explicitly condition the selection of non-treated firms on their exogenous 
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Table 9: Treatment effect estimates: OLS in differences 
Variable ----------RDdif----------    -----------RDintdif-----------   ------------lnRDdif-----------   --------lnRDintdif--------- 
Flemish sample (Number of obs.: 314) 
FUNdif  0.661    0.571   5.204  ***  5.158 ***  2.574 ***  2.444 ***  2.129 ***  2.144 ***
 (0.588)  (0.600)    (1.170)  (1.224)    (0.528)  (0.525)    (0.415)  (0.498) 
lnEMPdif      1.505      -2.461        1.069        0.227  
     (2.742)        (4.163)        (1.738)        (1.760) 
PATSTdif     0.461      0.324        0.786        0.541  
     (0.545)        (1.232)        (0.892)        (0.499) 
EXQUdif     4.727         12.668        2.185        1.427
     (6.644)        (15.079)        (6.076)        (5.002) 
R² 0.064  0.134    0.109  0.132    0.118  0.161    0.124    0.150 
German sample (Number of obs.: 968) 
FUNdiff  2.922  **  3.529  **   5.509  ***  4.871 ***  2.856 ***  2.644 ***  3.877 ***  3.466 ***
 (1.187)  (1.351)    (0.598)  (0.699)    (0.249)  (0.296)    (0.316)  (0.362) 
lnEMPdif      8.062      -2.886        0.054         -0.952  
     (5.316)        (1.971)        (0.809)        (0.933) 
PATSTdif     0.483      0.389        0.169        0.134  
     (0.399)        (0.478)        (0.158)        (0.192) 
EXQUdif     3.258        0.500        0.636        0.425  
     (3.797)        (2.117)        (1.342)        (1.778) 
EAST     -1.179       1.256 *        0.447        0.812  
     (0.733)        (0.574)        (0.442)        (0.668) 
R² 0.013  0.040    0.184  0.197    0.233  0.236    0.249  0.246 
Bootstrapped standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
*** (**, *): significant at 1% (5%, 10%). 
5.3. Robustness checks 
To support the evidence that the full crowding-out hypothesis can be rejected, 
we provide some extra robustness checks. First, we limit the sample to R&D active 
companies. Next, we add variables to the analysis. 
Only R&D active companies 
Czarnitzki (2006) shows that not only the R&D expenditure but also the R&D 
status may change when a subsidy is granted. Small firms and firms that can offer 
only limited surety may experience great difficulties in raising external capital for 
risky projects. Consequently, only a limited budget is available for R&D activities, 
which may be shut down as a result. As Lerner (1999) argued, the subsidy receipt 
may serve as a certification of the firm’s activities, which could convince potential 
financiers. Up until now the switch of R&D status was taken into account, as we 
allowed for the possibility that a funded R&D active company was matched to a 
non-funded non-R&D active company. If we limit the sample to innovating 
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robustness check, so we conducted the same analysis, selecting only R&D active 
companies from the CIS IV wave. For both the Flemish and German sample the 
treatment effect remains significantly positive, but is –as expected– somewhat 
lower. The samples reduce to 415 (121) matched German (Flemish) companies. The 
R&D intensity in Germany increases with 3.7% (significant at 1%) and the Flemish 
R&D intensity is 2.8% higher (significant at 5%), compared to an additionality 
effect of 5% for both countries (both significant at 1%), when all firms are kept in 
the analysis. 
Additional variables 
As mentioned before, a weakness of the additionality analysis presented in 
this chapter, lies in the potential omittance of relevant variables, resulting in a 
violation of the Conditional Independence Assumption. The analyses presented 
below include more information (PROJ_PAST5YR, CAPint, CASHF, 
TECHCONSTR, FINCONSTR and SCOMNACE), which is however not available 
or perfectly comparable for both samples and therefore less interesting if the reader 
wants to compare the impact of the S&T policy in both countries. Nevertheless, the 
models remain comparable to a certain extent (as they reflect more or less the same 
information) and they provide compelling evidence, showing that the inclusion of 
more specific and fine-tuned information confirms the rejection of the full 
crowding-out hypothesis found earlier in this chapter.  
The computation of the additional variables results in a total sample of 4184 
(1605) German (Flemish) observations on 3903 (1418) companies; the overlap 
between the two waves if even more limited: only 281 (187) German (Flemish) 
firms are observed twice. Of these firms, 14 Flemish and 46 German firms were 
observed in the same non-treated status and 17 Flemish and 18 German firms in the 
switching status (non-funded to funded) and consequently matched to their own past 
observation. The monetary variables (RD, lnRD, CAPint and CASHF) are deflated 
in the CDiDRCS. 
As the reduction of the dataset does not alter the descriptive statistics of the 
variables which were used in the initial analyses (see Table 4), we limit the 
descriptive statistics to the additional variables (see Table 10). The new probit 
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factors in the selection process to receive a subsidy. Experience in applying for a 
subsidy clearly is a strong asset: it significantly increases the likelihood to receive a 
subsidy; unfortunately this variable is only available in the Flemish dataset. The 
financial and technological quality of the company do not seem to be of importance 
in Flanders, but are crucial features for German firms: financially constrained firms 
are more likely to receive a subsidy, while firms facing technological difficulties are 
less likely to be subsidized. Firms that absorb information of competitors more 
easily also have a significantly higher chance of receiving a subsidy. Table 12 
shows the differences in the outcome variables after the matching (the t-tests on the 
other variables are not reported, as all differences were eliminated). The average 
treatment effects are calculated in Table 13: they remain significantly positive. Also 
after adding a time dimension to control for unobserved heterogeneity (Table 12), 
the conclusion remains stable: the hypothesis of full crowding-out can be rejected, 
both in the Flemish and German case. 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics of the additional variables 




Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev.   
 p-values of two-sided  
t-test on mean equality 
Flemish sample 
PROJ_PAST5YR  1.329  3.546    0.063  0.302    p = 0.0000 
CAPint  0.035  0.035    0.042  0.066    p = 0.0691 
CASHF  0.013  0.047    0.016  0.115    p = 0.5743 
SCOMNACE  1.080  0.456    0.853  0.471    p = 0.0000 
Number of obs.:  167    696     
German sample 
TECHCONSTR  0.713  0.693    0.728  0.761    p = 0.6853 
FINCONSTR  1.781  1.108    1.365  1.155    p = 0.0000 
SCOMNACE  1.283  0.283    1.095  0.316    p = 0.0000 
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Table 11: Probit estimates and marginal effects 
  --------------------Flemish sample--------------------    ----------------------German sample--------------------- 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects    Probit estimates  Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err.  dy/dx  Std. Err. 
lnEMP  0.163  0.116  0.023 *  0.013   0.000  0.057  0.018  **    0.007 
PATST 0.248 ***  0.078    0.062 ***  0.021    -0.001   0.002  -0.000    0.001 
GROUP° -0.066   0.154    -0.012   0.038    0.113   0.076  0.028    0.020 
FOREIGN° -0.530 ***  0.179    -0.098 ***  0.036    -0.064   0.113  -0.023    0.028 
EXQU 0.686 ***  0.207    0.199 ***  0.048   1.078 ***  0.154  0.292  ***  0.040 
PROJ_PAST5YR 0.856 ***  0.110    0.210 ***  0.031          
CAPint / TECHCONSTR  -1.868   1.335    -0.440   0.323    -0.126 **  0.048  -0.035  **  0.013 
CASHF / FINCONSTR  -0.373   0.620    -0.058   0.162    0.230 ***  0.031  0.062  ***  0.008 
SCOMNACE   0.246 *  0.149    0.059 *  0.036    0.726 ***  0.143  0.191  ***  0.037 
EAST°             0.788 ***  0.073  0.229  ***  0.023 
constant  -2.008 ***  0.522        -2.609 ***  0.276    
BR  χ²(12) = 37.37 
 p = 0.0002           χ²(11) = 20.80 
 p = 0.0355      
BR_lnEMP  χ²(12) = 26.52 
 p = 0.0091           χ²(11) = 25.39 
 p = 0.0080      
Log-Likelihood -289            -926       
Pseudo R²   0.318            0.1927       
Number of obs.   863            2131       
*** (**. *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5. 10%). The restriction to common support is not yet being enforced here. The marginal effects on 
subsidies are calculated at the sample means for continuous variables and for a discrete change of dummy variables (indicated by °) from 0 to 1. The 
interaction terms BR_lnEMP are not taken into account in the calculation of the marginal effects. Their standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
Table 12: Outcome variables of the Flemish and German matched samples 
Subsidized companies    Selected control group 
Non-subsidized companies   
Variable 
Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std. Dev.   
 p-values of two-sided  
t-test on mean equality* 
Flemish sample (Number of obs.: 136) 
RD  1.142  2.666    0.356  0.675    p = 0.001 
RDint  7.080  13.637    1.913  3.779    p = 0.000 
lnRD  -2.421  3.513    -4.406  4.113    p = 0.000 
lnRDint  -0.142  2.826    -1.921  3.064    p = 0.000 
German sample (Number of obs.: 474) 
RD  4.404  16.633    3.906  17.378    p = 0.720 
RDint  7.191  9.677    2.524  5.197    p = 0.000 
lnRD  -0.959  2.637    -3.178  3.493    p = 0.000 
lnRDint  0.394  2.887    -2.763  3.996    p = 0.000 
* t-statistics to test the mean equality between the sample of funded firms and the selected control group are based on Lechner's (2001) 
asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group 
Table 13: Average treatment effects on the treated companies 
   ------------------Flanders------------------   ----------------Germany----------------- 
Absolute Relative Absolute  Relative    
mean median  mean median    mean median    mean median 
RD (in mio EUR)    0.786  0.141    69%  60%    n.s.  0.361    n.s.  84% 
RDint (in %)    5.167  1.069    73%  72%    4.667  2.949    65%  91% 
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Table 14: Treatment effect estimates: OLS in differences 
Variable  ----------------RDdif----------------     -------------RDintdif--------------     --------------lnRDdif--------------     ----------lnRDintdif----------- 
Flemish sample (Number of obs.: 272) 
0.269   0.253     4.101 ***  3.535 ***    1.593 **  1.547 *    1.471 ***  1.398 **  FUNdif  (0.571) (0.595)    (1.413)  (1.242)    (0.562)  (0.624)    (0.475)  (0.498) 
    0.736         -4.815         0.259         -0.554   lnEMPdif     (1.347)       (4.086)       (1.737)       (1.294) 
    0.438         0.683         0.521        0.396   PATSTdif     (0.723)       (1.484)       (0.885)       (0.740) 
    0.097         2.386         0.828        0.730   GROUP     (0.406)       (1.798)       (0.808)       (0.696) 
    0.477         1.977         -0.379        -0.365   FOREIGN     (0.898)       (2.911)       (1.486)       (1.219) 
    -0.300         -0.466         1.591        1.073   EXQU     (0.831)       (3.012)       (1.315)       (1.065) 
    0.250         2.424         1.138 **        1.045 **  PROJ_PAST5YR     (0.551)       (1.490)       (0.636)       (0.561) 
    -4.869         -19.586         -6.763        -7.189   CAPint     (8.515)       (16.690)        (9.134)       (7.792) 
    7.704         -4.648         3.503        0.550   CASHF     (9.325)       (32.289)        (11.249)       (9.739) 
    -0.109         -0.275         0.917        0.773   SCOMNACE     (0.445)       (1.731)       (0.731)       (0.622) 
R² 0.000  0.050    0.047  0.170    0.037  0.153    0.045  0.181 
German sample (Number of obs.: 948) 
2.009 **  2.305 **    5.384 ***  4.575 ***    2.571 ***  2.337 ***    3.464 ***  3.046 ***  FUNdif  (0.883) (1.143)      (0.515)  (0.581)    (0.272)  (0.312)    (0.353)  (0.387) 
    6.759         -2.815         0.398         -0.612   lnEMPdif     (6.546)       (2.021)       (0.957)         (1.095) 
    0.147         0.042         0.025         0.025    PATSTdif     (0.209)       (0.033)       (0.022)         (0.022) 
    1.828         0.588         0.677         0.855    GROUP     (1.842)       (1.153)       (0.503)         (0.702) 
    0.196         -0.770         -0.216         -0.646    FOREIGN     (2.926)       (1.030)       (0.594)         (0.686) 
    4.496         4.051         1.959         2.111    EXQU     (5.078)       (2.098)       (1.184)         (1.569) 
    -0.895         -0.265         0.030         0.134    TECHCONSTR     (1.137)       (0.471)       (0.250)         (0.330) 
    0.573         0.547         0.289         0.434    FINCONSTR     (1.236)       (0.515)       (0.244)         (0.334) 
    6.014 *        4.495 ***        2.620 **        3.317 ***  SCOMNACE     (4.216)       (1.556)       (0.943)         (1.140) 
    -0.882         1.636 **        0.466         0.887    EAST     (0.749)       (0.677)       (0.415)         (0.630) 
R² 0.007  0.088    0.155  0.199    0.196  0.230    0.203  0.241 
Bootstrapped standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. *** (**, *): significant at 1% (5%, 10%). Essays on the economics of innovation  76
6. Conclusion 
We empirically tested whether public R&D subsidies crowd out private R&D 
investment in Flanders and Germany, using data from the CIS III and IV waves. 
The main concern in evaluation analysis is to tackle the problem of the potential 
selection bias. Several methods are available to solve this problem, each with 
specific advantages and disadvantages. First, hybrid nearest neighbour matching 
was employed in the CIS IV cross-sectional sample. The sample contains 
information on the funding status and other covariates in the period 2002-2004. For 
both samples the crowding-out hypothesis was rejected: on average, the R&D 
intensity of German (Flemish) funded companies is 76% to 100% (64% to 91%) 
higher than the R&D intensity of non-funded companies. The disadvantage of the 
matching estimator is that it does not control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Therefore, we applied a combination of the matching procedure and the difference-
in-differences method, i.e. conditional difference-in-differences, using the two 
cross-sections CIS III and IV. This estimator allows correcting for both observed 
and unobserved heterogeneity. Also in this case, the crowding-out hypothesis can 
clearly be rejected; funded firms are significantly more R&D active than non-
funded firms. Further robustness checks, like limiting the sample to R&D active 
companies only and taking additional, more fine-tuned variables into account, lead 
to the same results. The conclusions are in line with results from earlier studies on 
additionality in Flanders and Germany and also other European countries.  
Two countries with a similar policy with respect to the public funding of 
R&D were compared, using identical techniques on similar data. We tried to set 
some first steps towards internationally harmonized additionality research. An 
assessment of the countries’ innovative activity in the European Innovation 
Scoreboard (PRO INNO EUROPE, 2007a and 2007b) reveals that the innovation 
system is different to some extent. Both countries are among the top performers in 
the EU27. However, in comparison to other EU-countries, the German innovation 
system is rather weak at the input side (e.g. science and engineering graduates, 
R&D expenditure, innovative activity in SMEs, etc.), but highly performing on the 
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sectors, patent application, etc.) of the innovation system. The Flemish innovation 
system on the other hand, scores very well on the drivers of innovation (education 
in science and technology, R&D expenditure, innovating capacity in SMEs, etc.), 
but does not seem to be able to capitalize the benefits at the output side. This may 
introduce policy priorities in the subsidy system, which cannot be fully observed by 
the researcher: both countries emphasise the importance of innovative performance, 
of SMEs in R&D activities, of a strong supply of researchers, etc., but it is not clear 
how the differences in the innovation system precisely translate in different policy 
accents.  
An in-depth analysis of policy differences as well as the combination of the 
firm-level data in one dataset would therefore yield a highly interesting starting 
point to assess the impact of policy heterogeneity on additionality effects. However, 
due to secrecy reasons, this has been impossible until now. 
Only the funding status of firms is analyzed. Therefore it is not possible to 
indicate how much R&D expenditure is leveraged with 1 EUR extra funding. This 
has been tested for a cross-section of Flemish data (see Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2004 
and Aerts, 2008). It would be interesting to employ continuous treatment analysis in 
a time series framework for both countries and in this way test for heterogeneous 
treatment effects of subsidies. Another appealing research question is the 
additionality effect on the output side. Input additionality is not necessarily 
translated into innovative output and economic welfare. Very recently, studies have 
been conducted on output additionality, measured in terms of patents, in German 
firms (Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004 as well as Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). In 
addition to these studies, it would be interesting to look at other innovation 
indicators on the output side of the innovation process, such as the introduction of 
new products or processes. A first study using a dummy variable on the introduction 
of an innovation into the market has been conducted by Hujer and Radić (2005) for 
German data. Bérubé and Mohnen (2007) evaluate the effectiveness of direct R&D 
subsidies in addition to tax allowances in Canada employing other measures of 
innovativeness. However, long time-series data would give more insight and would 
allow testing different lag specifications between the moment of market 
introduction of new products or the implementation of new processes and the time 
period in which the corresponding R&D projects were actually conducted. Essays on the economics of innovation  78
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Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip? Do R&D subsidies merely increase 
researcher wages? 
1. Introduction 
R&D activity fosters economic growth (Romer, 1990) and is crucial in every 
modern economy these days. However, R&D is a high-risk activity entailing a 
substantial level of uncertainty (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). Large R&D 
investments may not (immediately) lead to results which contribute significant 
value to a company (Rosenberg, 1974). One of the main concerns of R&D 
managers therefore is to attract qualified and motivated personnel, apt to conduct 
R&D activities with a considerable degree of success. The lack of qualified 
personnel is an important bottleneck, seriously hampering innovative activity 
(Eurostat, 2004 as well as Mohnen et al., 2008). Moreover, sooner or later, 
knowledge created in the R&D process becomes available to other companies, 
which have the opportunity to free ride and exploit this knowledge (Arrow, 1962). 
Mobility of R&D personnel is one of the main factors explaining (un)desired 
spillovers between companies (Mansfield, 1985). Maliranta et al. (2008) mitigate 
this effect though, as they find that most of the knowledge which is transferred by 
employees, is knowledge which can be easily copied and implemented without 
substantial additional R&D efforts. An adequate remuneration therefore is crucial to 
attract, stimulate and retain highly competent R&D personnel. Earnings are an 
important determinant in the remuneration system, although also intrinsic 
motivations like job satisfaction and exciting job opportunities matter (Coombs and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1991). Researcher wages consume the lion’s share of the total R&D 
expenditure of a company. 
An adequate remuneration system may attenuate the free-rider problem, but 
also the government can play an important role through public intervention. 
Because of the negative externalities (see e.g. Arrow, 1962) in the R&D process, 
companies are expected to invest less than what is socially desirable and as a 
consequence some projects, despite their significant social benefit, will not be 
executed. An R&D subsidy lowers the cost of a private R&D project and possibly Essays on the economics of evaluation  86
alters its outcome into an expected net profit, resulting in a positive decision to 
conduct the project. Subsidies for R&D projects by now have become a well-
established government intervention tool in the private R&D sector. However, 
companies may well replace their own, private money with the grant they received 
from the government, which would in the end not increase total private R&D 
expenditures. Empirical research on this crowding-out hypothesis is vast (see e.g. 
Aerts et al., 2007 for a survey of the empirical evidence) and many researchers 
reject, while others support it. However, as David and Hall (2000) suggest: ‘the 
more the better’ is a questionable statement when it comes to R&D expenditure. 
Mere R&D expenditures may not constitute an adequate measure to evaluate the 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies. They advise to introduce the close 
interconnectivity between scientific labour markets and R&D investment decisions 
into the evaluation process of public R&D policy. Goolsbee (1998) came to the 
conclusion that R&D subsidies are primarily translated into researcher wage 
increases, inflating positive additionality effects by 30% to 50%. Wallsten (2000) 
and Suetens (2002) agree as their data refute the argument that R&D subsidies 
stimulate the demand for R&D personnel. Yet other researchers find positive 
estimates for increases in the R&D staff due to a subsidy (Üçdoğruk, 2004; Ali-
Yrkkö, 2005; as well as Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004).  
This chapter empirically analyzes the effect of public R&D subsidies on 
private R&D investments, employment and wages in Flanders, employing 
parametric treatment effects models and IV methods. In the next section, the 
relevant literature will be discussed. Subsequently, I come to a brief explanation of 
the econometric methods underlying the empirical evidence. After a description of 
the data in the fourth section, the estimation results are presented and subsequently 
discussed in the two last sections.  
2. Literature Review 
The evaluation of public R&D policy has been extensively addressed in 
empirical research. David and Hall (2000) conclude in their review of evaluation 
studies on innovation input that the results on potential crowding-out effects are 
ambiguous, and they criticize that most existing studies neglect the problem of Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  87
sample selection bias: it is not implausible that an endogenous relationship exists 
between R&D investments and the receipt of public R&D grants. On the demand 
side of public funding, R&D intensive firms may well be more likely to apply for a 
subsidy: they are more apt to market their project as being highly interesting for 
society and exhibiting a high expected rate of success. Moreover, they may be better 
acquainted with the eligibility criteria and the procedures to apply for a subsidy. On 
the supply side of the public funding system, the government may just as well be 
more inclined to grant them a subsidy, as R&D intensive firms exhibit a higher 
expected rate of success. This makes R&D funding an endogenous variable, which 
may seriously distort evaluation results. In the next section, I expound on the 
methodological consequences of this endogeneity problem. More recent research 
takes this potential sample selection bias into account through selection models, 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous equation systems), 
difference-in-differences estimations and matching techniques. So far, Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden and the US have been subject to an R&D input evaluation analysis of their 
public R&D funding system. These studies tend to reject full crowding-out effects 
but the results are ambiguous
30. Key reasons for these diverging conclusions are the 
use of different estimators, as well as the application for a broad range of countries, 
each with their own specific S&T policy (David and Hall, 2000).  
However, more private R&D investments do not necessarily translate into 
more R&D output. Moreover, even if an increase in private R&D activity is 
confirmed, it may not be beneficial for the society. Inefficiencies may rise from 
duplicate research (Irwin and Klenow, 1996 as well as David and Hall, 2000), 
though Dasgupta and Maskin (1987: 582) state that “parallelism need not imply 
waste”. The additional R&D budget may be allocated to more risky and therefore 
potentially less successful projects (Setter and Tishler, 2005). Romer (2000) 
denounces the mismatch between policy measures stimulating the private demand 
for scientists and engineers and the incapability of the educational system to provide 
                                                             
30 Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004 and 2006), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Ali-Yrkkö (2004), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Clausen 
(2007), Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Duguet (2004), Ebersberger (2005), 
Fier (2002), González and Pazó (2006), González et al. (2005), Görg and Strobl (2007), Hussinger (2008), Hyytinen and 
Toivanen (2005), Lööf and Heshmati (2005) and Streicher et al. (2004) reject full crowding-out effects, while Busom (2000), 
Heijs and Herrera (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lach (2002), Suetens (2002), Toivanen and Niininen (2000) as well as Wallsten 
(2000) find indications that public R&D funding replaces private R&D investments to some extent. The interested reader is 
referred to Aerts et al. (2007) for a survey of the recent literature on the evaluation of public innovation policy. Essays on the economics of evaluation  88
a positive supply response. Consequently, David and Hall (2000) advocate the 
introduction of labour market dynamics into the additionality issue.  
Although the development of econometric methods (see Heckman et al., 1997 
and Heckman et al., 1999 for a survey) to counter the difficulties in measuring the 
effectiveness of policy programs originated in labour market economics (the 
evaluation of labour programs including public job training and active labour 
market policies), the main research issue in additionality research of R&D subsidies 
became to find out how much more private R&D investments were made, due to the 
provision of public money for private R&D activities. The impact on the R&D 
workforce has been ignored to a large extent.  
To the best of my knowledge, only a limited number of studies explores this 
research path, either on the macro (Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004) or micro (Goolsbee, 
1998 for individuals and Wallsten, 2000; Suetens, 2002; Üçdoğruk, 2004 and Ali-
Yrkkö, 2005 for firms) level. The empirical evidence is not unanimous, however. 
One explanation can be found, by analogy with diverging results in the more 
traditional R&D additionality research, in the use of different datasets, covering 
different regions and time windows and the application of various methodologies. 
Another explanation is the behaviour of the inputs of the R&D process, including 
the supply of R&D personnel. Different hypotheses are put forward in the literature, 
predicting the elasticity of the supply of researchers and their wages. A subset of the 
studies mentioned above additionally substantiates proof on the impact of public 
R&D funding on R&D wages (Goolsbee, 1998; Reinthaler and Wolff, 2004; 
Üçdoğruk, 2004 and Ali-Yrkkö, 2005). An overview of the main characteristics of 
these articles is presented in Table 15. In the following subsections a synopsis of the 
literature on additionality effects on R&D employment as well as R&D wages is 
presented and the hypotheses, which will be tested in the empirical part, are derived. Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  89
Table 15: The impact of public R&D funding on employment and wages: literature overview 
Impact of R&D subsidies on: 
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*Note: although Wallsten (2000) measures the impact on total employment in a dataset of small high-tech SBIR funded firms, he (2000: 89) signals that “most employees in these small firms are likely to be 
scientists, engineers, or others who are directly involved in R&D”. Also Ebersberger (2004) studies the impact on firms’ employment. However, he adds that, as the subsidy program under investigation targets 
R&D activities, the impact of the program can be evaluated in terms of R&D labour demand. Therefore, I consider their studies being comparable with the other studies listed, which explicitly measure the impact 
of public R&D funding on R&D employment.  Essays on the economics of evaluation  90
2.1. Public R&D funding and R&D employment 
Applying fixed effect panel regressions on a panel dataset containing data on 
15 OECD countries from 1981 to 2002, Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) estimate 
positive additionality effects for R&D investments, as well as a smaller, but still 
significant increase in national R&D employment. Goolsbee (1998) investigates 
survey data on the income of 17,700 scientists and engineers in the U.S. from 1968 
to 1994. He relates the total and federal R&D expenditure to income as well as 
wages and hours worked in an OLS framework. The impact of federal R&D 
expenditure on the number of hours worked is not significant.  
Suetens (2002), Üçdoğruk (2004) and Ali-Yrkkö (2005) all apply a 
production function framework, taking information on subsidy receipt into account. 
Suetens (2002) uses panel data on Flemish firms observed between 1992 and 1999 
to estimate an R&D personnel equation and an output (added value) equation with 
instrumental variables and finds that crowding-out effects cannot be rejected 
offhand. Üçdoğruk (2004) employs a panel dataset on Turkish R&D active 
manufacturing companies, observed between 1993 and 2000. She concludes that 
R&D support programs significantly increase the demand for R&D personnel, 
especially for researchers holding a graduate degree. However, she does not correct 
for the potential endogeneity bias embodied in the relationship between the demand 
for R&D personnel and public R&D funding. In his set of Finnish firms, observed 
between 1997 and 2002, Ali-Yrkkö (2005) estimates significantly positive effects 
on R&D employment.  
Wallsten (2000) and Ebersberger (2004) present two studies which are closely 
related to this research issue and which are therefore included as well. Wallsten 
(2000) evaluates the impact of US SBIR grants to small high-tech firms on their 
total employment in an IV approach. Although this funding is not explicitly 
intended to support R&D activities, the author signals (Wallsten, 2000: 89) that 
“most employees in these small firms are likely to be scientists, engineers, or others 
who are directly involved in R&D”. He finds that larger firms are more likely to 
receive a grant, but additionality effects on employment cannot be confirmed. 
Ebersberger (2004) investigates the impact of two-year grants, allocated in 1996, on Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  91
the total labour demand in Finnish companies employing matching and difference-
in-differences methods. He claims that, as the subsidy program under investigation 
targets R&D activities, the impact of the program can be evaluated in terms of R&D 
labour demand. His estimates demonstrate no significant impact. From this review 
of research on R&D subsidies and R&D employment, it becomes clear that the 
evidence is mixed: both neutral as well as positive effects are found.  
Two elements may introduce some dynamics into the subsidy-employment 
relationship. First, increased R&D investments due to a subsidy may stimulate 
company growth and only in a second phase lead to increased R&D employment. 
See e.g. Chennels and Van Reenen (1999) for a survey of studies on the impact of 
technological change on employment. Second, as Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) 
suggest, technology spillover effects may exist: a subsidy may induce the 
development of a new technology, which nevertheless draws heavily on knowledge 
incorporated in existing technologies, and may therefore stimulate other firms to 
build on that technology. As a result, one could expect that the impact of public 
R&D funding is larger in the long than in the short run. Positive long-run effects on 
R&D employment are found by Lerner (1999), Ebersberger (2004) as well as 
Reinthaler and Wolff (2004).  
2.2. Public R&D funding and R&D wages 
R&D wages absorb a significant share of the total R&D expenditure (e.g. in 
Flanders on average around 67% in Czarnitzki et al., 2006). Therefore, also the cost 
of the input factor of R&D personnel, i.e. R&D wages, plays an important role in 
additionality research on R&D employment: R&D wages may adversely interact 
with Science and Technology policy measures introduced by the government. This 
may provide a sound explanation to why the publicly induced increase in R&D 
staffing does not keep up with the induced increase in R&D expenditure. 
Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) observe a simultaneous increase in national R&D 
investment and R&D employment. The increase of the R&D staff is smaller, 
though, which brings them to the conclusion that also scientists’ wages experience 
an increase. Goolsbee (1998) concludes that increases in R&D expenditure are 
mainly allocated to researcher wages and not to research effort. Ebersberger (2004) Essays on the economics of evaluation  92
claims that the Finnish innovation system provides an adequate inflow of 
researchers, and that therefore an increase in R&D investments is fully absorbed by 
an increase in R&D employment, but he does not put his statement to the test. This 
is however done by Ali-Yrkkö (2005), who concludes that R&D subsidies have, in 
addition to a positive effect on the number of R&D employees, also a significantly 
positive effect on researcher wages. Üçdoğruk (2004) finds indications that in 
Turkey, R&D subsidies significantly increase researcher wages. So, although there 
is substantial ambiguity concerning the impact of R&D subsidies on R&D 
employment, there is consensus on the fact that researcher wages increase when a 
company receives an R&D subsidy.  
Also few attempts have been made to assess the impact of R&D tax credits on 
private R&D wages. Although in this chapter, the explicit focus is on direct R&D 
funding, the main results are briefly mentioned. Marey and Borghans (2000) 
estimate the wage effect of R&D tax incentives in the Netherlands and estimate 
average elasticities of R&D wages to the total sectoral R&D expenditure of 0.52 in 
the short run and 0.38 in the long run. Lokshin and Mohnen (2008) estimate a short 
run elasticity of 0.10 and a long run elasticity of 0.12 in the Netherlands. Haegeland 
and Møen (2007) assess the Norwegian R&D tax credit measure and estimate an 
elasticity of 0.33. 
The latter studies typically conclude that the increase of R&D wages provokes 
a significant inflation problem in additionality research: it is criticized that a 
substantial part of the subsidised money dissipates, as it perishes into mere R&D 
wage increases, without any actual impact on R&D activity. Goolsbee (1998) 
estimates that, as a result of R&D wage increases, additionality effects of R&D 
subsidies may be overestimated by 30% to 50%. The indirect impact of this wage 
increase may be even worse, since an increase in researcher wages may also affect 
non-funded firms, as they have to downsize their R&D activity (Goolsbee, 1998 and 
Hinloopen, 2004).  
Inelastic labour supply 
The argument of inflated additionality effects is typically based on the 
underlying hypothesis that the supply of R&D personnel is inelastic. An inelastic 
labour supply increases the search costs for competent scientists and engineers and Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  93
strengthens the bargaining power of R&D employees in wage negotiations (Lokshin 
and Mohnen, 2008).  
Goolsbee (1998) provides evidence that the supply of scientists and engineers 
is relatively inelastic. Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) make a stand against a priori 
expectations about the elasticity of the R&D labour supply. An elastic supply curve 
can be expected when considering the large pool of university graduates available to 
R&D companies on the one hand and the number of researchers actually employed 
as R&D staff on the other hand. Lundborg (2005) concludes that supply is not a 
restrictive variable, as the underutilization of potential R&D employees is 
substantial. However, Goolsbee’s findings (1998) on an inelastic labour supply 
curve are not unrealistic when R&D is performed by thin on the ground experienced 
and highly specialized scientists. Trajtenberg (2000) also claims that shortages of 
highly skilled personnel in cutting edge technologies are a pervasive phenomenon in 
Israel. By contrast, Ebersberger (2004: 22) rejects the existence of this problem in 
Finland, as “the Finnish innovation system has been able to constantly increase the 
supply of science and technology graduates”. The reader should bear in mind 
however, that Goolsbee (1998) runs his analysis on survey data on the income of 
scientists and engineers, including both public and private R&D staff. One could 
expect that the researcher supply elasticity is highly dependent on the sector. 
Research in universities versus companies may require and/or attract a different 
kind of researcher. Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) compute elasticities of the labour 
supply in 15 OECD countries. Their estimates are rather low, but significantly 
larger than the estimates of Goolsbee (1998). They find an additional explanation 
for a potential underestimation of the labour supply elasticity in Goolsbee’s exercise 
(1998) in the fact that he uses data from a period exhibiting extraordinary 
government intervention. Moreover, the supply elasticity is measured in a different 
way: Goolsbee (1998) calculates the increase in the average working time in 
reaction to higher wages, while Reinthaler and Wolff (2004) also allow for the 
additional employment of R&D workers.  
Upskilling process 
Nevertheless, Goolsbee’s (1998) pessimism may be alleviated, as R&D wage 
increases do not necessarily equate a loss of R&D effort. For example, in a general Essays on the economics of evaluation  94
employment context, Merito et al. (2007) test the impact of public funding and 
record positive effects on SME wages on the short (two years) and long term (four 
years) and conclude that the simultaneity of increased R&D staffing and higher 
wages signals an ‘upskilling’ process: the employment structure is shifted towards 
more skilled employees. Katz and Murphy (1992) also found that rapid growth in 
the demand of skilled workers appears to be the driving force behind changes in the 
wage structure. Translated into an R&D environment, this would render the R&D 
effort of an equally large R&D staff more efficient. Moreover, the population of 
(potential) R&D employees is not homogeneous. Zucker and Darby (1996: 12709) 
state that “scientific breakthroughs are created by, embodied in, and applied 
commercially by particular individuals responding to incentives and working in 
specific organizations and locations”. As a result, in high-tech firms intellectual 
capital of key personnel is far more important than physical assets (Darby et al., 
1999). Therefore, partial or even full crowding-out of additional R&D investments 
into higher wages is not necessarily bad: if companies are able to allocate a larger 
budget to their human capital, this may strengthen their power in the competition to 
attract top researchers. 
Determinants of R&D wages 
Wage dispersion may originate in employee as well as employer specificities. 
Individual worker characteristics, among which gender and age are most important, 
determine a significant share of wage dispersion. Also, considerable disparities in 
the pay slip are due to differences in the workplace. A large share of the literature 
on wages focuses on the positive correlation between company size and wages as 
well as the impact of sector affiliation. Larger companies typically write higher pay 
slips. Different explanations can be found: higher wages may serve as a 
compensation mechanism for a more complex working environment in larger 
companies; act as an instrument to increase the workforce’s motivation; or reflect 
differences in the composition of the workforce. Heterogeneity in the composition 
of the workforce, generating a larger share of skilled workers in the larger firms, can 
originate in different capital intensities (skilled workers work in more capital 
intensive sectors; larger companies are typically more capital intensive), scale 
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the hierarchical structure (larger companies are structured more hierarchically, 
requiring the employment of more managers) and the employees’ seniority (larger 
companies can offer more promotion and education possibilities and face a lower 
risk of bankruptcy, implying a higher level of seniority and subsequently higher 
wages) (Plasman et al., 2008).  
Next to size, also sector affiliation is found to drive a significant share of 
wage differences (see Plasman et al., 2008). A growing body of the literature 
investigates the underlying reasons behind this strong correlation. First, the weight 
of wage bargaining differs significantly between the sectors. In some sectors (e.g. 
sectors with a large share of small companies), sectoral bargaining is absent and 
wages are settled at the company level. Furthermore, some sectoral agreements only 
determine minimum wages, as increases in the actual wages are only negotiated at 
the company level. Therefore, a strong centralization of the wage bargaining process 
reduces wage differences. This argument is strongly linked with the second: 
different sectors exhibit different productivity and profit levels (Plasman et al., 
2006). Moreover, differences in the way the profit gains are redistributed in the 
company also drive inter-firm wage differences. Rusinek and Rycx (2008) find that, 
the more this redistribution occurs on the company level, the larger the wage 
differences become. A last argument is the power of unions: they can put pressure 
on companies to increase the wages and close sectoral wage gaps.  
In this chapter we specifically look at R&D wages in the private sector. 
Typical factors influencing the general average wage level and dispersion are 
expected to play here, too, and interact with the factors explaining R&D activity. 
First, size seems to be an important driver of inter-firm
31 R&D wage differences: 
the annual R&D expenditure per R&D employee increases significantly with firm 
size (Czarnitzki et al., 2006). Also sector affiliation interacts with R&D wages. The 
annual R&D expenditure per R&D personnel and the share of personnel costs in the 
total R&D expenditure vary over the different sectors (Czarnitzki et al., 2006). 
Capital intensity is expected to have an impact, as well as the share of highly skilled 
employees. Productivity and, more specifically, R&D productivity may be 
correlated positively with R&D wages, as well as the level of international 
                                                             
31 As only information about the average R&D wage is available, intra-firm R&D wage dispersion can not be investigated. It 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, but remains an interesting and challenging issue for further research. 
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competition, and (foreign) group membership. Last, also the scope of the union’s 
power in the wage bargaining process may generate inter-firm R&D wage 
differences. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
In the empirical part of this chapter, I first assess the impact of public R&D 
funding on private R&D expenditure. In the next step, the typical testing of the 
crowding-out hypothesis in terms of R&D expenditure is extended with respect to 
the R&D workforce: if a subsidy stimulates private R&D expenditure, does this 
publicly induced increase in R&D expenditure generate additional R&D 
employment? In the last step, the wage structure is analysed with respect to R&D 
subsidies.  
The literature shows that long term effects may be significantly different from 
the effects found in the short run. However, this chapter focuses on the short term 
effects; potential long term effects are beyond its scope and left for further research. 
3. Selectivity issue  
This section will explain more in detail the nature of the endogeneity problem, 
which may distort estimation results of the relationship between public R&D 
funding and R&D activity. Next, I briefly explain the methodology which will be 
employed to eliminate the potential bias caused by this selectivity problem. 
















=  ,   (24) 
where X represents a set of exogenous variables and β their respective parameters. S 
refers to the treatment status (S=1: treated; S=0: untreated – treatment is the receipt 
of a subsidy in this case) and α measures the impact of this treatment. U is the error 
term with zero mean and U is assumed to be uncorrelated with X. However, it is not 
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unlikely that U is correlated with S: subsidized companies may well be more R&D 
active than the non-subsidized companies, even without the subsidy program. R&D 
intensive firms may be more likely to receive an R&D subsidy as governments aim 
at maximizing the probability of success and therefore may well cherry-pick 
proposals of companies with considerable R&D expertise. Moreover, it is also quite 
possible that only particular companies apply for public R&D grants because they 
have an information advantage and are acquainted with policy measures they 
qualify for. In an experimental setting, without any selection bias and random 
subsidy allocation, U and S are not correlated. This is most likely not the case in 
current innovation policy practice, though. This would imply a selection bias in the 
estimation of the treatment effect. Therefore, standard econometric approaches, 
regressing Y on X and S by OLS, are not valid and other approaches, taking this 
potential endogeneity properly into account, should be employed. Econometric 
literature has developed a range of methods (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 
1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, 2002; Aerts et al., 2007). Examples of these 
methods are difference-in-differences estimations, matching, selection models and 
instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous equation systems). I 
will apply the latter two methods in the empirical part. In the following paragraphs 
they are very briefly explained. 
The subsidy allocation can be modelled by the following selection equation: 
V Z S + = γ * , (25) 
where S* is an index, measuring the probability to receive public funding, 
depending on a set of company characteristics Z and their respective parameters γ, 
as well as an error term V. When S* is positive, the company is granted a subsidy:  
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The two-step selection model estimates two equations. A discrete choice 
model predicts the probability of being treated (S*) (the selection equation) and the 
outcome variable is regressed linearly on the treatment variable, controlling for 
observable exogenous characteristics (the outcome equation). Theoretically, the 
outcome equation is defined through the nonlinearity of the hazard parameter (also Essays on the economics of evaluation  98
labelled as the inverse Mills ratio). However, in practice, most observations are 
located within the quasi-linear range of the hazard parameter (Puhani, 2000). Hence, 
to identify the treatment effect, an exclusion restriction is imposed. This requires the 
existence of at least one variable, which is insignificant in the outcome equation, but 
at the same time significant in the selection equation. This regressor should not be 
correlated with the error term V of the selection equation. The selection model 
directly controls for the part of the error term U which is correlated with S. It is 
commonly assumed that U and V follow a joint normal distribution
33, resulting in 
the following conditional outcome equations: 
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where the last term in each equation represents the error term conditional on S. An 
important advantage of this methodology over matching lies exactly here: by 
separating the impact of S from the selection process, any correlation with 
unobserved variables is corrected for.  
This model has often been criticized as it is quite demanding on assumptions 
about the structure of the model. Therefore, the evaluation of the funding status is 
introduced in an IV framework. Moreover, while the application of treatment effects 
models is limited to binary treatment only, IV regressions allow refining the impact 
of the measure in a continuous treatment set-up
34. This will provide a further 
robustness check, as here not only the funding status, but now also the funding 
amount is taken into account.  
An instrument Z* is defined and a transformation g is applied, satisfying the 
requirement that g(Z*) is uncorrelated with U conditional on X, and that Z* is not 
completely determined by X. Unlike the selection model, IV is a simpler estimator 
as it omits the selection equation estimation. However, its major drawback lies in 
the identification of the instrument Z*: it has to be valid as well as relevant. Only in 
that case, the estimates will be consistent. Overidentifying restrictions are tested by 
                                                             
33 The assumption of joint normality of U and V can be relaxed, though. The interested reader is referred to Hussinger (2008). 
34 Most frequently, IV regressions are applied on discrete treatment variables. However, the same procedure is valid for 
continuous treatment variables (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002). Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  99
the Hansen-Sargan test. Its joint null hypothesis claims that the instruments Z* are 
valid, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term U, and that the excluded instruments are 
rightfully excluded from the estimated equation. The identification of the equation, 
i.e. whether the excluded instruments are relevant, is tested in the Anderson 
canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test. Its null hypothesis is that the equation is 
underidentified. Consequently, the potential endogeneity is adequately corrected for, 
if the Hansen-Sargan test holds and the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-
ratio test is rejected. Moreover, compliance with the Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption (SUTVA) is required: the treatment of one firm should not affect the 
treatment effect on another firm (Rubin, 1990). Unfortunately this cannot be tested. 
4. The data  
This section first sketches the contextual framework. Next, I come to a 
description of the data and the variables which are employed in the empirical part. 
4.1. Contextual framework 
The particularities of public R&D funding and the process of wage settlement 
in Flanders are briefly explained.  
Public R&D funding in Flanders 
In Flanders, IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through 
Science and Technology in Flanders, is the single counter where companies can 
apply for a subsidy. This implies that subsidies, at the Flemish and Belgian level, as 
well as certain EU-funded projects
35 are evaluated and granted through IWT. 
Accelerated depreciation for R&D capital assets and R&D tax allowances are 
available through the federal Belgian government. In contrast to most countries, the 
Belgian R&D tax allowances are fixed and not granted as a percentage: for each 
additional employee employed in scientific research, the company is granted a tax 
exemption for a fixed amount, in the year of recruitment. However, as Van 
                                                             
35 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
engaging in these programs is very limited. 
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Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) indicate, very few Belgian companies actually make use 
of these fiscal measures
36. Main reasons are a low level of acquaintance with the 
system, complexity and high administration costs
37 and the fact that the measures 
are not significantly substantial
38. Direct R&D funding through IWT remains the 
largest source of public R&D grants in the private sector in Flanders
39.  
Wage settlement in Flanders 
In Flanders, wages are typically settled through collective bargaining. This 
usually occurs hierarchically, on three levels, which implies that bargaining at lower 
levels can only affect wages upwards (Plasman et al., 2007). At the top level, wages 
are settled through inter-sectoral agreements at the national level: minimum wages 
are fixed, as well as a margin for wage increases. Second, additional sectoral 
agreements may be negotiated, setting industry standards (minimum wages by 
category of worker) for most of the employees in the industry concerned. Finally, in 
a third bargaining round, single-employer agreements may be settled at the firm 
level. The bargaining process at the firm level has gained importance over time. 
Strong wage increases may reduce the national competitiveness and hence also 
reduce employment rates. Therefore, the government froze the private-sector wages 
several times; e.g. in 1996, a wage standard was introduced, imposing an upper 
limit to wage increases, coupled to the wage margins in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands. However, international comparisons reveal that labour is still 
significantly expensive in Flanders. Nevertheless, wage settlement in Flanders is far 
from a centralized and tight system and leaves considerable margin for inter-firm 
wage dispersion; Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit higher dispersion rates, while 
wages are distributed more equally in the Scandinavian countries (Plasman et al., 
2008). 
                                                             
36 Due to recent changes in the Science and Technology Policy, this situation has changed, though. In the current system, 
fiscal measures, and more specifically tax credits for R&D personnel, are becoming increasingly popular. However, this is not 
relevant in the current chapter, as our data was collected before the change. 
37 First, each year the company has to deliver a certificate. Second, the researcher should be full time employed in the research 
department of the same company to qualify. Third, the tax allowance is nominative, inducing a burden to keep track of all 
employees who benefited from the measure in the past. 
38 First, the amount of the exemption is not sufficiently significant. Second, the definition of highly qualified personnel is too 
strict, so that only very few employees qualify for the measure. Third, the tax exemption is a short term measure (it only 
relates to the first year of recruitment) while R&D typically is a long term process. 
39 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006) for a detailed overview of the public R&D funding system in 
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4.2. Variables 
The potential crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies in Flanders is addressed 
empirically with data from the biannual Research and Development Survey. This 
mainly quantitative survey covers most EU countries with a by and large 
harmonized questionnaire and the collected data are, among other things, used to 
compose the European Innovation Scoreboard (see e.g. PRO INNO EUROPE, 
2008). The set-up of the Flemish R&D survey is inventory-based: all potentially 
R&D active companies are identified and surveyed. In terms of R&D expenditure, 
the collected data cover a sample of companies, which are, in total, responsible for 
about 80% of the total R&D expenditure in Flanders (Debackere and Veugelers, 
2007). Therefore, the sample is close to the population of all R&D active companies 
in Flanders. I pool two consecutive waves, i.e. the 2004 and 2006 R&D surveys
40. 
The R&D data are supplemented with patent application data from the European 
Patent Office since 1978. Balance sheet data from the National Bank of Belgium 
(Belfirst) was merged to the dataset to provide financial indicators. Last, 
information on the subsidy size and history of each company was added: IWT keeps 
track of all subsidy applications and potential subsequent grants. 
The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable (FUN) indicating 
whether the firm received public R&D funding. The amount of subsidies received is 
measured by AMT (in million EUR). No distinction is made with respect to the 
source which provided the public funding; the impact is an average effect over the 
different funding schemes.  
The outcome variables reflect a company’s R&D
41 activities. First, I test the 
impact of an R&D subsidy on R&D expenditure (RDX, in million EUR). As the 
distribution of RDX is highly skewed, the R&D expenditure intensity, RDXint 
(RDX / turnover * 100) is included as well. Second, I test how the R&D staffing 
changes when a subsidy is granted to a company. RDP is the number of R&D 
personnel (in full time equivalents, or FTEs). Again, to complete the picture of the 
                                                             
40 The data collected in the surveys refer to the period 2002-2004 (2004 survey) and 2004-2006 (2006 survey). The funding 
variables are measured in 2003 and 2005, respectively. To avoid endogeneity problems in the selection equation, the 
covariates are measured, whenever possible, at the beginning of the reference period. Only R&D active companies are kept for 
the analysis. 
41 R&D is defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002: 30): “creative work undertaken on a systematic 
basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications”. 
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impact of R&D subsidies on R&D activities in spite of the skewed distribution of 
R&D activities, R&D personnel intensities are calculated: RDPint (RDP / total 
number of employees * 100). The third set of outcome variables disentangles a 
company’s R&D expenditure into the share allocated to personnel costs on the one 
hand and the share allocated to all other costs (investments and operational costs) on 
the other hand. These variables are normalized by the number of R&D employees. 
Hence, RDX_P/RDP reflects the company’s R&D wage structure. RDX_O/RDP 
measures the R&D expenditure per R&D employee, leaving out the personnel costs. 
These variables will allow us to test whether potential additionality effects on the 
R&D expenditure are partially or fully absorbed by an increase in R&D staff wages. 
In that case, the effectiveness of the public R&D funding system could be 
questioned. The Flemish R&D activities are highly skewed. That is why one should 
also consider the logarithmically rescaled values of the measures of R&D activity: 
lnRDX and lnRDP; of course, also the amount of funding is rescaled in these 
models (lnAMT). 
In the literature on additionality assessment of public R&D funding, different 
authors have used different sets of exclusion restrictions and instrumental variables. 
Busom (2000) introduced selection models in additionality research and used the 
age of the company, reflecting its overall experience, as an exclusion restriction. 
She argues that more experienced firms are more aware of the value of innovation 
and may write better project proposals, both increasing the likelihood of receiving a 
subsidy. Kaiser (2004) uses a set of dummies reflecting competition (local, national 
or multinational orientation), ownership ((partly) publicly owned) and cooperation 
behaviour (external partners or academia involved in new product or process 
development). He argues that the firm may not care where the competition comes 
from, while governments may want to strengthen the technological competitiveness 
of domestic firms in the perspective of foreign competition. Moreover, the explicit 
policy aim of the Danish government to foster R&D cooperation may increase the 
likelihood that R&D cooperation projects are publicly funded. Ebersberger (2005) 
uses the share of R&D employees as exclusion restriction; as he uses a sample of 
innovative firms only, funding decisions have no influence on R&D status, but do 
influence the intensity of conducting R&D activity. Hussinger (2008) generates an 
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company, foreign ownership and the existence of an own R&D department within 
the company. Wallsten (2000) was the first to employ instrumental variable 
regressions. His instrument, the budget which is potentially available for a firm in a 
certain industry or technological area, has become very popular and was picked up 
by several authors (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005; Clausen, 2007 and Ali-Yrkkö, 
2004 and 2005). Ali-Yrkkö (2004) additionally experimented with the amount of 
funding the company has applied for in the year of the funding receipt. Aerts and 
Czarnitzki (2006) use the number of past project applications. Suetens (2002) and 
Gonzáles et al. (2005) introduce the lagged value of the subsidy as instrumental 
variable in their regression.  
Building on the existing research summarized above, I introduce two new 
variables. They are supposed to have an impact on the funding status, but not on the 
outcome. In the treatment effects model they serve as excluded explanatory 
variables in the outcome regressions, which are significant in the selection equation, 
though. In the IV-set-up, they provide a vector of instruments. They are computed 
from the company’s subsidy history. AMT/PROJ_past5yrs (in million EUR) 
contains the total public R&D funding the company received in the preceding five 
years, divided by the number of projects in this period. PROJ/EMP_past5yrs (in 
number / FTE) is a count variable, reflecting the total number of project proposals 
per employee each company submitted in order to obtain an R&D subsidy in the 
preceding five years. These variables seem to be reliable instruments, since they are 
highly correlated with a company’s current funding status but at the same time, the 
company’s current R&D activity does not influence its subsidy history. To obtain 
the right fit in the estimate dimensions, also the logarithmic transformations of these 
variables (lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs) were used in the 
respective models. 
I use several control variables which may affect both the subsidy receipt and 
R&D effort. Including the number of employees allows controlling for size effects, 
which are empirically often found to explain innovativeness (see e.g. Veugelers and 
Cassiman, 1999). Moreover, the Flemish S&T policy puts high value on R&D 
activities performed by small and medium sized companies. Therefore, the size 
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transformation (lnEMP) is used to avoid potential estimation biases caused by 
skewness of the data.  
Another important variable is the firms' patent stock (PAT). As I use data 
from two cross-sectional datasets, which do not include time-series information, the 
patent stock enables us to control for previous (successful) R&D activities. 
Obviously, not all innovation efforts lead to patents, which Griliches (1990: 1669) 
formulated nicely as “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are 
patented”. Likewise, not all patented innovations result from R&D activities; the 
R&D process is only part of a company’s innovative activity
42. Moreover, the 
propensity to patent may be heterogeneous among firms. However, as data on 
previous R&D expenditure are not available, the patent stock is the best 
approximation of past innovation activities. I use all patent information in the EPO 
database and generate the stock of patents for each firm as the depreciated sum of 
all patents filed at the EPO from 1978 until 2001(1997):  
t t t PATA PAT PAT + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ ,   (28) 
where PAT is the patent stock of a firm in period t and t-1, respectively, PATA are 
the number of patent applications filed at the EPO and δ is a constant depreciation 
rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15 as common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 
1986; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). On the one hand, firms that exhibit previous 
successful innovation projects indicated by patents, are more likely to receive public 
R&D funding, because public authorities may follow the ‘picking-the-winner’ 
principle in order to minimize the expected failure rates of the innovation projects, 
and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the society. On the other hand, the 
patent stock controls for the past average innovative engagement of the firms, 
because it is expected that firms that were highly innovative in the past will 
continue this strategy. The patents are counted only until 2001(1997), to ensure that 
the stock definitely refers to past innovation activities, in order to avoid a 
simultaneous equation bias in the regression analysis. The patent stock enters into 
the regression as patent stock per employee (PAT/EMP) to reduce the potential 
multicollinearity with firm size. 
                                                             
42 Innovative activity is defined as “all those scientific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial steps which 
actually, or are intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved products or processes” 
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The export quota (EXQU = exports / turnover) measures the degree of 
international competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be 
more innovative than others and, hence, would be more likely to apply for subsidies.  
Next, variables reflecting the technological and financial quality of the 
company may play a significant part in both the subsidy and R&D story. These 
characteristics are proxied by capital intensity (CAPint) as the value of fixed assets 
per employee and cash-flow (CASHF) (both in million EUR) respectively. Both 
variables are obtained from balance sheet records provided by the National Bank of 
Belgium (through the Belfirst database). CASHF is also divided by the number of 
employees (CASHF/EMP) to avoid multicollinearity with firm size.  
A dummy variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a group (GROUP) 
controls for different governance structures. Firms belonging to a group may be 
more likely to receive subsidies because they presumably have better access to 
information about governmental actions due to their network linkages. In addition to 
group membership, FOREIGN indicates whether this group is domestic or foreign-
owned. Foreign affiliates may be more likely to apply for a subsidy in their home 
country. Twelve industry dummies (BR) are included to allow for differences 
between sectors. On the one hand, some sectors may exhibit a larger R&D intensity. 
On the other hand, governments may favour certain sectors in their R&D policy, 
which increases the likelihood of receiving subsidies for firms in these industries. 
From the theoretical evidence on R&D wages, different factors are derived 
which could possibly drive inter-firm dispersion. Most of these are already reflected 
in the variables described above. Size (lnEMP) and sector (BR) may determine 
R&D wages. Also capital intensity is expected to have an impact. Productivity and 
more specifically R&D productivity may be correlated positively with R&D wages. 
This productivity is captured by the patent stock (PAT/EMP). Internationally 
competing firms may pay higher wages (EXQU). Moreover, also group membership 
(GROUP) and foreign ownership (FOREIGN) may play. Besides these variables, 
which are also included in the models assessing the impact of public funding on 
R&D expenditure and R&D employment, two other variables are defined to refine 
the assessment of additionality effects on R&D wages. First, the percentage of 
highly skilled employees is included as the share of R&D employees with a doctoral 
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process may be an influencing factor. This parameter is computed following 
Vandenbussche et al. (2001). The idea is to maximise the union’s utility function 
L w L w U . ) , ( = , explained by wages w and employment L, with respect to the 
wages:  
) 1 ( .
β β π
− = Ω     U    Max
w  .   (29) 
The parameter β reflects the bargaining strength of the union, and has a value 
between zero, i.e. in the absence of a union: all rents are absorbed by the firm, and 
unit value, i.e. with a ‘monopoly union’: the union determines the wages 









+ = , (30) 
where the employee’s wage is the sum of his alternative wage w
a and a fraction of 
the firm’s profit per employee π
0/L
0. For each sector, an unbalanced firm-level 
panel was constructed, containing balance sheet information from the National 
Bank of Belgium (Belfirst), covering all Belgian firms in the sector, with non-
missing values for the period 1998-2006. The profit π
0/L
0 was computed as the 
value added minus the labour costs, divided by the number of employees, and 
normalized by the consumer price index (obtained from Eurostat, 2008). The 
average wage w was generated dividing the total labour costs of the firm by the 
number of employees. The alternative wage w
a was set to zero
43. As this model may 
be subject to endogeneity, the regression is instrumented by the profit per employee 




1 / − − t t L π  and year dummies. The monetary values were 
deflated (EconStats, 2007). Table 16 shows the estimated bargaining power 
coefficients β for the sectors in the dataset. Parameter β is additionally included in 




                                                             
43 Vandenbussche et al. (2001) alternatively suggest to set the alternative wage w
a at the sectoral minimum wage, but as this 
did not change their results, I also use a zero value for w
a. 
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Table 16: Estimated bargaining power coefficients 
Nace  β 
Number of 
companies   Nace  β 
Number of 
companies 
All sectors  0.0623  224613             
Manufacturing 0.0890  148564    27 0.1015  3794 
15 0.1172  22345    271 0.0636  1565 
16 n.s.  184    274 0.1415  765 
17 0.0993  8355    28 0.0693 29427 
18 0.1617  4819    29 0.0481 12105 
19 0.1130  945    30 n.s.  941 
20 0.1007  9113    31 n.s.  5270 
21 n.s.  2913    32 n.s.  2463 
22 0.0322  15396    321 n.s.  827 
23 0.1885  352    33 n.s.  4240 
24 0.1343  6971    34 n.s.  3276 
244 0.1160  1358    351 0.1209  752 
25 0.1108  6288    353 n.s.  283 
26 0.0689  9367    355 n.s.  152 
Services 0.0146  76049        
72 0.0325  18893        
722 n.s.  10603        
73 n.s.  1185        
74 0.0489  39684*        
*To facilitate computation, for sector 74 only a randomly selected subset of the total population (110846) companies 
was used. Note: in the models only twelve industry dummies are included, as some sectors were aggregated. However, 
as information on the exact 2-digit (for some subgroups 3-digit) sector affiliation is known for the companies, I 
decided to use all available information. 
 
To test the presence of upskilling effects, a subgroup of the total R&D 
personnel, i.e. researchers (RDPR, in FTE) as well as the share of these researchers 
in the total R&D staff (RDPR/RDP, in %) are included as dependent variables. 
As I use data from two pooled cross-sections and the average R&D expenditure was 
subject to a downward trend (see e.g. Debackere and Veugelers, 2007), a year 
dummy (YEAR=1 for the R&D 2006 wave) was included in each regression to 
control for differences over time. Moreover, the monetary variables
44 were deflated 
(EconStats, 2007). Extreme outliers with respect to the funding amount, R&D 
expenditure, R&D personnel and R&D wages were removed. The final sample 
consists of 470 observations. The summary statistics of the variables used to 
evaluate the input additionality of Flemish R&D subsidies are presented in Table 
17. 
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Table 17: Summary statistics dataset 
 All  companies   
  #  Obs.  Mean  St.  Dev.  Min.  Max.       
TREATMENT VARIABLES                 
FUN  (dummy)  470  0.3957  0.4895  0 1       
AMT  (in  mio  EUR)  470  0.0744  0.1761  0  1.3284       
  Funded companies  Non-funded companies 
  # Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max.  # Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
OUTCOME  VARIABLES                 
RDX  (in  mio  EUR)  186  0.9122  1.1911  0.0074  5.6797  284  0.5375 0.7699 0.0092 5.6544 
RDXint  (in  %)  186  0.0987  0.1509  0.0004  0.7219  284  0.0499 0.0984 0.0000 0.7635 
RDP (in FTE)  186  11.9277  14.8525  0.2000  72.4000  284  7.1340  9.8024  0.1000  79.8000 
RDPint (in %)  186  0.2228  0.2586  0.0053  1  284  0.1321  0.1970  0.0019  1 
RDX_P/RDP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  0.0538  0.0282  0.0129  0.2157  284  0.0528  0.0290  0.0118  0.2118 
RDX_O/RDP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  0.0265  0.0258  0  0.1267  284  0.0217  0.0284  0  0.1800 
INSTRUMENTS                 
AMT/PROJ_past5yrs (in mio EUR)  186  0.0157  0.0579  0  0.5462  284  0.0014  0.0091  0  0.0889 
PROJ/EMP_past5yrs (in number / FTE)  186  0.1355  0.3216  0  2.7500  284  0.0412  0.1710  0  2.0000 
CONTROL VARIABLES                 
lnEMP  (in  FTE)  186  4.0436  1.5037  0.69315  8.1928  284  4.2080  1.3968 0.69315 7.6159 
PAT/EMP (in number / FTE)  186  0.4613  1.1672  0  7.2847  284  0.2882  0.9227  0  8.7338 
EXQU (in %)  186  0.6135  0.3412  0  1  284  0.5768  0.3444  0  1 
CAPint (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  134.8062  490.8716  1.26242  4856.3270  284  80.9283  125.6292  0.37779  790.2966 
CASHF/EMP (in mio EUR / FTE)  186  16.0572  45.0683  -181.41  325.5137  284  17.3998  47.6177  -509.71  400.9867 
GROUP (dummy)  186  0.5645  0.4972  0  1  284  0.6549  0.4762  0  1 
FOREIGN (dummy)  186  0.2204  0.4157  0  1  284  0.2465  0.4317  0  1 
YEAR (dummy)  186  0.5161  0.5011  0  1  284  0.5317  0.4999  0  1 
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES                 
UNI* (in %)  171  0.5874  0.2911  0  1  256  0.5700  0.3218  0  1 
BARG  (index)  186  0.0490  0.0485  0  0.1617 284  0.0629  0.0504 0 0.1885 
RDPR** (in FTE)  175  7.0906  10.6564  0  60.0000  266  3.9445  6.5300  0  48.0000 
RDPR/RDP** (in %)  175  0.5803  0.3229  0  1  266  0.5581  0.3479  0  1 
Note: the details of BR are not presented here. To compute the logarithmic transformation values of AMT, RDX, RDP, AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs, zero values 
before the transformation were replaced by the minimum observed logarithmic value after the transformation. 
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5. Estimates 
This section presents empirical evidence on the impact of R&D subsidies on 
R&D expenditure, employment and wages in Flanders. I employ parametric 
treatment effects models as well as IV regression models. First, the impact of the 
funding status is evaluated in a treatment effects framework. Table 18 reports the 
estimates of the selection equations. The amount of funding received as well as the 
number of projects submitted in the past are highly significant in the selection 
equation; they strongly influence the likelihood to receive public R&D funding in 
Flanders. This seems to indicate that there is a high level of continuity in the receipt 
of public funding. 
Table 18: Treatment effects model: selection equations 
  Probit estimates  Marginal effects  Probit estimates  Marginal effects 
AMT/PROJ_past5yrs  17.2055 (5.1059) ***  6.6760 (2.0125)  ***             
PROJ/EMP_past5yrs  0.9137 (0.3595) **  0.3545 (0.1397)  **             
lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs            0.1958 (0.0953)  **  0.0742 (0.0363)  ** 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs            0.2473 (0.0310)  ***  0.0937 (0.0117)  *** 
lnEMP  0.0407  (0.0625)     0.0158  (0.0242)     0.0904  (0.0639)     0.0343  (0.0242)    
PAT/EMP  0.0268  (0.0680)     0.0104  (0.0264)     -0.0099  (0.0694)     -0.0038  (0.0263)    
EXQU 0.3598  (0.2057)  *  0.1396 (0.0799)  *  0.3752 (0.2188) *  0.1422  (0.0829) * 
CAPint  0.0005  (0.0003)     0.0002  (0.0001)     0.0006  (0.0004)     0.0002  (0.0002)    
CASHF/EMP  -0.0003  (0.0014)     -0.0001  (0.0006)     -0.0001  (0.0015)     0.0000  (0.0006)    
GROUP°  -0.2299  (0.1528)     -0.0896  (0.0596)     -0.0540  (0.1637)     -0.0205  (0.0623)    
FOREIGN°  -0.2347  (0.1767)     -0.0894  (0.0658)     -0.1949  (0.1852)     -0.0725  (0.0673)    
YEAR°  -0.0572  (0.1261)     -0.0222  (0.0489)     -0.0759  (0.1325)     -0.0288  (0.0502)    
CONSTANT  -1.0552 (0.3649) ***        1.2089 (0.6561)  *     
BR  χ²(11) = 20.13  **        χ²(11) = 14.72       
Log-Likelihood  -278.8042     -247.2025    
Pseudo  R²  0.1163     0.2164    
#  obs.  470     470    
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) 
The standard errors (between brackets) are obtained by the delta method. 
 
Next, the outcome equations are estimated, taking the estimated coefficients 
from the selection equation (Table 18) into account. In doing so, the actual 
treatment effect is separated from the potential selection bias (in the HAZARD 
coefficient). In Table 19 the outcome estimates are presented. The receipt of a 
public R&D grant clearly has a positive impact on a company’s R&D effort.  
The results confirm positive additionality effects of R&D subsidies on R&D 
expenditure in Flanders, which is in line with previous analyses for Flanders (Aerts Essays on the economics of evaluation  110
and Czarnitzki, 2004 and 2006 as well as Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). Funded 
companies spend more (RDX***) on R&D than their non-funded counterparts. 
Also, funding is positively correlated with the company’s R&D expenditure 
intensity (RDXint***). However, as David and Hall (2000) put forward well-
founded, this significantly positive impact on R&D expenditure may well be fully 
absorbed merely by researcher wage increases if the labour supply of R&D staffing 
is inelastic. Additional R&D expenditure would then not be translated into more 
R&D activity. The current analysis allows completing the additionality picture with 
information on the impact of public R&D grants on R&D employment and wages. 
First, we look at the impact on R&D staffing. Table 19 shows that similar 
companies with an opposite funding status significantly differ in terms of the R&D 
personnel they employ: the number of R&D employees (RDP***) as well as R&D 
personnel intensity (RDPint***) are significantly higher after the receipt of a 
subsidy. Hence, in Flanders, public R&D funding is actually translated into more 
R&D activity. These results suggest that the supply of R&D personnel in Flanders is 
not fully inelastic: companies are able to attract more R&D personnel when they 
have a larger R&D human resources budget at their disposal. This result contrasts 
with the findings of Suetens (2002), who could not provide evidence to support 
positive additionality effects of R&D subsidies to Flemish companies, evaluating 
the R&D staffing employed. This may, however, be due to the fact that the dataset 
as well as the analysis framework differ significantly (see David and Hall, 2000). 
Lastly, we turn to the potential impact of public R&D funding on a company’s 
R&D wages (RDX_P/RDP). The estimates reveal that, in addition to a significantly 
positive impact on R&D expenditure and R&D staffing, also the wage structure 
reacts to an R&D subsidy: the average personnel cost per R&D employee 
(RDX_P/RDP*) increases, while the average operational costs and investments per 
R&D employee (RDX_O/RDP) do not change.  Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  111
Table 19: Treatment effects model: outcome equations 
Table 20: IV regressions on the receipt of a subsidy 







HAZARD  -0.5911 (0.1968) ***  -0.0349 (0.0141) **  -6.7083 (2.4905) ***  -0.0524 (0.0230) **  -0.0114 (0.0067) *  -0.0027 (0.0062)  
FUN  1.2007 (0.3180) ***  0.0768 (0.0217) ***  14.0455 (4.0166) ***  0.1259 (0.0352) ***  0.0181 (0.0108) *  0.0101 (0.0099)  
lnEMP  0.3247 (0.0370) ***  -0.0273 (0.0044) ***  4.2379 (0.4671) ***  -0.0849 (0.0071) ***  0.0032 (0.0012) **  0.0003 (0.0011)  
PAT/EMP  0.0292 (0.0415)   0.0019 (0.0048)   0.5808 (0.5240)   0.0062 (0.0078)   -0.0012 (0.0014)   -0.0015 (0.0013)  
EXQU  0.0855 (0.1358)   0.0471 (0.0154) ***  0.4880 (1.7134)   0.1032 (0.0251) *** 0.0060  (0.0046)    0.0086 (0.0042) ** 
CAPint  0.0004 (0.0001) **  -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0031 (0.0018) *  -0.0000 (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0000 (0.0000)  
CASHF/EMP  0.0031 (0.0009) ***  0.0001 (0.0001)   0.0220 (0.0113) *  0.0005 (0.0002) ***  0.0001 (0.0000) *  0.0001 (0.0000) *** 
GROUP  0.1728 (0.1007) *  0.0191 (0.0116) *  1.5964 (1.2699)   0.0253 (0.0188)   0.0045 (0.0034)   0.0082 (0.0031) *** 
FOREIGN  0.2157 (0.1070) **  0.0138 (0.0126)   1.7087 (1.3500)   0.0076 (0.0205)   0.0042 (0.0036)   -0.0006 (0.0033)  
YEAR  -0.0203 (0.0790)   -0.0054 (0.0093)   0.6038 (0.9964)   0.0075 (0.0152)   -0.0055 (0.0027) **  -0.0010 (0.0024)  
CONSTANT  -1.6781 (0.2228) ***  0.0801 (0.0256) ***  -19.5058 (2.8099) ***  0.3632 (0.0416) ***  0.0161 (0.0075) **  0.0070 (0.0069)  
BR  χ²(11) = 42.07  ***  χ²(11) = 110.11  ***  χ²(11) = 51.83  ***  χ²(11) = 99.68  ***  χ²(11) =31.82  ***  χ²(11) = 14.92   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
The selection equation includes: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. Number of obs.: 470. 







FUN  1.1852 (0.4087) ***  0.0797 (0.0273) ***  11.7621 (5.3633) **  0.1581 (0.0837) *  0.0290 (0.0128) **  0.0124 (0.0085)  
lnEMP  0.3247 (0.0431) ***  -0.0273 (0.0044) ***  4.2396 (0.5819) ***  -0.0850 (0.0092) ***  0.0032 (0.0013) **  0.0003 (0.0010)  
PAT/EMP  0.0297 (0.0384)   0.0018 (0.0036)   0.6619 (0.4653)   0.0051 (0.0060)   -0.0016 (0.0011)   -0.0016 (0.0014)  
EXQU  0.0879 (0.1412)   0.0466 (0.0181) ***  0.8282 (1.6535)   0.0984 (0.0288) *** 0.0044  (0.0055)    0.0082 (0.0044) * 
CAPint  0.0004 (0.0001) ***  -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0035 (0.0018) **  -0.0000 (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)   0.0000 (0.0000)  
CASHF/EMP  0.0031 (0.0013) **  0.0001 (0.0002)   0.0217 (0.0135)   0.0005 (0.0003) **  0.0001 (0.0000) *  0.0001 (0.0000) ** 
GROUP  0.1713 (0.0855) **  0.0194 (0.0123)   1.3773 (1.1210)   0.0284 (0.0198)   0.0056 (0.0035)   0.0084 (0.0032) *** 
FOREIGN  0.2151 (0.1270) *  0.0139 (0.0146)   1.6280 (1.5233)   0.0088 (0.0198)   0.0046 (0.0038)   -0.0005 (0.0036)  
YEAR  -0.0207 (0.0772)   -0.0053 (0.0089)   0.5518 (0.9572)   0.0082 (0.0154)   -0.0052 (0.0029) *  -0.0009 (0.0024)  
CONSTANT  -1.6748 (0.2538) ***  0.0795 (0.0213) ***  -19.0212 (3.3051) ***  0.3563 (0.0547) ***  0.0138 (0.0069) **  0.0065 (0.0065)  
BR  χ²(11) = 48.26  ***  χ²(11) = 83.70  ***  χ²(11) = 59.97  ***  χ²(11) = 95.06  ***  χ²(11) = 32.25  ***  χ²(11) = 14.86   
Instrument tests:                   
Anderson   χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 103.293  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  ***  χ²(2) = 21.518  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 1.141    χ²(1) = 0.032    χ²(1) = 0.430    χ²(1) = 1.050    χ²(1) = 0.001    χ²(1) = 1.814   
Centered  R²  0.2689  0.3561   0.3200   0.4736   -0.1040    0.1038  
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent.  
The instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs – 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. Number of obs.: 470. Essays on the economics of evaluation  112
The parametric treatment effects models reveal that the Flemish R&D policy 
stimulates private R&D activity, both in terms of expenditure and employment. In a 
next step, the evaluation of the funding status (FUN) is introduced in an IV 
framework. As discussed before, both the amount of funding received and the 
number of projects submitted by the company in the preceding five years are 
expected to be reliable instruments in an IV approach of the additionality issue. 
Table 20 shows the regression results. The coefficient of FUN is again highly 
significant and positive for R&D expenditure, personnel, intensity and wages. 
Moreover, the tests on the quality of the instrumental variables confirm that the 
model requirements hold. Compared to the treatment effects model, the coefficients 
are very similar.  
In the last step, I extend the analysis of the funding status and take the amount 
of funding (AMT) into account. This enables a more profound insight into the 
nature of the additionality effects found in the discrete models. These latter models 
reject full crowding-out effects. However, it is still possible that funded companies 
to some extent replace private money with the public grant. This would mean that a 
subsidy partially crowds out companies’ private R&D effort.  
Again, funding is instrumented with both the amount of funding received and 
the number of projects submitted by the company in the preceding five years. The 
estimates for different R&D expenditure measures are presented in Table 21. The 
coefficient of AMT is highly significant and positive. Moreover, the tests on the 
quality of the instrumental variables confirm that the model requirements hold. A 
subsidy of 1 million EUR increases the average R&D expenditure with 1.793 
million EUR. The Flemish R&D activities are highly skewed, however. That is why 
one should also consider lnRDX and RDXint. The coefficients of the log-log 
specification can be interpreted as elasticities. Here, the picture looks a little less 
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Table 21: IV regression: R&D expenditure 




AMT  1.7927  (0.6528) ***            
lnAMT       0.1244 (0.0268)  ***  0.0114 (0.0039)  *** 
lnEMP  0.3044 (0.0390)  ***  0.4950 (0.0421)  ***  -0.0282 (0.0043)  *** 
PAT/EMP  -0.0244 (0.0502)    0.0605 (0.0373)    -0.0020 (0.0036)   
EXQU 0.1703  (0.1170)    0.8621  (0.1401) ***  0.0512  (0.0181) *** 
CAPint  0.0006 (0.0001)  ***  0.0002 (0.0001)  ***  -0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0034 (0.0011)  ***  0.0034 (0.0011)  ***  0.0002 (0.0002)   
GROUP  0.0666 (0.0599)    0.2690 (0.1045)  **  0.0164 (0.0120)   
FOREIGN  0.1464 (0.1065)    0.0546 (0.1218)    0.0102 (0.0145)   
YEAR  0.0315 (0.0673)    0.1417 (0.0889)    0.0034 (0.0095)   
CONSTANT  -1.3650 (0.1932)  ***  -3.8667 (0.2830)  ***  0.1642 (0.0342)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 50.26  ***  χ²(11) = 173.01  ***  χ²(11) = 85.32  *** 
Instrument tests:                
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.983    χ²(1) = 0.318    χ²(1) = 0.310   
Centered R²  0.5134    0.5572    0.3777   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 470. 
 
Also the evaluation of the impact of public funding on R&D employment 
leads to similar results as the discrete treatment analyses. Again, the absolute 
increase is very high: a subsidy of 1 million EUR would result in the hiring of 17 
additional R&D employees. The elasticity is 11%.  
Table 22: IV regression: R&D personnel 




AMT 17.2735  (9.7748)  *             
lnAMT       0.1069  (0.0242)  ***  0.0166  (0.0057)  *** 
lnEMP 4.0445  (0.5595)  ***  -0.5784  (0.0390)  ***  -0.0863  (0.0087)  *** 
PAT/EMP 0.1519  (0.6825)    0.0821  (0.0362)  **  0.0010  (0.0060)   
EXQU 1.6734  (1.4056)    0.5722  (0.1202) ***  0.1112  (0.0255) *** 
CAPint 0.0055  (0.0013)  ***  0.0002  (0.0001)  *  0.0000  (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP 0.0245  (0.0134)  *  0.0018  (0.0009)  **  0.0006  (0.0002)  ** 
GROUP 0.3353  (0.8877)    0.1273  (0.0929)    0.0200  (0.0186)   
FOREIGN 0.9537  (1.4098)    0.0563  (0.1109)    0.0020  (0.0185)   
YEAR 1.0472  (0.9753)    0.2027  (0.0813)  **  0.0199  (0.0148)   
CONSTANT -15.9628  (2.6074)  ***  -0.4785  (0.2496)  *  0.4891  (0.0550)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 62.38  ***  χ²(11) = 190.68  ***  χ²(11) = 120.75  *** 
Instrument tests:                  
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  ***  χ²(2) = 215.930  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.919    χ²(1) = 0.986    χ²(1) = 1.118   
Centered R²  0.4588    0.6479    0.5282   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are: 
a AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs - 
b lnAMT/PROJ_past5yrs and 
lnPROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 470. 
 
Table 23 confirms the earlier conclusion that also the wage structure is 
influenced by the R&D subsidy policy in Flanders. In the first model, only variables 
used in the models for RDX and RDP are included. The second model additionally 
includes two variables which may also exert a particular influence on R&D wages, 
i.e. the share of highly skilled R&D employees (UNI) and the union’s strength in Essays on the economics of evaluation  114
the wage bargaining process (BARG). The composition of the workforce (UNI***) 
indeed seems to drive a share of inter-firm wage dispersion, but the union (BARG) 
does not significantly affect R&D wages. This is not too surprising, as R&D 
employees are typically white-collar workers, who often receive pay supplements 
outside of collective agreements (Rusinek and Rycx, 2008). Therefore, the union’s 
bargaining power is not relevant. This was already suggested in Table 16, where the 
bargaining power is less significant in sector 73: Research and Development. 
Obviously, the bargaining power is calculated from the total population of 
employees, but the share of R&D employees is expected to be high in this sector.  
Table 23: IV regression: R&D wage structure 
   ---------RDX_P/RDP 
a --------- ---------RDX_P/RDP
 b --------- --------RDX_O/RDP 
a -------- 
AMT  0.0370  (0.0138) ***  0.0357 (0.0153)  **  0.0079 (0.0101)     
UNI       0.0124 (0.0050)  **      
BARG       0.0852 (0.0787)        
lnEMP  0.0028  (0.0012) **  0.0028 (0.0013)  **  0.0002 (0.0010)   
PAT/EMP  -0.0026  (0.0014) *  -0.0029 (0.0017)  *  -0.0016 (0.0014)   
EXQU  0.0068  (0.0048)   0.0037 (0.0050)   0.0097  (0.0042) ** 
CAPint  -0.0000  (0.0000)   -0.0000 (0.0000)    0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0001  (0.0000) **  0.0001 (0.0000)  **  0.0001 (0.0000)  ** 
GROUP  0.0030  (0.0030)   0.0042 (0.0030)    0.0072 (0.0030)  ** 
FOREIGN  0.0030  (0.0035)   0.0020 (0.0036)    -0.0011 (0.0036)   
YEAR  -0.0043  (0.0028)   -0.0038 (0.0029)    -0.0009 (0.0024)   
CONSTANT  0.0211  (0.0060) ***  0.0059 (0.0115)    0.0094 (0.0061)   
BR  χ²(11) = 34.73  ***  χ²(11) = 29.57  ***  χ²(11) = 13.91   
Instrument tests:                  
Anderson   χ²(2) = 97.635  ***  χ²(2) = 81.767  ***  χ²(2) = 97.635  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 1.194    χ²(1) = 1.166    χ²(1) = 2.719   
Centered R²  0.0762    0.0877    0.1101   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is reported, though. The 
instruments used are AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The standard errors (between brackets) are 




So, bringing the results together, it is clear that public R&D funding induces 
additional R&D expenditure. Moreover, funded companies enlarge their R&D 
workforce. However, at the same time, the average R&D wage increases. Two 
potential explanations are advanced. On the one hand, the R&D wage increase may 
not involve any difference in productivity and result from an inelastic R&D labour 
supply. However, as the increase in R&D personnel after receiving a subsidy is 
considerable, the R&D labour supply in Flanders seems not to be fully inelastic. On 
the other hand, this R&D wage increase could signal an ‘upskilling’ process, i.e. the 
R&D workforce composition is shifted upwards with respect to its qualification. As 
only information on the average R&D wage is available, it is not possible to directly 
test this hypothesis. However, to some extent, a change in workforce composition Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  115
can be assessed through other approximating variables. First, we look at the number 
of researchers. Compared with technicians and other R&D employees, it can be 
expected that they typically are more likely to be highly skilled. If we take into 
account that the total number of R&D employees increased with about 17.3 FTEs 
and compare this to the increase in the number of researchers only, which is about 
16.7 (see RDPR in Table 24), it appears that the increase in R&D employment 
mainly comes from an increase in researchers. Further analyses (not shown here) 
indeed confirm that there is no significant increase in the number of technicians and 
other R&D employees. Second, I assess the impact of the subsidy on the share of 
researchers in the total R&D workforce (see RDPR/RDP in Table 24). Also here, a 
significantly positive impact can be found. In a cautious conclusion, one could 
therefore collect some evidence that the increase in R&D wages is not that 
detrimental, as the quality of the R&D employees tends to increase, which in turn 
increases the quality of the R&D activity, as well as the expected output. 
Table 24: IV regression: number of researchers and their share in the total 
R&D workforce 
   ---------RDPR
 --------- ---------RDPR/RDP
 --------- 
AMT  16.7069 (7.6660)  **  0.3719 (0.1273)  *** 
lnEMP  2.5592 (0.4882)  ***  -0.0284 (0.0143)  ** 
PAT/EMP  0.2066 (0.5348)    0.0146 (0.0159)   
EXQU 0.4368  (1.1295)   0.0322  (0.0564)   
CAPint  0.0010 (0.0007)    -0.0000 (0.0000)   
CASHF/EMP  0.0192 (0.0100)  *  0.0002 (0.0002)   
GROUP  0.1144 (0.6702)    0.0130 (0.0397)   
FOREIGN  -0.0039 (1.0194)    -0.0161 (0.0409)   
YEAR  0.9278 (0.7326)    0.0604 (0.0320)  * 
CONSTANT  -10.5676 (2.0651)  ***  0.6360 (0.0859)  *** 
BR  χ²(11) = 47.62  ***  χ²(11) = 12.59   
Instrument tests:            
Anderson   χ²(2) = 88.458  ***  χ²(2) = 88.458  *** 
Hansen-Sargan  χ²(1) = 0.000    χ²(1) = 0.101   
Centered R²  0.3970    0.0693   
Note: the industry dummy coefficients are not shown here; the test on their joint significance is 
reported, though. The instruments used are AMT/PROJ_past5yrs and PROJ/EMP_past5yrs. The 
standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. Number of obs.: 441. 
6. Conclusion 
Government intervention in private R&D activity is common practice 
nowadays. However, its impact may not be unambiguously positive, as presupposed 
by many governments. In the first place, one could ask whether R&D grants 
actually stimulate private R&D investments: companies may simply replace private 
R&D budgets with the public money provided by the government. This is the main Essays on the economics of evaluation  116
question to which researchers try to find an answer in additionality research. 
However, even if an increase in private R&D investment is confirmed (as concluded 
by many scholars), this may not automatically induce more R&D activity: the 
additional R&D budget may be crowded out by duplicate or more risky research, or 
a mere increase in researcher wages without any impact on the R&D activity of a 
company and as a result render an R&D grant, although to the benefit of private 
R&D expenditure, ineffective.  
This chapter provides insights into the impact of R&D grants, giving audience 
to the appeal of David and Hall (2000) to include labour market dynamics in the 
traditional application of treatment effects models in additionality research. I 
empirically analyze the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D 
investments, employment and wages in Flanders, employing parametric treatment 
effects models and IV regression methods. The main data source is the Flemish 
R&D Survey, supplemented with information from companies’ balance sheets 
(National Bank of Belgium), patenting activity (EPO) and subsidy history (IWT). 
Size, previous innovative activity, international competition, group 
membership, foreign ownership and industry affiliation may induce a considerable 
selection bias, rendering the receipt of a subsidy endogenous. Controlling for this 
bias with information on the company’s subsidy history, I conclude that R&D 
subsidies in Flanders bring about positive additionality effects, measured in R&D 
expenditure. Moreover, this public R&D funding is translated into more R&D 
activity: funded companies employ more R&D personnel, suggesting that the 
supply of R&D personnel in Flanders is not fully inelastic. Full crowding-out 
effects are rejected. However, partial crowding-out cannot be ruled out: funded 
companies do not add the whole subsidy amount to their private R&D budget. This 
analysis highlights the importance of evaluating the effectiveness of the R&D 
policy in terms of both the funding status and the grant size. The estimates indicate 
that, to some extent, the private R&D activity is reduced and replaced by the 
subsidy. The results for the impact on R&D expenditure and employment are very 
comparable; they change likewise.  
However, next to a significantly positive impact on R&D expenditure and 
R&D staffing, also an increase in R&D wages is found in firms receiving R&D 
subsidies. A mismatch between the demand and supply of R&D employees may Chapter 4. Who writes the pay slip?  117
enforce an increase in labour costs for the companies, which translates in increased 
R&D remuneration. In the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) country reports, 
the drivers of innovative activity are assessed at the country level (PRO INNO 
EUROPE, 2007). Belgium is among the TOP10 in the EU27. Although it is clear 
that its performance lags behind in several indicators, and Belgium’s weak 
competence in capitalizing the full benefits of above average levels of R&D and 
innovation expenditure in terms of innovative output is exposed, the main strength 
of the Belgian innovation system seems to lie in its strong relative performance on 
human resources in innovation. Despite a small shortage of skilled technical staff in 
specific industries, especially in the Walloon region, and a considerable outgoing 
brain drain, which are denounced in the EIS report, the analysis in this chapter 
shows that the Flemish human resources in innovation seem to be sufficiently strong 
to withstand an increase in the demand for R&D employees and to provide a 
significantly large supply in response. Conversely, also an upskilling process could 
be an underlying explanation for an increase in R&D wages after the receipt of a 
subsidy. As the increase in R&D employment is significant and as mainly the 
number of researchers is increased after a subsidy receipt, I tend to believe that a 
change in the composition of the workforce towards more highly skilled employees 
is the main force driving inter-firm R&D wage dispersion between funded and non-
funded firms.  
In these last paragraphs, I come to some final caveats which the reader should 
bear in mind and which give way to further research. First, the restriction to R&D 
active companies implies that the additionality effect can only be derived in terms of 
additional R&D spending. However, subsidies can be a trigger, pushing companies 
without any R&D activity to become R&D active. If these switchers would be taken 
into account as well, the treatment effects are very likely to be higher. Second, the 
literature review implies that the effect of an R&D subsidy may be very different in 
the long run. Here, short term effects were investigated. However, the increase in 
R&D activity on the short run may induce different effects on the long run. The 
impact on the R&D personnel demand may become even larger, when, as one could 
expect, the elasticity of labour supply is larger in the long run: more R&D personnel 
becomes available as idle R&D educated people switch to R&D jobs and new R&D 
educated people become available on the job market. Research on the long term Essays on the economics of evaluation  118
effects would therefore add much value to the existing studies. Third, a profound 
analysis of the determinants of R&D wages is highly relevant. The composition of 
the workforce was revealed as a very important factor, while the union’s bargaining 
power does not seem to play. However, an extension of the current model, including 
other potential determinants, seems a promising research field. Fourth, the variables 
reflecting the wage structure do not capture other benefits to reward R&D 
personnel. Examples are stock options or other fringe benefits. Taking these 
rewards additionally into account could refine the analysis currently presented here. 
However, this information is very difficult to obtain and highly company-specific. 
Last, it would be highly interesting to evaluate the R&D output effects of the 
increase in R&D activity. Some work has been done in this respect, using patenting 
activity (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006 as well as Schneider, 2008) or the introduction 
of new products (Aerts, 2008; Hujer and Radić, 2005 as well as Bérubé and 
Mohnen, 2007), but the topic deserves further elaboration. Also, the relationship 
between researcher wages and innovative performance seems to be a valuable 
research domain. 
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Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle? R&D subsidies and 
foreign ownership 
1. Introduction 
Innovation and R&D activities have become crucial components in modern 
knowledge-based economic systems (Romer, 1990). However, R&D is a risky 
process exhibiting high levels of uncertainty (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). 
Moreover, once knowledge is created by one company, other companies can never 
be fully prevented from free-riding on the R&D efforts of the company that did 
commit to the initial R&D investment (see Arrow, 1962). In addition to this 
imminent externality problem, also capital market constraints may hamper private 
R&D effort (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). As a result, the actual level of R&D 
spending will be lower than what would be socially desirable. Governments are well 
aware of this underinvestment problem and attempt to counter it by reducing the 
price of private R&D through granting public R&D funding to those projects which 
would normally not be undertaken. The aim of the government obviously is to 
increase the total R&D expenditure, which, in the ideal case, ultimately should 
result in more innovative output. However, it is possible that companies replace 
their own R&D budget with the money they received from the government. In that 
case, the total R&D expenditure would not increase and the instrument of public 
R&D funding would not be effective.  
As Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) prove, especially companies depending on 
external finance are burdened by asymmetric information and moral hazard motives 
and may experience serious obstacles in raising adequate R&D budgets (see also 
Hall, 2005). Hence, multinational enterprises (MNEs) may be less subject to these 
threats, as “The primary advantage of the multinational firm […] lies in the 
flexibility to transfer resources across borders through a globally maximizing 
network” (Kogut, 1993: 242). Markusen (1998) collects evidence showing that 
MNEs expand their foreign activities especially in R&D intensive industries, as 
knowledge-based assets can easily be transferred and serve many production 
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in R&D efforts through foreign affiliates. Foreign-owned firms may also benefit 
from a better organizational structure, resulting in a larger control over knowledge 
flows. Therefore, uncertainty and externality risks may be kept to a minimum (see 
e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 2004). Hence, the ownership structure of companies 
may result in heterogeneous effects of R&D subsidies and as a result, MNEs may be 
less likely to apply for a subsidy and on their turn, governments may be less 
inclined towards public R&D funding of MNEs. On the other hand, many scholars 
(see Bellak, 2004 for a survey) have shown that a significant performance gap exists 
between foreign-owned and domestic firms, to the benefit of the former. As a 
consequence, foreign-owned companies, exhibiting larger technical efficiency, may 
just as well be more effective in their R&D activities (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 
2005). The government’s desire to maximize the expected rate of return of public 
R&D funding may therefore conversely justify why governments would also 
provide public R&D funding to MNEs.  
Being a small, open economy, Belgium hosts a large share of foreign-owned 
MNE activity. For example, in 2000, foreign affiliates employed more than 40% of 
the total workforce and created more than 50% of the total added value in the 
manufacturing industry (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005). Research on Flemish 
data (the largest region in Belgium) learns that these foreign-owned companies are 
less likely to receive a subsidy (see e.g. Aerts et al., 2007). But then again, they 
harvest the larger R&D grants and, aggregated, the lion’s share of the total subsidy 
amount in Flanders. Obviously, it is imperative for policy makers to know how this 
skewed state of affairs is translated in R&D efforts and innovative output of 
domestic and foreign-owned companies. This is exactly the research question that 
will be tackled in this chapter: do R&D subsidies have a different impact on the 
R&D expenditure and the innovative output of domestic versus foreign-owned firms 
in Flanders? After this introduction, the relevant literature is presented. Next, the 
main methodological difficulties and adequate solution mechanisms are described. 
The fourth section elaborates on the data. The results are presented in the fifth 
section. The last section concludes with some final remarks and paths for further 
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2.  Literature Review 
Two literature streams are relevant for this research. First, the literature on the 
evaluation of public R&D funding is reviewed. Second, we dive into the literature 
on the internationalization of R&D activities and more specifically, the different 
roles played by domestic and foreign-owned companies in host countries. 
2.1. Additionality of R&D subsidies 
The predominant inquiry in the evaluation of public R&D funding addresses 
the impact of subsidies on private R&D investment: does public money replace (or 
crowd out) private expenditure on R&D? After an extensive review of the literature, 
David and Hall (2000) conclude that the results on potential crowding-out effects 
are ambiguous and they criticize that most existing studies neglect the problem of 
sample selection bias. R&D intensive firms may well be more likely to apply for a 
subsidy. Just as well, governments may be more inclined to grant them a subsidy. 
This makes R&D funding an endogenous variable, and should be tackled in an 
adequate way. Consequently, in more recent research the potential sample selection 
bias is taken into account through selection models, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimations (including simultaneous equation systems), difference-in-differences 
estimations and matching techniques. Although recent studies correct for a potential 
selection bias, the results remain ambiguous: many researchers reject full crowding-
out effects, while others find indications that public R&D funding replaces private 
R&D investments to some extent (see Aerts et al., 2007, for a survey of 
methodologies and applications). Key reasons for these diverging conclusions are 
the use of different estimators, as well as their application on a broad range of 
countries, each with their own specific S&T policy. So far, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Flanders, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the 
US have been subject to an R&D input evaluation analysis of their public R&D 
funding system
45.  
                                                             
45 Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004 and 2006), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Ali-Yrkkö (2004), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Clausen 
(2007), Czarnitzki (2001), Czarnitzki and Fier (2002), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Duguet (2004), Ebersberger (2005), 
Fier (2002), González and Pazó (2006), González et al. (2005), Görg and Strobl (2007), Hussinger (2008), Hyytinen and 
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Heijs and Herrera (2004), Kaiser (2004), Lach (2002), Suetens (2002), Toivanen and Niininen (2000) as well as Wallsten 
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Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004) address the additionality issue using a cross-
section of Flemish manufacturing and selected service companies with the nearest 
neighbour matching approach. Next, they extend their research in an IV framework, 
adding information on the amount of subsidies companies receive (Aerts and 
Czarnitzki, 2006). Both full and partial crowding-out effects are rejected. Aerts and 
Schmidt (2008) employ matching and the conditional difference-in-differences 
method with repeated cross-sections and find similar results. These studies jointly 
constitute substantial evidence supporting the positive effect of Flemish subsidies 
on private R&D spending. Conversely, Suetens (2002) applies an IV framework on 
a panel of Flemish firms, but her results are by and large not significant and full 
crowding-out cannot be rejected. A first explanation for these divergent results can 
be found in the use of a different methodology on a different dataset. Second, her 
variable of interest is, unlike in the research mentioned above (R&D expenditure), 
the number of R&D employees. David and Hall (2002) emphasize the importance 
of differentiating between the impact of subsidies on expenditure and employment, 
as companies may increase their R&D spending, but not necessarily also their R&D 
staffing. Goolsbee (1998) for example, concluded that R&D subsidies are primarily 
translated into researcher wage increases. Using a matching approach, Aerts (2008) 
gives audience to the appeal of David and Hall (2002) to include labour market 
dynamics in additionality research and finds, in addition to significantly positive 
R&D expenditure increases, a smaller, but still positive impact on the number of 
R&D employees. This coincides with an increase of R&D wages, which tends to 
reflect an upskilling process. 
The work of Görg and Strobl (2007) is of particular relevance here. They 
employ the conditional difference-in-differences technique on a rich panel data set 
of Irish manufacturing plants. They allow for a certain degree of heterogeneous 
treatment effects, distinguishing between small, medium and large grants and add 
the dimension of foreign ownership, given the importance of foreign multinational 
companies in Ireland. In contrast to the Flemish innovation policy, the public R&D 
funding allocated to domestic Irish firms is almost five times larger than the support 
foreign-owned affiliates receive. They reject crowding-out of small and medium 
grants and find additionality effects of small grants. However, no effect can be 
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not imply that public R&D grants to MNE affiliates are wasted, though, as they 
evaluate the effect on privately financed R&D and not on the total R&D 
investments. The R&D grants are actually deployed in Ireland, for R&D activities 
which may otherwise have been conducted in other locations. Moreover, knowledge 
spillovers to the benefit of the domestic economy may well occur. 
While investigating potential crowding-out effects of public R&D funding on 
private R&D expenditure indisputably is highly relevant for innovation policy 
evaluation, a rejection of such effects does not necessarily imply that increased 
R&D spending really induces technological progress and subsequently economic 
value creation. As hinted before, subsidies may just increase R&D wages instead of 
the real R&D effort. Or, subsidies can be used to finance duplicate R&D, which 
may induce inefficiency in the national innovation system (Irwin and Klenow, 
1996). Moreover, an actual reinforcement of private R&D activities may be directed 
towards more risky and consequently potentially less successful projects (Setter and 
Tishler, 2005). Hence, extending additionality research on R&D inputs to an 
analysis of the induced innovative and economic output is imperative to get a full 
understanding of the impact of R&D subsidies. Klette et al. (2000) survey the 
literature on evaluation studies, also measuring firm growth, firm value, patents, etc. 
Since then, researchers also have been evaluating measures on product and process 
innovations. More recent research extends the crowding-out question by linking 
privately financed and publicly induced R&D expenditure to innovative activity 
(Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004 as well as Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). A two 
equation model is considered: first, a treatment effects analysis on R&D expenditure 
is conducted using the matching approach. In the second equation, a knowledge 
production function is estimated, relating a measure of innovative output to the 
firms’ R&D spending and other covariates. The first step allows disentangling total 
R&D spending into two components: on the one hand, that part of the R&D 
expenditure that would have been invested in the absence of subsidies, i.e. the 
estimated counterfactual situation. On the other hand, the remaining part of the 
R&D expenditure that has been induced by the receipt of subsidies, which 
comprises the amount of the subsidy itself, and the additionally stimulated privately 
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observed R&D spending, but the decomposition allows analyzing the productivity 
of privately financed versus the additionally induced R&D by public subsidies. 
The neo-classical paradigm of decreasing returns predicts that R&D projects, 
which would have been conducted anyway, exhibit higher returns; the marginal 
return of any additional R&D spending is smaller (Griliches, 1998). Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger (2004) indeed find that both components exert a significantly positive 
impact on the number of patents a company applies for, although the productivity of 
the public part is slightly lower. Patent counts do not give any indication of the 
social value of the publicly induced R&D, though. The return to these R&D budgets 
may well be higher than private benefits. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) follow the 
same approach, distinguishing between East and West Germany to investigate 
whether and how the massive supply of public innovation funding fosters the 
transformation of East Germany from a planned to a market economy after the re-
unification of Germany. For both regions, subsidies are shown to positively affect 
the average R&D spending as well as the number of patent applications. However, 
the R&D productivity in West Germany is significantly higher than in East 
Germany, which casts doubt on the efficiency of the German subsidy allocation. 
2.2. The internationalization of R&D activities  
Standard literature on MNEs and their affiliate R&D activity focuses on the 
motives for international R&D activities. Initially, MNE affiliates conducted R&D 
abroad to adapt the MNE’s products to local markets: the knowledge of the MNE is 
exploited to serve foreign markets: the so-called asset-exploiting (Dunning and 
Narula, 1995) or home-base-exploiting (Kuemmerle, 1997) motive. Over time 
however, R&D activities became more and more internationalized and foreign MNE 
affiliates became a potential source of valuable knowledge to the MNE head 
quarters. External knowledge is picked up and internalized in the MNE: the so-
called asset-seeking (Dunning and Narula, 1995) or home-base-augmenting 
(Kuemmerle, 1997) motive. The increasing importance of the home-base-
augmenting motive in internationalization activities of MNEs excited a growing fear 
of national governments that foreign affiliate R&D activity may become a 
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Krahmer and Reger, 1999 as well as Guellec and Zuniga, 2006). Conversely, 
domestic companies may also just as well benefit from the knowledge which is 
encased in these foreign-owned companies. An often mentioned prerequisite to 
realize positive spillover effects is a substantial level of absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989 and Haskel et al., 2007). Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) 
investigate how foreign subsidiaries can channel international technology diffusion 
in Belgium. They find that unwanted spillovers are minimized by limiting the 
personnel turnover and cannot confirm the presence of positive spillovers to 
domestic companies. However, they also show that the host country gains 
significantly when foreign-owned technology sourcing affiliates closely cooperate 
with domestic firms. Ivarsson (2002) draws a similar conclusion from his research 
on Swedish companies and suggests efforts should be made to strengthen 
technological linkages. Nevertheless, even when the MNE knowledge does not spill 
over to domestic firms, foreign-owned affiliates may still create economic value for 
the host country’s society. Bellak (2004) gives an extensive overview on research 
unravelling performance gaps between foreign-owned versus domestic firms, 
showing up in wages, skills, labour, productivity, growth, profitability and 
technology (see also Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2000). He concludes that MNE 
affiliates outperform domestic companies, most often because of their ownership 
status and not because of the fact that they are foreign-owned; the gaps between 
domestic and foreign MNEs are significantly smaller than the gaps between uni-
national and multinational firms. However, foreign ownership may still be a reason 
to explain a performance gap as foreign-owned firms face the liability of 
foreignness (Hymer, 1976 and Zaheer, 1995). Because foreign-owned firms initially 
are not familiar with the host country’s context, they are disadvantaged, relative to 
domestic firms. Firm-specific advantages enable multinationals to overcome this 
initial discriminatory position (Caves, 1971). As a result, multinationals may excel 
after they have learned to adapt to the host country and consequently outperform the 
domestic companies.  
Especially the potential difference in innovative effort and R&D efficiency 
between domestic and foreign-owned firms is interesting in the evaluation of 
additionality effects, as governments may cherry-pick exactly these high performing 
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expected rate of return. Many researchers confirm the presence of a gap in 
innovative capabilities between foreign-owned and domestic companies. Country 
studies in favour of the higher innovative capabilities of foreign-owned firms cover 
Belgium (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005), Finland (Ebersberger et al., 2005), 
Norway (Ebersberger and Lööf, 2005), Sweden (Ebersberger and Lööf, 2004), and 
the UK (Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2007). Falk and Falk (2006) conduct propensity 
score matching to relate innovation intensity, computed as expenditures on 
innovation divided by sales, to foreign ownership in Austria and conclude that 
foreign affiliates spend relatively less on innovative activities. They do not evaluate 
potential differences at the output side of the innovative process, though. 
Ebersberger et al. (2007) analyze the impact of foreign ownership on innovativeness 
in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. They found no differences in 
input, but higher levels of output in foreign-owned firms, again suggesting that 
foreign-owned firms conduct their R&D activities in a more efficient way. 
Explanations for the better performance of foreign-owned companies can be found 
in firm-specific assets of the MNE. Also, MNEs can capitalize scale advantages, 
possess a larger knowledge base, which is easily accessible for affiliates, and reduce 
duplicate research, because R&D activities can be shared and coordinated 
internally. Moreover, different ownership structures may be related to differences in 
innovative strategies, potentially resulting in higher efficiency. De Bondt et al. 
(1988) found that Belgian domestic firms focus on specific market segments, 
whereas MNE affiliates rather conduct more R&D efforts for larger markets. When 
foreign-owned companies can realize a higher efficiency in their innovative 
productivity and the innovative and economic value can subsequently be captured 
by the host country, the social value of public R&D funding of MNE affiliates may 
be very high. Positive impacts may arise on the host country’s innovativeness 
(measured in patents, sales of new products,…) and create economic value 
(measured in net added value growth, employment,…). This would then justify why 
governments may allocate more public R&D funding to foreign-owned companies.  
3. Methodology  
An extensive range of econometric methods is available to correct for the 
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overview). In the following subsections this endogeneity problem and the correction 
method employed here, i.e. the matching estimator, are explained. In a last 
subsection I briefly summarize how the counterfactual, i.e. privately financed, and 
the publicly induced R&D expenditure are disentangled in order to measure their 
respective impact on the technological progress and economic value in the host 
country. 
3.1. Selection bias 
I empirically evaluate the impact of public R&D funding. The average impact 
of a subsidy can be computed as follows:  
) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − = = S Y E S Y E
C T
TT α , (31) 
where Y is the outcome variable (e.g. R&D expenditure) of a firm
46, in the so-called 
treated (T) and counterfactual (C) situation, S is the treatment status (S=1: treated; 
S=0: untreated – treatment is the receipt of a subsidy here). So  TT α , the average 
impact of the treatment on the treated firms, results from comparing the actual 
outcome of subsidized firms with their potential outcome in case of not receiving a 
grant. The approach of measuring potential outcomes goes back to Roy (1951). The 
actual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
T  can be estimated by the sample mean of the outcome in 
the group of subsidized firms.  
The counterfactual situation  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  can however never be observed and 
has to be estimated. In a hastily analysis a researcher could compare the average 
R&D spending of subsidized and non-subsidized companies to compute the 
treatment effect on the treated, assuming that:  
) 0 ( ) 1 ( = = = S Y E S Y E
C C . (32) 
However, subsidized companies may well have been more R&D active than 
the non-subsidized companies, even without the subsidy program. This would imply 
a selection bias in the estimation of the treatment effect. Ex ante innovative and 
R&D intensive firms may be more likely to receive an R&D subsidy, as 
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governments want to maximize the expected rate of return of their public money 
and therefore may well cherry-pick proposals of companies with considerable R&D 
expertise. Moreover, it is quite possible that those R&D intensive firms have an 
information advantage and are better acquainted with policy measures they qualify 
for. As a result they would be more likely to apply for a subsidy. Expression (32) 
only holds in an experimental setting where there would be no selection bias and 
subsidies are granted randomly to firms. This is most likely not to be the case in 
current innovation policies.  
As the highest expected success is correlated with current R&D spending, the 
subsidy receipt (treatment) becomes an endogenous variable. To estimate treatment 
effects while taking this potential endogeneity problem into account, econometric 
literature has developed a range of methods (see e.g. the surveys of Heckman et al., 
1999; Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000, 2002 as well as Aerts et al., 2007, for a survey 
of methods applied in additionality research). Examples of these methods are 
selection models, instrumental variable (IV) estimations (including simultaneous 
equation systems), difference-in-differences estimations and matching. The latter 
method will be employed here.  
3.2. Matching estimator 
The matching estimator is a non-parametric method and its main advantage is 
that no particular functional form of equations has to be specified. The 
disadvantages are strong assumptions and heavy data requirements. The main 
purpose of the matching estimator is to re-establish the conditions of an experiment. 
The matching estimator attempts to construct an accurate counterpart sample for the 
treated firms' outcomes if they would not have been treated, by pairing each treated 
firm with members of a comparison group. Under the matching assumption, the 
only remaining difference between the two groups is the actual subsidy receipt. The 
difference in outcome variables can then be attributed to the subsidy. 
Rubin (1977) proved that the receipt of subsidies and the potential outcome 
are independent for firms with the same set of exogenous characteristics X=x: 
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This crucial conditional independence assumption (CIA) helps to overcome 
the problem that the counterfactual outcome  ) 1 ( = S Y E
C  is unobservable. If the 
CIA holds, the expected outcome  ) , 0 ( x X S Y E
C = =  can be used as a measure of 
the potential outcome of the subsidy recipients. However, the CIA is only fulfilled if 
all variables X influencing the outcome Y and selection status S are known and 
available in the dataset. This imposes heavy requirements on the richness of the 
dataset. If the relevant variables are known and available and the CIA holds, the 
equation  
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C C = = = = = , 0 , 1  (34) 
is valid and the average outcome of subsidized firms in the absence of a subsidy can 
be calculated from a sample of comparable, i.e. matched, firms.  
Another feature the matching procedure relies on, is the compliance with the 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the 
potential outcome for each treated firm is stable: it should take one single value (and 
not follow a distribution) and the treatment of one firm should not affect the 
treatment effect on another firm (Rubin, 1990). Unfortunately this cannot be tested. 
In the matching process, for all treated firms a valid counterpart should be 
found in the non-treated population and every firm should represent a potential 
subsidy recipient. Therefore, a so-called common support restriction is imposed. If 
the samples of treated and non-treated firms would have no or only little overlap in 
the exogenous characteristics X, matching is not applicable to obtain consistent 
estimates. If the assumptions hold, the average treatment effect on the treated would 
consequently amount to 
( ) ( ) x X S Y E x X S Y E
C T M
TT = = − = = = , 0 , 1 α  (35) 
which can be estimated using the sample means of both groups.  
In the ideal case, the matching procedure includes as many matching 
arguments X as possible to find a perfect twin in the control group of non-treated 
firms for each treated firm. However, the more dimensions that are included, the 
more difficult it becomes to find a good match: the so-called curse of   Essays on the economics of evaluation  138 
dimensionality enters. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that it is valid to 
reduce the number of matching dimensions X to a single index: the propensity 
score ) ( ˆ X P , which is the probability to receive a subsidy. Lechner (1998) suggested 
hybrid matching, where the propensity score  ) ( ˆ X P and a subset of X condition the 
matching procedure. This increases the accurateness of the matching procedure, 
since the equivalence of these extra variables is explicitly imposed, in addition to 
their weight in the propensity score. Each treated firm is then matched to its nearest 
neighbour by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance between the respective 
propensity scores and additional matching arguments. To obtain the best possible 
match, a large pool of controls is required. Therefore, I match with replacement and 
allow different treated firms to be matched to the same non-treated firm. This will 
cause a bias in the ordinary t-statistic on mean differences, which has to be 
corrected (Lechner, 2001).  
3.3. R&D output evaluation 
Once the additionality effect is estimated, it is disentangled into two 
components: the privately financed, counterfactual, R&D expenditure (RDC) on the 
one hand and the additional, publicly induced, R&D expenditure (RDdif) on the 
other hand, following Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) as well as Czarnitzki and 
Licht (2006). Obviously, the additional R&D expenditure of companies which did 
not receive any funding is zero, and their counterfactual R&D spending equals their 
actual R&D expenditure. In summary, companies’ R&D expenditure is disentangled 
as displayed in Table 25. 
Table 25: Decomposition of R&D expenditure 
----------------------------RDC---------------------------- --------------------------RDdif-------------------------- 
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Next, different kinds of ‘productivity functions’ are estimated to relate R&D 
input to output within the additionality framework. The decomposition allows 
disentangling heterogeneous effects on the productivity of the counterfactual versus 
leveraged R&D spending. Innovative activity is measured in terms of the share of Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  139
new products in the total sales as well as the engagement in a patent application. In 
addition to the productivity of companies’ innovative efforts, also economic value 
creation more in general is measured, in terms of the growth of the net added value. 
Censored-normal as well as ordinary regression models are employed for the share 
of new products in the total sales and the growth of the net added value. A probit 
model is used to estimate potential productivity differences in the patenting activity.  
4. The data  
The particularities of public R&D funding and foreign multinational activity 
in Flanders are briefly explained first. Next, I come to the description of the data 
and the variables used to conduct an assessment of R&D subsidies in Flanders. 
4.1. Contextual framework 
In Flanders, IWT, the Institute for the Promotion of Innovation through 
Science and Technology in Flanders, is the single counter where companies can 
apply for a subsidy. This implies that subsidies, at the Flemish and Belgian level, as 
well as certain EU-funded projects
47 are evaluated and granted through IWT. 
Accelerated depreciation for R&D capital assets and R&D tax allowances are 
available through the federal Belgian government. In contrast to most countries, the 
Belgian R&D tax allowances are fixed and not granted as a percentage: for each 
additional employee employed in scientific research, the company is granted a tax 
exemption for a fixed amount, in the year of recruitment. However, as Van 
Pottelsberghe et al. (2003) indicate, very few Belgian companies actually make use 
of these fiscal measures
48. Main reasons are a low level of acquaintance with the 
system, complexity and high administration costs
49 and the fact that the measures 
                                                             
47 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
engaging in these programs is very limited. 
48 Due to recent changes in the Science and Technology Policy, this situation has changed, though. In the current system, 
fiscal measures, and more specifically tax credits for R&D personnel, are becoming increasingly popular. However, this is not 
relevant in the current chapter, as our data was collected before the change. 
49 First, each year the company has to deliver a certificate. Second, the researcher should be full time employed in the research 
department of the same company to qualify. Third, the tax allowance is nominative, inducing a burden to keep track of all 
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are not significantly substantial
50. Direct R&D funding through IWT remains the 
largest source of public R&D grants in the private sector in Flanders
51. 
De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2005) confirm Belgium’s weak FDI outward 
position relative to its FDI inward position: there is a strong presence of foreign 
multinational activity in Flanders. In 2001, 2,958 foreign affiliates employed 
293,409 people and created an added value of about 25 billion EUR (Sleuwaegen et 
al., 2004a). These affiliates usually are owned in a structure of a foreign majority 
share holder; head quarters are mostly located in the Netherlands (34%), France 
(19%), the US (10%) or Germany (8%) (Vanweddingen, 2006). In terms of the 
number of companies, this foreign presence is strongest in the service sector (75% 
of the foreign affiliates), and more specifically in wholesale trade and other business 
services. However, a limited number of foreign-owned companies realizes a 
considerable share of the added value and employment in industry (especially in 
chemicals, automotive and metals): they represent 8% in the total number of foreign 
companies, but 60% and 51% in terms of the added value and employment, 
respectively, created by all foreign affiliates. (Sleuwaegen et al., 2004a) 
A comparison of the presence of foreign-owned versus domestic companies 
(Sleuwaegen et al., 2004b) learns that foreign affiliates are especially active in the 
high-tech and medium-high-tech sectors, while in comparison, Flemish firms are 
rather active in the medium-low-tech sectors. Performance indicators show that 
foreign-owned companies outperform domestic companies in terms of profitability 
and added value per employee (Sleuwaegen et al., 2004b) as well as innovative 
capabilities (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2005). 
Although Flanders is moving towards a knowledge economy, it is strongly 
dependent on multinational activity in this respect. In the chemical, automotive and 
metal industries as well as in the telecommunication sector, there is a strong 
sensitivity to delocalisation: the presence of foreign affiliates is considerable and 
delocalisation would imply serious decreases in the number of companies, 
employment and added value in these sectors in Flanders. In a dynamic analysis, 
Sleuwaegen et al. (2004b) look at the evolution of the number of jobs and added 
                                                             
50 First, the amount of the exemption is not sufficiently significant. Second, the definition of highly qualified personnel is too 
strict, so that only very few employees qualify for the measure. Third, the tax exemption is a short term measure (it only 
relates to the first year of recruitment) while R&D typically is a long term process. 
51 The interested reader is referred to Aerts and Czarnitzki (2006) for a detailed overview of the public R&D funding system in 
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value between 1998 and 2002. They found that the number of jobs in foreign 
enterprises went down in the low-tech, medium-high-tech and medium-low-tech 
sectors; the number of jobs in the high-tech sectors increased in foreign affiliates 
because of new entrants. In the Flemish companies, employment in low-tech 
industries decreased (especially in textiles), but increased in medium-high and 
medium-low-tech industries. In this way, Flanders may start reducing its strong 
dependence on multinational activity. 
With respect to R&D activity, it can be observed that in the foreign activity in 
the high-tech and medium-tech industries, especially Germany and the US are 
highly active (Sleuwaegen, 2004b). Also, these countries exhibit a high R&D-
intensity: in 2006 the share of the GERD in the GDP was 2.51% in Germany and 
2.62% in the US, compared to 1.85% in Belgium (OECD, 2007). So, next to the 
economic gains from multinational activity in terms of employment and added 
value, foreign multinationals can be an extremely valuable source of knowledge, in 
support of the local R&D activity. A primordial condition however, is the ability of 
the domestic companies to absorb and internalise this knowledge. Hence, the 
Belgian and Flemish government seem to follow a double strategy: on the one hand, 
it is important that the Flemish economy develops into a strong and healthy 
knowledge-intensive economy, reducing its dependence on foreign activity, while 
on the other hand, the government wants to promote Flanders as the ideal location 
for setting-up and expanding multinational activity. 
The Belgian government stresses its non-discriminatory treatment: “foreign 
companies, subsidiaries or branches, have the same legal obligations, but can also 
apply to all possible incentives, as domestic companies” (FOD Economie, KMO, 
Middenstand en Energie, 2008). With different incentives, a considerable attempt 
was made to create a business-friendly environment. Besides their explicit claim of 
non-discrimination, the Flemish and Belgian government make substantial efforts to 
attract business activity from abroad, especially by providing clear information 
about different options and possibilities and thereby facilitating access to the 
Belgian and Flemish economic and technological potential.  
The regions carry the full responsibility in granting direct financial incentives. 
Most of the tax incentives are provided through the federal government, but some 
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incentives are provided at both the federal and regional level. The Belgian Science 
and Technology Policy is highly regionalized and the Flemish government has a 
large degree of control in this matter. Other policy areas are less regionalized. As 
multinational activity in high-tech industries is expected to generate high gains in 
terms of employment, added value, performance and innovative capacity, with large 
potential spillovers towards the local economy, foreign affiliates constitute an 
important player in the Flemish economy. The Flemish government has a strong 
power, especially in granting financial incentives for R&D activity and the 
provision of R&D subsidies may serve as an instrument to attract foreign activity in 
Flanders. So, especially here, this consideration becomes very relevant: through 
public R&D funding, the Flemish government may aspire to increase R&D activity, 
but also attract multinational (R&D) activity more in general. On the other hand, the 
total amount of public R&D funding which companies can receive is limited to 8 
million EUR per year. In larger companies this amount typically represents only 5% 
to 10% of their total R&D expenditure. Hence, R&D grants are often regarded as 
‘structural support’. The Flemish government puts high value on the valorisation of 
the research results in Flanders. This is hard to enforce, though, especially in 
multinational companies. In this chapter, the impact of public R&D funding is 
looked into, in domestic versus foreign-owned companies and at both the input as 
well as output side of the R&D process. 
4.2. Variables 
The potential crowding-out effect of R&D subsidies in Flanders is addressed 
empirically with data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS is 
conducted biannually and covers most EU countries. The questionnaire is by and 
large harmonized. Eurostat (2004) presents detailed descriptive survey results for all 
countries, as well as aggregate statistics. To evaluate the impact of subsidies at the 
input side, the CIS III (1998-2000) and IV (2002-2004) waves are pooled. To 
measure the impact of the subsidies at the output side, CIS IV (2002-2004) and V 
(2004-2006) data are used. The innovation data are supplemented with patent 
application data from the European Patent Office since 1978. Balance sheet data 
from the National Bank of Belgium (Belfirst) were merged to the dataset to provide 
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subsidy history of each company was added: IWT keeps track of all subsidy 
applications and potential subsequent grants. 
The receipt of subsidies is denoted by a dummy variable (FUN) indicating 
whether the firm, observed in the CIS IV (III)
52, received public R&D funding in 
the period 2002 to 2004 (1998 to 2000). On average 22% of the Flemish companies 
received public funding in the observation period. The Flemish government 
provided 68% of these firms with R&D funds; the national and European 
governments were to a lesser, but nevertheless significant extent, sources of public 
R&D funding of Flemish companies (40% and 19% respectively). The funding 
impact is measured as an average effect over the different funding schemes.  
The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable indicating foreign 
ownership (FOREIGN). First, the CIS information on foreign ownership was 
extracted. Next, I compared this information with ownership information from the 
balance sheet data of the National Bank of Belgium. This allowed me to fill up 
some missing data. As common in the literature, foreign ownership was defined as 
being owned for at least 10% by a foreign mother company
53. In my sample, 26% of 
the companies is owned by a foreign mother company. The most important 
countries where head offices of Belgian subsidiaries in this sample are located, are 
the Netherlands, the US, Germany, France and Great Britain. 
The outcome variables are twofold. First, R&D expenditure
54 (in million 
EUR) at the firm level in 2004(2000), RD, is evaluated. However, as the 
distribution of this indicator is highly skewed in the economy, the R&D intensity, 
RDint (R&D expenditure / turnover * 100), is evaluated as well. Also due to the 
skewness of RD and RDint, some extreme values might affect the mean of the 
distribution significantly, so that a few observations may determine the estimation 
results. A logarithmic transformation scales down the large values and reduces the 
problem with these skewed distributions. Therefore, the logs
55 of RD and RDint are 
additionally evaluated as outcome variables. All outcome variables refer to the year 
2004(2000). 
                                                             
52 In the description of the variables, I always refer to two years, i.e. the observation window of the CIS-waves.  
53 The low cut-off value of 10% is more rigid to some extent, though. More detailed information on the degree of ownership is 
included in the CIS IV and CIS V waves. The descriptive statistics show that 95% of the Flemish subsidiaries observed in the 
CIS are being owned by 50% or more by their parent company. Therefore, the control power of the parent companies is 
substantial in the sample. 
54 In the CIS survey, R&D expenditure is defined in accordance with the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002).  
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Several control variables are introduced which may affect both the probability 
to receive R&D subsidies and R&D effort, respectively. As the subsidy dummy 
covers a three year period, I use, whenever possible, values of the covariates 
measured at the beginning of the reference period, 2002(1998) in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems in the selection equation. Including the number of employees 
allows controlling for size effects, which are empirically often found to explain 
innovativeness (see e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Moreover, the Flemish 
S&T policy puts high value on R&D activities performed by small and medium 
sized companies. Therefore, the size variable is also expected to influence the 
subsidy receipt. Again, the logarithmic transformation (lnEMP) is used to avoid any 
potential estimation bias caused by skewness of the data. 
PROJ is a count variable, reflecting the total number of project proposals each 
company submitted in order to obtain an R&D subsidy in the preceding five years. 
It is obtained by merging the firm level CIS/patent information with the project 
level ICAROS database, in which IWT keeps track of all subsidy applications by 
Flemish companies. PROJ is an important control variable since it is very likely 
highly correlated with both the probability to receive a subsidy and the R&D 
activities. Companies which submitted many projects in the past may on the one 
hand be more innovative and therefore more likely to apply for a subsidy to support 
their extensive R&D activities. On the other hand, they are more experienced in 
applying for a subsidy and hence possibly more ‘eligible’ for a grant. 
Another important variable is the firms' patent stock. As I use data from two 
cross-sectional datasets which do not include time-series information, the patent 
stock enables controlling for previous (successful) R&D activities. Obviously, not 
all innovation efforts lead to patents, which Griliches (1990: 1669) formulated 
nicely as “not all inventions are patentable, not all inventions are patented”. 
Likewise, not all patented innovations result from R&D activities; the R&D process 
is only part of a company’s innovative activity
56. Moreover, the propensity to patent 
may be heterogeneous among firms. However, as data on previous R&D 
expenditure are not available, the patent stock is the best approximation of past 
innovative activities. I use all patent information in the EPO database and generate 
                                                             
56 Innovative activity is defined as “all those scientific, technological, organizational, financial and commercial steps which 
actually, or are intended to, lead to the implementation of technologically new or improved products or processes” 
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the stock of patents for each firm as the depreciated sum of all patents filed at the 
EPO from 1978 until 2001(1997):  
t t t PATA PAT PAT + − = −1 ) 1 ( δ ,   (36) 
where PAT is the patent stock of a firm in period t and t-1, respectively, PATA are 
the number of patent applications filed at the EPO and δ is a constant depreciation 
rate of knowledge which is set to 0.15 as common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe, 
1986; Griliches and Mairesse, 1984). On the one hand, firms that exhibit previous 
successful innovation projects indicated by patents, are more likely to receive public 
R&D funding, because public authorities may follow the ‘picking-the-winner’ 
principle in order to minimize the expected failure rate of the innovation projects, 
and hence, to maximize the expected benefit for the society. On the other hand, the 
patent stock controls for the past average innovative engagement of the firms, 
because it is expected that firms that were highly innovative in the past will 
continue this strategy. The patents are counted only until 2001(1997), to ensure that 
the stock definitely refers to past innovation activities and to avoid a simultaneous 
equation bias in the regression analysis. The patent stock enters into the regression 
as patent stock per employee (PAT/EMP) to reduce potential multicollinearity with 
firm size. 
The export quota (EXQU = exports / turnover) measures the degree of 
international competition a firm faces. Firms that engage in foreign markets may be 
more innovative than others and, hence, would be more likely to apply for subsidies.  
Next, variables reflecting the technological and financial quality of the 
company may play a significant role in both the subsidy and R&D story. These 
characteristics are proxied by capital intensity (CAPint) as the value of fixed assets 
per employee and cash-flow (CASHF) (both in million EUR) respectively. Both 
variables are obtained from balance sheet records provided by the National Bank of 
Belgium (through the Belfirst database). CASHF is also divided by the number of 
employees (CASHF/EMP) to avoid multicollinearity with firm size.  
The variable SCOM acts as a measure of absorptive capacity, signalling to 
which extent information from competitors in the same industry is absorbed by the 
company. To avoid potential endogeneity with the outcome variables, this variable 
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a firm belongs to a group (GROUP) controls for different governance structures
57. 
Firms belonging to a group may be more likely to receive subsidies because they 
presumably have better access to information about governmental actions due to 
their network linkages.  
Twelve industry dummies (BR) are included to allow for differences between 
sectors. On the one hand, some sectors may exhibit a larger R&D intensity. On the 
other hand, governments may favour certain sectors in their R&D policy, which 
increases the likelihood of receiving subsidies for firms in these industries. The 
relationship between size and R&D activities is often found to depend on industry 
characteristics. Acs and Audretsch (1987), amongst others, conclude that large firms 
are more innovative when they operate in capital-intensive and highly concentrated 
sectors, while smaller firms expose a higher degree of innovative activity in 
industries which are highly innovative and dependent on skilled labour. Moreover, 
some funding schemes directly target specific industries or groups of industries, like 
Biotech programs. Therefore, interaction terms between the industry dummies and 
lnEMP (BR_lnEMP) are included as well. As I use data from two pooled cross-
sections and the average R&D expenditure was subjected to a downward trend (see 
e.g. Debackere and Veugelers, 2007), a year dummy (YEAR=1 for the CIS IV 
wave) was included in the regressions to control for differences over time. 
Moreover, the monetary variables (RD, lnRD, CAPint and CASHF) were deflated 
(EconStats, 2007). The total sample consists of 1441 observations, of which 313 
companies received public R&D funding and of which 372 companies are owned by 
a foreign mother company. The summary statistics of the variables are presented in 
Appendix 1 (on page 167). 
In the second step, the counterfactual and additionally leveraged R&D 
spending are disentangled, to evaluate the impact of Flemish R&D subsidies at the 
output side of the innovative process and, more general, their economic impact. 
Obviously, developing successful innovative output is time-consuming. Therefore, 
lead variables are extracted from two other data sources. The subsequent CIS wave, 
i.e. the CIS V, conducted in 2006, provides information on the share in the total 
2005 turnover realized by products which are new to the market (TURNMAR = 
share * turnover). As a robustness check, also the impact on TURNMAR per 
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employee (TURNMAR/EMP) is tested. Second, the CIS V asks whether the 
company applied for a patent in the period 2004-2006. This information was 
translated into the dummy variable PATdum
58. However, the variables TURNMAR, 
TURNMAR/EMP and PATdum are only available as a lead variable for companies 
which are also observed in the CIS IV survey. Unfortunately, this results in a 
limited number of observations, as we loose the CIS III wave. To estimate a more 
general economic impact of R&D subsidies, the net added value (the value of the 
output produced minus the costs of the intermediate goods) was computed from the 
Belfirst database. The variable NAV_growth measures the growth of the deflated 
net added value of a company between 2005 and 2004 (2001 and 2000, 
respectively) and is linked to the firms observed in the CIS IV and III, respectively. 
An extra control variable, the one-year-lagged deflated net added value (NAVt-1) 
was introduced to control for past productivity. To avoid multicollinearity with size, 
this variable was normalized by the number of employees (NAV/EMP t-1). The 
summary statistics of these variables can be found in Table 26. 
Table 26: Summary statistics – output additionality 
Variable  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
TURNMAR  151  0.341  1.004 0 7.315 
TURNMAR/EMP 151  2.277  3.917  0  23.878 
PATdum 360  0.153  0.360  0  1 
NAV_growth 1455  0.061  3.523  -32.927  61.845 
NAV/EMP t-1  1455  0.063 0.049 -0.848 0.702 
5. Estimates 
In this section, the estimation results are presented. First, I focus on the input 
side of the R&D process and measure potential additionality effects in terms of 
R&D expenditure and R&D intensity. In a second step, the impact on R&D 
spending due to public funding is first related to the output side of the R&D process, 
in terms of the share of new products in the turnover and the patenting propensity 
and second, to a more general economic indicator, i.e. the growth of the net added 
value realized by a company. 
                                                             
58 By using patent information from the CIS survey, I avoid the truncation problem which would occur if the EPO patent 
information would have been used. However, in doing so, I can only assess a dummy variable and refrain from using 
information on the number of patent applications.   Essays on the economics of evaluation  148 
As indicated in the methodological section, hybrid nearest neighbour 
matching with replacement is employed. To elucidate the role of foreign ownership 
in the additionality issue, the same matching procedure is conducted for three 
samples. First, the full dataset is used. Second, the full sample is split according to 
ownership and potential additionality effects are evaluated for foreign-owned versus 
domestic firms in two separate estimations. The propensity score ) (X P
59, lnEMP 
and YEAR
60 are used to select matched pairs with:  
P(X) = f(FOREIGN, lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, 
CASHF/EMP, SCOM, GROUP, YEAR, BR, BR_lnEMP).  (37) 
Full sample 
The summary statistics in Appendix 1 (on page 167) show that funded and 
non-funded companies seem to exhibit different characteristics for both the outcome 
and control variables. This is confirmed by two-sided t-tests (not reported here). 
Hence, the difference in outcome variables cannot be assigned as such to the receipt 
of a subsidy: a selection bias may be present here. Matching can solve this problem. 
First, the propensity to receive funding is estimated (see Table 27). As already 
indicated before, foreign-owned companies are significantly disadvantaged to 
receive a subsidy. This bias may be due to the applying (company) as well as the 
granting (government) side of the subsidy system. On the other hand, these foreign-
owned firms receive a disproportionate amount of subsidies, potentially resulting in 
heterogeneous additionality effects, as hypothetically stated in this chapter. 
Furthermore, size, experience in project applications, past innovative activity and 
international competition are important determinants increasing the likelihood of 
receiving an R&D subsidy. Industry affiliation matters as well. As the interaction 
terms BR_lnEMP are jointly significant (χ²(11) = 17,51*), I include them in the 
final propensity score estimates. 
 
 
                                                             
59 Obviously FOREIGN is only included in the full sample; GROUP is only included when domestic firms are in the sample. 
60 YEAR is included to guarantee that companies are matched only to other companies observed in the same CIS wave. This 
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Table 27: Propensity to receive funding – full sample 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err. 
FOREIGN°  -0.4530  ***  0.1156  -0.1123  ***  0.0254 
lnEMP  0.0994 ***  0.0372    0.0273 ***  0.0102 
PROJ  0.5459 ***  0.0634    0.1497 ***  0.0188 
PAT/EMP  0.1018 ***  0.0268    0.0279 ***  0.0074 
EXQU 0.7320  ***  0.1348   0.2007  ***  0.0364 
CAPint  0.0670   0.3383    0.0184   0.0928 
CASHF/EMP  0.7975   0.5694    0.2187   0.1565 
SCOM  0.1515   0.0934    0.0415   0.0256 
GROUP°  0.1208   0.1024    0.0330   0.0278 
YEAR°  -0.1977  **  0.0857  -0.0542  **  0.0234 
constant -1.6875  ***  0.2109         
BR  χ²(11) = 20.97  
p = 0.0337 
Log-Likelihood -607 
Pseudo R²  0.1951 
# obs.  1441 
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
 
The predicted propensity to receive a subsidy (the propensity score), is 
combined with lnEMP and YEAR to select pairs of subsidized and very similar 
non-subsidized companies. T-tests on the matched samples (not reported here) do 
no longer exhibit significant differences in the control variables foreign ownership, 
size, past project applications, patent stock, export ratio, capital intensity, cash flow, 
absorptive capacity, group membership, industry affiliation and the probability to 
receive funding. However, the differences in the outcome variables remain 
significant (see Table 28): the funded companies are more R&D active; they spend 
more on R&D both in absolute terms (0.636 million EUR, or 58%) and in 
proportion to the turnover (2.73%, or 52%). The crowding-out hypothesis is 
rejected: the average R&D expenditure and the average R&D intensity have 
increased due to the public funding of R&D. 
Table 28: Descriptive statistics after matching – full sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
----------------- α ° ----------------- 
RD 1.0962  0.1695  0.4598  0.0711  0.6364  ***  58% 
RDint 5.2155 0.5427  2.4869  0.3158 2.7286  ***  52% 
lnRD -2.4131  0.1932 -4.5537 0.2405 2.1406  ***   
lnRDint -0.4997  0.1874  -2.5835  0.2325  2.0838  ***   
# obs.  297  297       
Note: the control variables (FOREIGN, lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, GROUP, SCOM, 
YEAR, BR and BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are not significantly different after the matching and 
therefore not reported here. 16 funded companies were deleted due to common support restrictions. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the sample of funded 
firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on the funded firms. The relative 
difference is calculated as 




= = , 1
α
.These statistics are based on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation 
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The next step now is to split the full sample according to ownership in 
foreign-owned and domestic companies and repeat the analysis.  
Foreign sample 
Again, a probit model is estimated to obtain a score for the propensity to 
receive public R&D funding. In the subsample of foreign-owned firms, size, past 
project applications and the export ratio positively influence the likelihood to 
receive a subsidy (see Table 29). Table 30 presents the differences in the outcome 
variables after the matching. Also for the subsample of foreign-owned firms, the 
hypothesis of full crowding-out can be rejected. 
Table 29: Propensity to receive funding – foreign sample 
  Probit estimates    Marginal effects 
  Coef.  Std. Err.    dy/dx  Std. Err. 
lnEMP  0.1706 **  0.0715   0.0497 **  0.0207 
PROJ  0.8180 ***  0.1527   0.2382 ***  0.0519 
PAT/EMP  0.0107   0.0605   0.0031   0.0176 
EXQU 0.7054  **  0.2996   0.2054 **  0.0856 
CAPint  0.7180   1.1021   0.2091   0.3213 
CASHF/EMP  -0.4756   2.1239   -0.1385   0.6180 
SCOM  -0.0405   0.1858   -0.0118   0.0541 
YEAR°  -0.3911 **  0.1899   -0.1117 **  0.0522 
constant -2.1909  ***  0.5617         
BR  χ²(10) = 8.79  
 p = 0.5517 
Log-Likelihood -140.6634 
Pseudo R²  0.2984 
# obs.  361 
° dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
 
Table 30: Difference in R&D effort after the matching – foreign sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
---------------- α ° ----------------- 
RD 1.7345  0.3250  0.6316  0.1410  1.1029  ***  64% 
RDint 3.3398 0.6632  1.5548  0.4845 1.7850  * 53% 
lnRD -1.1122  0.3475 -2.9090 0.4103 1.7968  **   
lnRDint -0.3621  0.3011  -1.8293  0.3553  1.4672  **   
# obs.  75  75       
Note: Although BR_lnEMP were not jointly significant (χ² (10) = 5.51 p = 0.8548), they were included in the final 
propensity score for the sake of comparison with the other matching analyses. The control variables (lnEMP, PROJ, 
PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, SCOM, YEAR, BR and BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are 
not significantly different after the matching and therefore not reported here. 13 funded companies were deleted due to 
common support restrictions. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the sample of funded 
firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on the funded firms. The relative 
difference is calculated as 
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.These statistics are based on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation 
of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
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Domestic sample 
In the last step, the additionality analysis focuses on the subsample of 
domestic firms. The probit model (see Domestic sample in Table 31) signals the 
impact of past project applications, patent stock, and export ratio. After the 
matching, the differences in outcome variables remain significant (see Domestic 
sample in Table 32): on average, a subsidy stimulates private R&D spending with 
0.580 million EUR and the R&D intensity with 3.7%.  
Now I proceed and compare the additionality effects of foreign-owned and 
domestic firms by evaluating the differences in outcome variables between the 
funded and non-funded companies for each group. However, one could criticize this 
approach, as foreign-owned and domestic companies may well be very different. 
For example, foreign-owned firms are typically larger than domestic firms. This 
may be correlated with the R&D activity and bias the comparison of additionality 
effects between foreign-owned and domestic firms. Therefore, the analysis of 
domestic firms was refined by selecting a subsample of domestic firms which is 
similar to the sample of foreign-owned firms with respect to size, regional location 
and industry affiliation
61. The estimates for the propensity score (see “Domestic 
subsample” in Table 31) are slightly different, but the additionality effects remain 
strongly positive (see “Domestic subsample” in Table 32): on average, funded 
companies spend 1.237 million EUR more on R&D and their R&D intensity 
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Table 31: Propensity to receive funding – domestic sample 
   Probit model    Marginal effects    Probit model    Marginal effects 
   Coef.  dy/dx   Coef.   dy/dx 
  Domestic sample    Domestic subsample 
-0.0077     -0.0018     -0,0074     -0,0022    lnEMP 
(0.0406)  (0.0093)  (0.0871)   (0.0265) 
0.5748 ***    0.1317 ***    0.5095 ***    0.1549 ***  PROJ  (0.0687)  (0.0166)  (0.1365)   (0.0434) 
0.1111 ***    0.0255 ***    0.1767 **    0.0537 **  PAT/EMP  (0.0274)  (0.0064)  (0.0828)   (0.0259) 
0.4937 ***    0.1131 ***    0.9017 ***    0.2742 **  EXQU  (0.1415)  (0.0322)  (0.2630)   (0.0791) 
-0.0165     -0.0038      2.2620     0.6879    CAPint  (0.3869)  (0.0887)  (2.2130)   (0.6731) 
0.8376     0.192     0.0972     0.02956    CASHF/EMP  (0.7379)  (0.1696)  (5.9211)   (1.8007) 
0.181 *    0.0415 *    0.1800      0.0547    SCOM  (0.1008)  (0.0231)  (0.1733)   (0.0525) 
-0.148     -0.034     0.3207  *    0.0959  *  GROUP*  (0.1006)  (0.0231)  (0.1858)   (0.0543) 
-0.1425     -0.0327     -0.1368     -0.0413    YEAR*  (0.0911)  (0.0209)  (0.1799)   (0.0538) 
-1.2122 ***          -1.5188 ***        constant 
   (0.2196)          (0.4752)       
BR  χ² (11) = 15.64  
p = 0.1551 
χ² (11) = 8.68  
p = 0.6518 
Log-Likelihood -522.24896  -158.5842 
Pseudo R²  0.1422  0.2057 
# obs.  1353  347 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). 
Standard errors (between brackets) are obtained by the delta method. 
Table 32: Difference in R&D effort after the matching – domestic sample 
  Subsidized companies  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
------------- α ° ------------- 
Domestic sample 
RD 0.9007  0.2067  0.3204  0.0734  0.5803  **  64% 
RDint 5.6354  0.6765  1.9062  0.2898  3.7292  ***  66% 
lnRD -2.8590  0.2239  -5.4189  0.2749  2.5599  ***   
lnRDint -0.5586  0.2298  -3.3214  0.2723  2.7628  ***   
# obs.  218  218       
Domestic subsample 
RD 1.5326  0.4591  0.2952  0.0532  1.2374  ***  81% 
RDint 4.2369  0.9879  1.3863  0.2449  2.8506  ***  67% 
lnRD -2.1221  0.3444  -4.5588  0.4396  2.4367  ***   
lnRDint -0.5748  0.3214  -2.8101  0.4103  2.2353  ***   
# obs.  85  85       
Note: BR_lnEMP (χ²(11) = 21.65 - p = 0.0272 for the full domestic sample and χ²(11) = 4.76 - p = 
0.9420 for the domestic subsample) were included as well in the final propensity score. The control 
variables (lnEMP, PROJ, PAT/EMP, EXQU, CAPint, CASHF/EMP, GROUP, SCOM, YEAR, BR and 
BR_lnEMP) as well as the propensity scores are not significantly different after the matching and 
therefore not reported here. 7 and 6 funded companies were deleted due to common support restrictions 
from the full and subsample, respectively. 
° *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of the t-tests on mean equality between the 
sample of funded firms and the selected control group. α is the average treatment effect of a subsidy on 
the funded firms. The relative difference is calculated as 




= = , 1
α
.These statistics are based 
on Lechner’s (2001) asymptotic approximation of the standard errors that accounts for sampling with 
replacement in the selected control group. 
 
The crowding-out hypothesis is rejected for both foreign-owned and domestic 
firms. However, there seem to be differences in the size of the treatment effect. In 
general, the R&D intensity of subsidized firms is 2.7% higher than the R&D Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  153
intensity of non-subsidized firms. However, the additionality effect on R&D 
intensity for foreign-owned firms is only 1.8%, while the effect for domestic firms 
is 3.7%. Even if I correct for the potential selection bias and only consider a selected 
sample of domestic companies
62, the impact of a subsidy on the R&D intensity is 
still larger (2.9%). Econometric tests however did not provide robust proof to 
support the significance of the difference in input additionality for foreign-owned 
and domestic firms. Nevertheless, as only a very limited number of foreign-owned 
companies receives a large part of the total subsidy amount available in Flanders, it 
is remarkable that there is no evidence indicating that the impact of subsidies is 
larger for foreign-owned companies. 
Next, I concentrate on the output side of the innovation system and evaluate 
the effect of R&D subsidies on innovative output as well as economic value. As 
outlined in the methodological section, the estimates from the input additionality 
analysis allow disentangling private and publicly induced R&D expenditure. 
Subsequently, I can also unravel their respective impact on our new set of outcome 
variables. RDC represents the counterfactual R&D expenditure, i.e. the investment a 
company would have made in the absence of the subsidy system. RDdif measures 
the R&D expenditure which was induced by the subsidy. Obviously, the value for 
RDC of non-funded firms just equals their R&D spending as they reported it and 
their RDdif value is zero. The new set of outcome variables is fourfold: TURNMAR 
(share of new-to-the-market products in the turnover * turnover in 2005), 
TURNMAR/EMP (TURNMAR divided by the number of employees), PATdum (a 
dummy variable reflecting patent applications between 2004 and 2006) and 
NAV_growth (the growth of the net added value, between t+1 and t). For 
TURNMAR and TURNMAR/EMP a censored regression (cnreg) was conducted, as 
well as ordinary regression (reg) (as a robustness check). PATdum was included in 
                                                             
62 Different shares of non-innovators in the potential control group may provide an additional explanation as to why the 
treatment effects are lower when only a selected subsample of domestic firms is taken into account. The share of innovators in 
the total sample (1441 observations) amounts to 65%. The matching procedure enforces a high level of similarity between the 
funded (and per definition innovative) companies and non-funded (both innovative and potentially non-innovative) 
companies, including variables reflecting the innovative and technological strength of companies. As a result, the selected 
control group contains a large share of innovative companies and in the matched samples, the share of non-innovators is rather 
limited: 13% in the full matched sample (297 pairs); 14% in the domestic matched sample (218 pairs), 9% in the domestic 
matched subsample (85 pairs) and 5% in the foreign matched sample (75 pairs). T-tests reveal that the share of innovators is 
indeed significantly larger (p-value = 0.0001), when comparing the full domestic (436 companies) with the foreign (150 
companies) matched samples. When we only take the subsample of domestic firms into account, the share of non-innovators is 
only slightly significantly higher (p-value = 0.0951) in the domestic matched sample (170 companies) compared to the foreign 
sample (150 companies). As a further robustness check, I conducted the analysis presented in this chapter, but filtered out all 
non-innovators from the potential control group. The number of observations obviously drops significantly in the propensity 
score estimations, but apart from that, the results remain very similar. 
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a probit model, and NAV_growth was plugged in into an ordinary regression. 
Additional covariates in the models are size (EMP) and industry affiliation (BR). In 
the model estimating the impact on NAV_growth, the lagged value of the net added 
value per employee was included, to control for past productivity, as well as the 
year of observation (YEAR=1 for CIS IV observations, as again pooled data from 
the CIS III and IV surveys is used). In a first series of regressions, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the company is a domestic firm (DOMESTIC=1) is 
introduced, in addition to RDC and RDdif. The results are displayed in Table 33. 
Both RDC and RDdif have a significantly positive impact on the share of new 
products in the turnover and the patenting propensity: larger R&D efforts are 
efficiently translated into more R&D output. Notably, also the publicly induced 
private R&D spending delivers a significantly positive innovative output. Tests 
show that the coefficient of RDdif even is significantly larger than the coefficient of 
RDC in the probit model: the additionally leveraged R&D expenditure apparently is 
being used in a more efficient way, resulting in more innovative output. This is a 
positive result, as one could argue that publicly induced R&D investments are 
allocated to more risky projects and may therefore not result in more innovative 
output (Setter and Tishler, 2005 and Aerts et al., 2007). RDC positively influences 
the growth of the net added value, but the publicly induced R&D expenditure does 
not seem to foster company growth. Overall, the conclusion is very optimistic, as it 
confirms that R&D subsidies not only stimulate R&D input, but also positively 
influence R&D output. A positive impact on the economic value can not be 
supported empirically, though. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient of DOMESTIC is significant and negative in 
some specifications. This may reflect heterogeneous effects for domestic versus 
foreign-owned firms. That is why a second bundle of very similar, but more flexible 
models is estimated. I now allow the coefficient estimates of RDC and RDdif to be 
different, depending on the ownership status, i.e. RDC and RDdif are interacted 
with DOMESTIC and FOREIGN (= 1 - DOMESTIC), resulting in the variables 
RDCDOM, RDCFOR, RDdifDOM and RDdifFOR. The advantage of this set-up is 
that the coefficients are directly comparable for the domestic and foreign-owned 
firms. The results (see Table 34) now demonstrate a more detailed picture and 
provide insight into the heterogeneous output effects of R&D subsidies. As Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  155
expected, the counterfactual R&D expenditure has a positive impact on the share of 
new-to-the-market products in the turnover, the patenting probability and the 
growth of the net added value. This is in line with the previous results. I also find 
proof to state that R&D subsidies and the subsequently induced R&D expenditure 
raise the share of new-to-the-market products in the turnover and the patenting 
propensity. An astonishing result however, is that the censored regression model for 
TURNMAR and the probit model for PATdum provide evidence to conclude that 
the additionality effect is larger for foreign-owned firms. If we focus our attention to 
NAV_growth, it can be noticed that there is no significant effect stemming from the 
additional R&D expenditure of domestic firms, but in contrast a significantly 
positive impact on foreign-owned firms.  
The current models investigate potential heterogeneity in domestic and 
foreign-owned firms. However, to some extent, this heterogeneity may be alleviated 
by the fact that the group of domestic firms includes independent companies as well 
as companies belonging to a Belgian group. Therefore, as a robustness check, an 
interaction term (DOMESTIC*GROUP) was included in the model presented in 
Table 34. The new variable only had a slightly significant positive impact in the 
probit model estimating the propensity to patent, but did not introduce any change 
in the remaining results.  
Table 33: Additionality effects at the R&D output side I 
Variable  TURNMAR  
(in mio €) 
TURNMAR/EMP  




(in mio €) 
   cnreg  reg  cnreg  reg  probit  reg 
NAV/EMP t-1                    -20.3390  ** 
                    (9.0592) 
DOMESTIC°  -0.3106 **  -0.1811   -1.6484 *  -0.8423   -0.3773 *  -0.0849  
 (0.1322)  (0.1447)  (0.8648)  (0.6215)  (0.1958)  (0.3277) 
RDC  0.3278 ***  0.3170 ***  0.7411 ***  0.683 ***  0.2023 *  0.4753 *** 
 (0.0322)  (0.0473)  (0.2231)  (0.1669)  (0.1038)  (0.1680) 
RDdif  0.3580 ***  0.3411 ***  1.0207 ***  0.8986 **  0.7322 **  0.2479  
 (0.0324)  (0.0724)  (0.2271)  (0.4244)  (0.3199)  (0.2693) 
EMP          -0.0053 ***  -0.0045 ***  0.0012 **  -0.0012  
         (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0004)  (0.0010) 
YEAR                   0.2735  
                    (0.2102) 
constant  0.4708 ***  0.5010   2.7486 **  2.8777 ***  -1.571 ***  1.1955  
 (0.1764)  (0.3262)  (1.2596)  (0.7961)  (0.3733)  (0.8139) 
F(11. 137) = 1.73  F(11. 136) = 1.43  F(11. 136) = 0.74  F(11. 135) = 1.46  χ²(11) = 18.84  F(11.1437) = 2.88 
BR 
p = 0.0735  p = 0.1676  p = 0.6942  p = 0.1548  p = 0.0640  p = 0.0010 
Test  RDC - RDdif = 0 
F(1.137) = 0.48  F(1.136) = 0.09  F(1.136) = 0.95  F(1.135)= 0.29  χ²(1) = 2.76  F(11.1437)= 0.98 
 
p = 0.4918  p = 0.7672  p = 0.3313  p = 0.5942  p = 0.0964  p = 0.3329 
# obs.  151  151  151  151  360  1455 
(Pseudo) R²  0.3453  0.7033  0.0473  0.2405  0.2435  0.1194 
Standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
*** (**, *): significant at 1% (5%, 10%).   Essays on the economics of evaluation  156 
Table 34: Additionality effects at the R&D output side II 
Variable  TURNMAR  
(in mio €) 
TURNMAR/EMP  




(in mio €) 
   cnreg  reg  cnreg  reg  probit  reg 
NAV/EMP t-1                  -19.7953  ** 
                  (8.8982) 
DOMESTIC°  -0.2700 *  -0.1623 **  -0.7252   -0.0977   -0.2078   0.0714  
 (0.1450)  (0.0804)  (0.9456)  (0.6222)  (0.2287)  (0.2945) 
RDCDOM  0.3421 ***  0.3368 ***  0.5719 **  0.5431 ***  0.4369 *  0.4564 *** 
 (0.0348)  (0.0490)  (0.2453)  (0.0921)  (0.2422)  (0.1647) 
RDCFOR  0.2959 ***  0.2620 ***  1.6535 ***  1.4371 *  0.2705 *  0.6086 * 
 (0.0747)  (0.0387)  (0.4910)  (0.2130)  (0.1443)  (0.3245) 
RDdifDOM  0.3279 ***  0.3109 ***  0.9445 ***  0.8305 ***  0.3551 *  -0.0393  
 (0.0345)    (0.0550)  (0.2340)  (0.4381)  (0.1992)  (0.1533) 
RDdifFOR  0.5110 ***  0.4999 *  1.4757 ***  1.3004 **  4.5903 ***  0.8596 * 
 (0.0785)  (0.2572)  (0.5618)  (0.5381)  (1.4261)  (0.5043) 
EMP          -0.0055 ***  -0.0047 ***  0.0012 ***  -0.0014  
         (0.0019)  (0.001)  (0.0005)  (0.0010) 
YEAR                  0.2973   
                  (0.2049) 
constant  0.3939 **  0.4348 **  2.0598   2.2806 **  -1.9307 ***  0.9995  
 (0.1827)  (0.1917)  (1.2779)  (0.7040)  (0.4687)  (0.7459) 
F(11.135) = 1.51  F(11.134) = 1.45  F(11.134) = 0.84  F(11.133) = 1.54  χ²(11) = 20.54  F(11. 1435) = 2.91 
BR 
p = 0.1347  p = 0.1593  p = 0.5968  p = 0.1252  p = 0.0384  p = 0.0008 
Tests  RDCdom - RDdifdom = 0 
F(1.135)= 0.09  F(1.134)= 0.12  F(1.134)= 1.37  F(1.133)= 0.44  χ²(1) = 0.08  F(1.1435) = 8.32    p = 0.7678  p = 0.7289  p = 0.2439  p = 0.5076  p = 0.7809  p = 0.0040 
  RDCfor – Rddiffor = 0 
F(1.135)= 4.30  F(1.134)= 1.00  F(1.134)= 0.06  F(1.133)= 0.06  χ²(1) = 9.56  F(1.1435) = 0.33    p = 0.0399  p = 0.3200  p = 0.7995  p = 0.8036  p = 0.0020  p = 0.5639 
  RDCdom – RDCfor = 0 
F(1.135)= 0.32  F(1.134)= 1.59  F(1.134)= 4.03  F(1.133)= 14.50  χ²(1) = 0.33  F(1.1435) = 0.20    p = 0.5755  p = 0.2102  p = 0.0466  p = 0.0002  p = 0.5631  p = 0.6517 
  RDdifdom – Rddiffor = 0 
F(1.135)= 4.55  F(1.134)= 0.53  F(1.134)= 0.82  F(1.133)= 0.52  χ²(1) = 8.60  F(1.1435) = 2.95 
 
p = 0.0347  p = 0.4699  p = 0.3664  p = 0.4723  p = 0.0034  p = 0.0860 
# obs.  151  151  151  151  360  1455 
(Pseudo) R²  0.3570  0.7192  0.0538  0.2665  0.3012  0.1342 
Standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
*** (**, *): significant at 1% (5%, 10%). 
6. Conclusion 
The large presence of foreign-owned companies in Flanders, especially in 
R&D intensive industries, combined with a limited number of foreign affiliates 
receiving the lion’s share of Flemish R&D subsidies, raises questions about the 
impact of foreign ownership on the effectiveness of public R&D funding. In a first 
step, the additionality effect on R&D expenditure was investigated in detail, 
employing a semi-parametric matching approach. It was found that R&D subsidies 
are effective, in the sense that they induce R&D investments, both in domestic and 
foreign firms. However, the difference in additionally invested R&D budgets is not 
significantly different between the two samples. This is remarkable, given that 
foreign affiliates typically receive larger grants. In a next step, I elaborated on the 
results from the matching procedure and disentangled the counterfactual, privately 
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investment components were subsequently used as input factors for various 
productivity functions, in order to investigate potential differences in efficiency. 
The results show that in general, both R&D expenditure components are translated 
into more R&D output: they both have a significantly positive impact on the share 
of new products in the turnover, as well as on the patenting activity. Only the 
counterfactual R&D expenditure adds to the economic value, though. Lastly, I 
analyzed whether efficiency differences exist in foreign-owned versus domestic 
firms. The tests show that both groups experience positive additionality effects, but 
also that foreign-owned firms seem to use publicly induced R&D expenditures in a 
more efficient way: compared to the domestic firms, the share of new products in 
the sales, as well as the patenting activity, realized by the publicly induced R&D 
expenditure is higher. Moreover, separating the foreign-owned firms shows that, in 
contrast to the domestic firms, they also capitalize growth of the net added value 
with the publicly induced R&D investments. Görg and Strobl (2007) do not find any 
support for additionality effects in their sample of Irish foreign-owned firms, but 
emphasize that this does not imply that the public R&D funding was wasted, as 
these firms now exhibit positive R&D investments, which may otherwise have been 
undertaken abroad. In contrast to the Irish situation, Flemish foreign-owned 
affiliates receive a substantial amount of public R&D money and this chapter shows 
that the effects for Flanders are positive. 
My results are in line with the existing literature on superior innovative 
capabilities of foreign-owned firms. Although there are no significant differences in 
input additionality effects on domestic versus foreign-owned firms, the Flemish 
government’s policy of allocating large R&D grants to a limited number of foreign-
owned firms, seems to be guided by their outperforming status in innovative 
activity. A major concern of the Flemish government is that the valorisation of the 
induced R&D efforts is realized within Flanders. The analysis in this chapter shows 
that funded MNEs generate innovative output, which is also valorised in Flanders. 
This excellence in innovative efficiency may be driven by firm-specific assets 
encased in the MNE and easily accessible for its affiliates. The significantly positive 
impact of R&D subsidies on the net added value growth may emanate from better 
performance. However, a less optimistic and more down-to-earth, but not 
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additionally be found in purely economic arguments. R&D subsidies are the main 
instrument which gives some power to the Flemish government to attract or retain 
foreign multinational activity in Flanders, but the total amount which companies can 
receive is limited to 8 million EUR per year. In large MNEs, this is only a minor 
share of their total R&D expenditure and therefore, subsidies may be regarded as 
mere structural support. Hence, MNEs may bluntly conduct their accounting 
evaluation exercises and consider R&D subsidies as a net inflow of money in their 
calculation of the net profit which can be realized in their subsidiaries. In this case, 
concluding that the growth of the net added value is a direct result of higher 
performance due to an R&D subsidy would rather be a deception.  
Two caveats are called for with respect to the measurement of public R&D 
funding in this chapter. First, only information on a company’s funding status was 
used. This implies that the hypothesis is limited to assessing the presence of full 
crowding-out effects: the results show that funded firms spend more on R&D 
activities. However, it is possible that companies do not add the whole subsidized 
amount to their privately budgeted R&D expenditure, which would translate into 
partial crowding-out effects. To provide a decisive answer to this hypothesis, 
information on the grant size is needed, though. Second, the funding system is based 
on projects, while this research evaluates companies. It is not unlikely that a funded 
project is complementary to other projects and that positive spillovers between 
projects are generated. Therefore, additionality effects at the firm level may be 
induced by a funded project but originate from other projects within the company. It 
is not my aim to evaluate additionality effects at the project level, though, as the 
government’s aim is to increase companies’ R&D input and output, irrespective of 
how this increase is generated.  
I urge for further elaboration of the current study, and more specifically on 
three aspects, as this would significantly improve our insights into heterogeneous 
additionality effects of R&D subsidies due to the ownership structure. First, 
including additional information on the subsidy, i.e. the grant size, the granting 
authority, the specificities of the subsidy program, etc. will allow further 
refinement. Second, international R&D activity is worth a closer look: the degree of 
independence from the head quarters as well as intra-group knowledge flows and 
resource utilization may explain the better innovative performance of foreign Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  159
affiliates, as they are likely to be correlated with the access to knowledge in the 
group as well as the extent to which affiliates can determine own topics to 
investigate in their R&D labs and the kind of R&D which is conducted (home-base-
augmenting versus home-base-exploiting). In this respect, also the validity of the 
economic argument should be tested. Finally, the public authority’s interest in the 
total impact of funding foreign-owned companies on the host economy and its 
innovative potential remains a valuable issue. Other indicators may be introduced. 
Moreover, taking a measure of embeddedness into account would allow scholars to 
also measure the more indirect impact on the host economy.  
Acknowledgements 
The author is indebted to Dirk Czarnitzki for his valuable and highly 
appreciated comments. Moreover, comments raised by Petra Andries, Koenraad 
Debackere, Kornelius Kraft, Bart Leten, Pierre Mohnen, Jan Vandekerckhove and 
Reinhilde Veugelers contributed to the strength of this chapter. 
References 
Acs, Z.J., Audretsch, D.B., 1987. Innovation, Market Structure, and Firm Size, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics 69(4), 567-574. 
Aerts, K., 2008. Who writes the pay slip? Do R&D subsidies merely increase 
researcher wages?, Research Report, K.U.Leuven, Faculty of Business and 
Economics, Leuven, forthcoming. 
Aerts, K., Czarnitzki, D., 2004. Using innovation survey data to evaluate R&D 
policy: The case of Belgium, ZEW Discussion Paper 04-55, Mannheim. Also 
appeared as Research Report OR 0439, K.U.Leuven, Dept. of Applied 
Economics, Leuven.  
Aerts, K., Czarnitzki, D., 2006. The impact of public R&D funding in Flanders, 
IWT M&A study 54, Brussels.  
Aerts, K., Czarnitzki, D., Fier, A., 2007. Capítulo 3: Evaluación econométrica de las 
políticas públicas de I+D: situación actual, 79-104, in: Heijs, J., Buesa, M.,   Essays on the economics of evaluation  160 
(Eds.), La cooperación en innovación en España y el papel de las ayudas 
públicas, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid. 
Aerts, K., Schmidt, T., 2008. Two for the price of one? On additionality effects of 
R&D subsidies: A comparison between Flanders and Germany, Research Policy 
37(5), 806–822. 
Ali-Yrkkö, J., 2004. Impact of Public R&D financing on private R&D – Does 
Financial Constraint Matter?, Discussion Paper 943, The Research Institute of 
the Finnish Economy, Helsinki. 
Almus, M., Czarnitzki, D., 2003. The Effects of Public R&D Subsidies on Firms' 
Innovation Activities: The Case of Eastern Germany, Journal of Business and 
Economic Statistics 21(2), 226-236. 
Arrow, K. J., 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocations of Resources of 
Invention, 361-392, in: Nelson, R.R. (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity: Economic and Social Factors, Princeton. 
Bellak, C., 2004. How domestic and foreign firms differ and why does it matter?, 
Journal of economic surveys 18(4), 483-514. 
Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., 2000. Evaluation methods for non-experimental data, 
Fiscal Studies 21(4), 427-468. 
Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., 2002. Alternative approaches to evaluation in 
empirical microeconomics, Portuguese Economic Journal 1, 1-38. 
Busom, I., 2000. An empirical evaluation of the effects of R&D subsidies, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology 9(2), 111-148.  
Caves, R.E., 1971. International corporations: the industrial economics of foreign 
investment, Economica 38 (149), 1-27. 
Clausen, T.H., 2007. Do subsidies have positive impacts on R&D and innovation 
activities at the firm level?, Working Paper 20070615, Centre for Technology, 
Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
Cohen, W.M., Levin, R.C., 1989. Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market 
Structure, 1060-1107, in: Schmalensee, R., Willig, R.D., (Eds.), Handbook of 
Industrial Organisation, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford/Tokyo, North-Holland. Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  161
Czarnitzki, D., 2001. Die Auswirkungen der Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik 
auf die Innovationsaktivitäten ostdeutscher Unternehmen, Schmollers Jahrbuch - 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 121(4), 1-22. 
Czarnitzki, D., Fier, A., 2002. Do Innovation Subsidies Crowd Out Private 
Investment? Evidence from the German Service Sector, Konjunkturpolitik - 
Applied Economics Quarterly 48(1), 1-25. 
Czarnitzki, D., Hussinger, K., 2004. The link between R&D subsidies, R&D input 
and technological performance, ZEW Discussion Paper 04-56, Mannheim. 
Czarnitzki, D., Licht, G., 2006. Additionality of public R&D grants in a transition 
economy: the case of Eastern Germany, Economics of Transition 14(1), 101-131. 
Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E., 1987. The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios, The 
Economic Journal 97(387), 581-595. 
David, P., Hall, B.H., 2000. Heart of Darkness: Modeling Public-Private Funding 
Interactions Inside the R&D Black Box, Research Policy 29(9), 1165-1183. 
De Backer, K., Sleuwaegen, L., 2005. A closer look at the productivity advantage of 
foreign affiliates, International Journal of the Economics of Business 12(1), 17-
34. 
De Bondt, R., Sleuwaegen, L., Veugelers, R., 1988. Innovative strategic groups in 
multinational industries, European Economic Review 32(4), 905-925. 
Debackere, K., Veugelers, R., (Eds.), 2007. Vlaams Indicatorenboek 2007 
Wetenschap, Technologie en Innovatie, Steunpunt O&O Indicatoren and 
Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap, Leuven. 
Duguet, E., 2004. Are R&D subsidies a substitute or a complement to privately 
funded R&D? Evidence from France using propensity score methods for non 
experimental data, Revue d’Economie Politique 114(2), 263-292. 
Dunning, J. H., Narula, R., 1995. The R&D Activities of Foreign Firms in the 
United States, International Studies of Management & Organization 25(1-2), 39-
74. 
Ebersberger, B., 2005. The Impact of Public R&D Funding, VTT Publications 588, 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, Helsinki.   Essays on the economics of evaluation  162 
Ebersberger, B., Dachs, B., Lööf, H., 2007. The Innovative Performance of Foreign-
owned Enterprises in Small Open Economies, CESIS Working Paper Series 87, 
Stockholm. 
Ebersberger, B., Lööf, H., 2004. Multinational enterprises, spillovers, innovation 
and productivity, CESIS Working Paper 22, Stockholm. 
Ebersberger, B., Lööf, H., 2005. Corporate innovation activities - does ownership 
matter? STEP Report, Oslo. 
Ebersberger, B., Lööf H., Oksanen, J., 2005. Does foreign ownership matter for the 
innovation activities of Finnish firms?, VTT Working Papers 26, Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, Helsinki.  
EconStats, 2007. GDP Deflator. 
Eurostat, 2004. Innovation in Europe – Results for the EU, Iceland and Norway, 
Luxembourg. 
Falk, M., Falk, R., 2006. Do foreign-owned firms have a lower innovation intensity 
than domestic firms?, WIFO Working Paper 275, Vienna. 
Fier, A., 2002. Staatliche Förderung industrieller Forschung in Deutschland, ZEW 
Wirtschaftsanalysen 62, Baden-Baden. 
FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie, 2008. Why invest in Belgium?, 
Brussels. 
Frenz M., Ietto-Gillies, G., 2007. Does Multinationality Affect the Propensity to 
Innovate? An Analysis of the Third UK Community Innovation Survey, 
International Review of Applied Economics 21(1), 99-117. 
González, X., Pazó, C., 2006. Do public subsidies stimulate private R&D 
spending?, Documentos de Traballo 0601, Universidade de Vigo. 
González, X., Jaumandreu, J., Pazó, C., 2005. Barriers to innovation and subsidy 
effectiveness, RAND Journal of Economics 36(4), 930-950. 
Goolsbee, A., 1998. Does Government R&D Policy Mainly Benefit Scientists and 
Engineers?, American Economic Review 88(2), 298-302. 
Görg, H., Strobl, E., 2007. The effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D, 
Economica 74(294), 215-234. Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  163
Griliches, Z., 1990. Patent statistics as economic indicators: A survey Journal of 
Economic Literature 2(4), 1661-1797. 
Griliches, Z., 1998. R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, Chicago, 
Chicago University Press. 
Griliches, Z., Mairesse, J., 1984. Productivity and R&D at the Firm Level, 339-374, 
in: Griliches, Z. (Ed.), R&D, Patents and Productivity, Chicago. 
Guellec, D., Zuniga, M.P., 2006. Globalisation of technology captured with patent 
data. A preliminary investigation at the country level, Yearbook on Productivity 
2006, Statistics Sweden. 
Hall, B.H., 2005. The Financing of Innovation, in: Shane, S. (Ed.), Blackwell 
Handbook of Technology and Innovation Management, Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford.  
Haskel, J.E., Pereira, S.C., Slaughter, M.J., 2007. Does inward foreign direct 
investment boost the productivity of domestic firms?, Review of Economics and 
Statistics 89(3), 482-496. 
Heckman, J.J., Lalonde, R.J., Smith, J.A., 1999. The Economics and Econometrics 
of Active Labour Market Programs, 1866-2097, in: Ashenfelter, A., Card, D., 
(Eds.), Handbook of Labour Economics 3, Amsterdam. 
Heijs, J., Herrera, L., 2004. The distribution of R&D subsidies and its effect on the 
final outcome of innovation policy, Working Paper Instituto de Análisis 
Industrial y Financiero 46, Madrid. 
Himmelberg, C.P., Petersen, B.C, 1994. R&D and Internal Finance: A Panel Study 
of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, Review of Economics and Statistics 
76(1), 38-51.  
Hussinger, K., 2008. R&D and subsidies at the firm level: an application of 
parametric and semi-parametric two-step selection models, Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 23(6), 729-747.  
Hymer, S.H., 1976. The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of 
Direct Investment, Cambridge.   Essays on the economics of evaluation  164 
Hyytinen, A., Toivanen, O., 2005. Do financial constraints hold back innovation 
and growth? Evidence on the role of public policy, Research Policy 34(9), 1385-
1403. 
Irwin, D.A., Klenow, P.J., 1996. High-tech R&D subsidies: estimating the effects of 
Sematech, Journal of International Economics 40(3-4), 323-344. 
Ivarsson, I., 2002. Transnational corporations and the geographical transfer of 
localised technology: a multi-industry study of foreign affiliates in Sweden, 
Journal of Economic Geography 2(2), 221-247. 
Jaffe, A.B., 1986. Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence 
from Firm's Patent, Profits, and Market Value, American Economic Review 76 
(5), 984-1001. 
Kaiser, U., 2004. Private R&D and public R&D subsidies: Microeconometric 
evidence from Denmark, CEBR Discussion Paper 2004-19, Denmark. 
Klette, T.J., Møen, J., Griliches, Z. 2000. Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce 
market failures? Microeconometric evaluation studies, Research Policy 29(4-5), 
471-495. 
Kogut, B., 1993. Foreign Direct Investment as a Sequential Process, 38-56, in: 
Kindleberger, C., Audretsch, D., (Eds.), The Multinational Corporation in the 
1980s, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Kuemmerle, W., 1997. Building effective R&D capabilities abroad, Harvard 
Business Review, 61–70. 
Lach, S., 2002. Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D? Evidence 
from Israel, Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4), 369-390.  
Lechner, M., 1998. Training the East German labour force: microeconometric 
evaluations of continuous vocational training after unification, Heidelberg. 
Lechner, M., 2001. Identification and estimation of causal effects of multiple 
treatments under the conditional independence assumption, 43-58, in: Lechner, 
M., Pfeiffer, F., (Eds.), Econometric evaluation of active labour market policies, 
Heidelberg. Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  165
Lööf, H., Heshmati, A., 2005. The impact of public funding on private R&D 
investment. New evidence from a firm level innovation study, CESIS Working 
Paper 06, Sweden.  
Markusen, J.R., 1998. Multinational Firms, Location and Trade, World Economy 
21, 733–756. 
Meyer-Krahmer, F., Reger, G., 1999. New perspectives on the innovation strategies 
of multinational enterprises: lessons for technology policy in Europe, Research 
Policy 28(7), 751-776. 
OECD, 2002. Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and 
Experimental Development - Frascati Manual, Paris. 
OECD, 2007. Main Science and Technology Indicators, Paris. 
OECD/Eurostat, 1997. Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Technological Innovation Data - Oslo Manual, Paris. 
Pfaffermayr, M., Bellak, C., 2000. Why Foreign-Owned Firms are Different: A 
Conceptual Framework and Empirical Evidence for Austria, HWWA Discussion 
Paper 115, Hamburg.  
Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous Technological Change, Journal of Political 
Economy 98(5), 71-102. 
Rosenbaum, P.R., Rubin, D.B., 1983. The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects, Biometrika 70(1), 41-55. 
Roy, A.D., 1951. Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings, Oxford Economic 
Papers 3(2), 135-146. 
Rubin, D.B., 1977. Assignment to treatment group on the basis of covariate, Journal 
of Educational Statistics 2, 1-26. 
Rubin, D.B., 1990. Formal mode of statistical inference for causal effects, Journal 
of Statistical Planning and Inference 25(3), 279-292. 
Serapio, M.G., Dalton, D.H., 1999. Globalization of industrial R&D: an 
examination of foreign direct investments in R&D in the United States, Research 
Policy 28(2/3), 303–316.   Essays on the economics of evaluation  166 
Setter, O., Tishler, A., 2005. Investment Policies in Advanced Defence R&D 
Programs, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv. 
Sleuwaegen, L., De Backer, K., Coucke, K., Vandenbroere, I., 2004a. Buitenlandse 
aanwezigheid in Vlaanderen, Ondernemen en internationaal ondernemen, 
Leuven. 
Sleuwaegen, L., De Backer, K., Coucke, K., Vandenbroere, I., 2004b. De 
Industrieel Economische structuur en competitiviteit van de Vlaamse Economie - 
Bijdrage van de buitenlandse ondernemingen aan de Vlaamse Kenniseconomie, 
Ondernemen en internationaal ondernemen, Leuven. 
Streicher, G., Schibany, A., Gretzmacher, N., 2004. Input additionality effects of 
R&D subsidies in Austria, TIP Working Paper, 04-03, Vienna. 
Suetens, S., 2002. R&D subsidies and production effects of R&D personnel: 
evidence from the Flemish region, CESIT Discussion Paper 2002/03, Antwerp. 
Toivanen, O., Niininen, P., 2000. Investment, R&D, subsidies, and credit 
constraints, Helsinki School of Economics Working Paper 244, Helsinki.  
Van Pottelsberghe, B., Nysten, S., Megally, E., 2003. Evaluation of current fiscal 
incentives for business R&D in Belgium, Solvay Business School and Service 
Public Federal de Programmation Politique Scientifique, Brussels.  
Vanweddingen, M., 2006. Buitenlandse bedrijven in Vlaanderen: een profielschets, 
Studiedienst van de Vlaamse Regering, Brussel. 
Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B., 1999. Make or buy in innovation strategies: evidence 
from Belgian manufacturing firms, Research Policy 28(1), 63–80. 
Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B., 2004. Foreign subsidiaries as a channel of 
international technology diffusion: Some direct firm level evidence from 
Belgium, European Economic Review 48, 455–476. 
Wallsten, S.J., 2000. The effects of government-industry R&D programs on private 
R&D: the case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program, RAND 
Journal of Economics 31(1), 82-100. 
Zaheer, S., 1995. Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness, Academy of 
Management Journal 38(2), 341-364. Chapter 5. Carrying Flemish coals to Newcastle?  167
Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
Variable  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max  # obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
FUN 1441  0.217  0.412  0  1                
FOREIGN 1441  0.258  0.438  0  1          
   NOT FUNDED 
   domestic foreign-owned 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
RD (in mio EUR)  844  0.114  0.454  0  8.904  284  0.563  3.102  0  49.468 
RDint (in %)  844  1.296  4.510  0  56.602  284  1.141  3.391  0  31.818 
lnRD  844 -7.087  3.548  -9.509  2.187  284 -5.571  4.258  -9.509  3.901 
lnRDint  844 -4.836  3.725  -7.405  4.036  284 -3.924  3.760  -7.405  3.460 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
P(X)  844 0.169  0.133  0.019  0.977  284 0.165  0.129  0.007  0.965 
lnEMP  844 3.451  1.096  0  6.978  284 4.575  1.337  2.079  7.672 
PROJ  844 0.092  0.423  0  4  284 0.085  0.357  0  3 
PAT/EMP  844 0.083  0.768  0  16.552 284 0.146  1.151  0  17.107 
EXQU 844  0.286  0.314  0  1 284  0.499  0.390  0  1 
CAPint  844 0.037  0.134  0  3.638  284 0.042  0.083  0  0.780 
CASHF/EMP  844 0.014  0.024  -0.089  0.464  284 0.015  0.057  -0.233  0.821 
SCOM  844 0.774  0.437  0  3  284 0.903  0.520  0  3 
GROUP  844  0.339  0.474  0 1  284  1 0 0 1 
YEAR  844 0.528  0.499  0  1  284 0.482  0.501  0  1 
   FUNDED 
   domestic foreign-owned 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
RD (in mio EUR)  225  1.006  3.418  0  25.152  88  3.384  8.051  0  63.552 
RDint (in %)  225  5.629  9.893  0  56.576  88  4.492  8.423  0  49.862 
lnRD  225  -2.821 3.327 -9.509 3.225  88 -0.666 3.008 -9.509 4.152 
lnRDint  225  -0.540 3.388 -7.405 4.036  88 -0.130 2.561 -7.405 3.909 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
P(X)  225  0.365 0.252 0.039  1  88 0.437 0.290 0.052  1 
lnEMP  225  3.912 1.341 0.693 7.763  88 5.429 1.376 1.946 7.847 
PROJ  225  0.733 1.892  0  24  88 1.886 4.853  0  32 
PAT/EMP  225  0.858 2.928  0  20  88 0.617 1.841  0  8.921 
EXQU 225  0.483  0.337  0  1 88  0.736  0.260 0  1 
CAPint  225  0.036 0.049 0.000 0.374  88 0.046 0.069 0.001 0.500 
CASHF/EMP  225  0.033 0.277 -0.310 4.141  88 0.018 0.020 -0.020 0.103 
SCOM    225  0.924 0.462  0  3  88 1.107 0.595  0  3 
GROUP  225  0.520  0.501  0 1  88  1 0 1 1 
YEAR  225  0.476 0.501  0  1  88 0.352 0.480  0  1 
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Knowledge has become a fundamental economic asset (see e.g. Romer, 1990) 
and determines companies’ competitive strength (Schumpeter, 1942). On the one 
hand, knowledge creation is a time and money consuming process, with an 
uncertain outcome (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1987). Optimal staff motivation is to the 
benefit of expected success. On the other hand, knowledge spreads relatively 
quickly into the public domain once it has been created, allowing other companies 
to take advantage of the originating company’s investments. Mansfield (1985) 
showed that a significant share of knowledge leaks out through employees. 
Therefore, in knowledge creating companies, it is vital to attract valuable employees 
and curtail the staff turnover and additionally, to motivate this highly qualified 
workforce. One important aspect is employee remuneration. A vast body of research 
is devoted to investigating optimal remuneration systems and it appears that 
monetary as well as non-pecuniary incentives matter (see e.g. Coombs and Gomez-
Mejia, 1991), jointly optimized in a stimulating work environment with an attractive 
remuneration system. In this chapter, we zoom in on one specific remuneration 
system, namely profit
64 sharing: employees share in the profit of a company, 
through the receipt of financial rewards, depending on the company’s performance. 
Often, this financial incentive is disbursed as a supplement to the fixed base wage 
(see Kraft and Ugarković, 2007; Bhargava and Jenkinson, 1995 as well as 
Wadhwani and Wall, 1990). 
The direct aim of companies introducing profit-sharing in their remuneration 
policy is to stimulate staff performance. As profit maximization becomes a win-win 
strategy to all parties involved, i.e. both the employees and the firm owners, their 
                                                             
63 Technical University of Dortmund, IZA and ZEW, Germany. 
64 Also ‘capital sharing’ exists, a system in which employees hold shares of the company and in this sense, become co-owners 
of the company. This issue lies beyond the framework of this chapter, though. 
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mutual interests become aligned. If the incentive system works in an efficient way 
and if employees behave rationally, they increase their efforts, which should 
subsequently raise the company’s performance. Since a considerable time, profit-
sharing has been the subject of many empirical studies (see e.g. Pérotin and 
Robinson, 2002 as well as Strotmann, 2002, for elaborate surveys of this literature 
stream). The direct link between profit-sharing and output explains why 
traditionally productivity has by far been the most often investigated issue in this 
research domain. Less frequently investigated topics are the effects on profitability 
and wages. The latter variable is investigated as Weitzman (1983) suggested using 
profit-sharing as an alternative, instead of a supplement to the going wage rate. 
Scholars typically find positive to neutral impacts of profit-sharing on a firm’s 
output. However, productivity measures only show part of the picture, as they 
merely reflect the final impact, without illuminating possible reasons explaining this 
productivity increase. An efficient incentive system is expected to affect workers’ 
performance, but may additionally strengthen a company’s innovative capabilities, 
as theoretical arguments predict that potential resistance against innovative activity 
can be offset and what is even more, employees may actively cultivate the 
company’s innovative capabilities.  
In this chapter, we introduce measures of technological progress in an attempt 
to unravel how the introduction of profit-sharing may interact with firm 
performance through the realisation of both product and process innovations. This 
area has remained by and large unexplored until now. We employ an extensive 
dataset on German firms. In order to eliminate possible selectivity effects, we apply 
conditional difference-in-differences methods. In the second section, we briefly 
summarise the history of research on profit-sharing and advance some theoretical 
considerations. The third section entails the strategy we follow in the empirical part, 
which is subsequently presented in two sections, covering the data description and 
the estimation results. The last section concludes with a summary of our findings, 
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2. Literature summary and theoretical arguments 
The literature on profit-sharing can be categorized into two substreams. The 
first substream, which is especially supported by the European Community (see the 
so-called Pepper reports: Commission of the European Communities, 1991 and 
1996, and Lowitzsch, 2006), tries to provide a framework for international 
comparisons and to quantify the prevalence of profit-sharing in Europe and the US. 
However, definition problems and internationally different legislation schemes 
seriously complicate these studies and imply strong limitations with respect to their 
comparability.  
The second substream of literature investigates the potential impact of profit-
sharing on various company characteristics. As mentioned before, the traditionally 
most investigated variable in this domain is productivity. The interested reader is 
referred to FitzRoy and Kraft (1987) as one of the first studies, Doucouliagos (1995) 
for a meta-analysis and to Pérotin and Robinson (2002) as well as Strotmann (2002) 
for elaborate surveys of the extensive literature. Overall, the conclusions tend to 
confirm small but positive productivity increases as a result of profit-sharing. Other 
variables which are studied in relationship with the existence of profit-sharing are 
wages and labour demand (see Pérotin and Robinson, 2002), as well as profitability 
(Kraft and Ugarković, 2007). An important issue, which is nevertheless often 
ignored, is the fact that different selection mechanisms may play a part when 
studying profit-sharing and its impact. This may seriously distort evaluation 
exercises and undermines the validity of the results. In the methodological section, 
we will extensively come back to this issue of selectivity.  
To the best of our knowledge, no studies exist on the impact of profit-sharing 
on the innovative performance of companies. However, in the subsequent 
paragraphs we will advance theoretical arguments and predict a potential positive 
impact of this specific remuneration system on the company’s innovation process.  
Although a high-quality workforce is expected to produce highly valuable 
R&D and innovative output, there are two main motives why employees may 
hamper innovative activity. First, employees are expected to dislike technological 
change if its introduction implies re-training, alternative work organizations and 
adaption costs, in addition to potential dismissals. Training will most likely be firm-  Essays on the economics of evaluation  174 
specific and thus the risk for the workers increases, which may therefore excite 
opposition against innovative activities within the company. Schaefer (1998) found 
that these frictions do not necessarily obstruct innovative activity, but nevertheless 
may seriously slow down or change the innovation process. Zwick (2002) proves 
that internal resistance against innovation is more likely if it is uncertain whether 
the employees benefit from the investment. Our second argument as to why 
employees may negatively affect a company’s technological progress and 
innovative capabilities works more directly. New technologies may enable 
companies to substitute labour by capital. This in turn may lower the demand for 
labour and therefore reduce employment and/or wages. As a result, employees may 
exhibit a substantial scepticism or even negative attitude towards technological 
progress. In that case, any attempt to modernize the company’s technological 
equipment or to conduct process innovations will be distrusted or even opposed.  
Profit-sharing can provide an effective remedy to counter or even upturn these 
frictions and the potential negative pressure of human capital on R&D. First, the 
premium offered through profit-sharing can be regarded as a compensation for the 
training and subsequent risk. Therefore, profit-sharing may moderate employee 
opposition against technological advancement. Second, profit-sharing may even 
stimulate the employees’ incentives to actively support and contribute to process 
innovations. As profit-sharing entails an explicit commitment on behalf of the 
company owners to share part of the profits with the employees, their mutual 
interests are aligned towards one denominator: profit maximization. Process 
innovations are expected to increase a company’s future profits, so technological 
progress is to the benefit of both parties. Employees are closely involved in the 
company’s bench level expertise and may therefore possess an information 
advantage on potential weaknesses and inefficiencies of the technologies in use. 
Without profit-sharing there is hardly any incentive to disclose this information to 
the management. However, when employees participate in any profit increase, it is 
in their self-interest to fully exploit all available information. Hence, if the company 
employs a profit-sharing system, employees will be less averse towards 
strengthening the company’s technological equipment, and, even more important, 
they may become a valuable asset in the process of technological progress. In this Chapter 6. Let’s get on the same page!    175
chapter, we therefore advance the hypothesis that profit-sharing fosters process 
innovation.  
Less obvious but possibly also present is an effect of profit-sharing on product 
innovation. During the production process, employees go through a learning curve: 
they accumulate knowledge, gain experience and subsequently may come up with 
ideas to improve a product’s quality. If a monetary incentive is coupled to the 
implementation of any useful suggestion on a product improvement, the likelihood 
that the employee discloses his ideas obviously increases. Similarly, employees may 
become aware of potentially interesting additional features of the produced goods. 
Hence, while it seems unlikely that employees can contribute significantly to the 
development of totally new products, they may possess a substantial potential to 
improve existing products to a significant extent. Moreover, some employees 
closely interact with the company’s customers and as a result are well aware of their 
preferences. They gather information on potential shortcomings of the existing 
product range as well as the customers’ needs and wishes concerning improvements 
of existing as well as desired features of future products. This valuable knowledge 
should be transferred to the company’s R&D department, in order to develop 
products along these lines. If the company succeeds in complying with these 
requirements, its market success is expected to rise and consequently also its sales 
of improved or newly developed products. Profit-sharing generates clear incentives 
to share this information with the management as, in contrast to the traditional 
wage-based firm, its capitalization is shared with the source of information: the 
employee. In summary, our theoretical arguments predict that introducing profit-
sharing has the potential to stimulate both process and product innovation.  
3. Empirical Strategy: the treatment of selectivity 
Although many empirical studies confirm the hypothesis that profit-sharing 
has a neutral to significantly positive effect on the company’s performance, only a 
surprisingly small minority of firms actually employs this remuneration scheme. 
The percentage of firms with a profit-sharing system is quite low in the European 
Union, except in France and the United Kingdom, where financial participation in 
companies is supported by a legal framework and substantial tax advantages (see   Essays on the economics of evaluation  176 
Poutsma, 2001, for an extensive description of country differences in the European 
Union). This seems to indicate that profit-sharing is not a beneficial strategy to all 
companies, but only to certain firms. Strotmann (2002) denounces the fact that, 
even after the clear conclusion of FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) that different selectivity 
mechanisms may play a role in the evaluation of profit-sharing, many studies do not 
or not sufficiently control for the potential distortion of the results due to these 
selection biases. This section first clarifies the different arguments supporting 
expectations about the presence of selectivity. Next, we expound how this problem 
is solved in our empirical analysis. 
A first reason for the rather low ratio of firms employing profit-sharing might 
originate in firm-specific advantages or disadvantages with respect to different 
incentive schemes. Companies presumably differ in a number of aspects. For 
instance, the respective workforces may exhibit different qualification levels. 
Furthermore, firms may differ in their capability to validate individual performance. 
Examples are highly structured work processes, e.g. in the extreme belt production, 
or a team-based production process, where only joint, i.e. not individual, output is 
observed. In general, smaller firms suffer significantly less from problems in 
measuring individual employee performance. Other differences may stem from 
turnover rates, the workforce’s cultural and ethical background, industrial relations 
and many other characteristics. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to believe 
that firms that are able to capture specific advantages from profit-sharing are likely 
to introduce this incentive scheme in their remuneration policy, while others show 
no interest and rather rely on other motivational instruments like tournaments, piece 
rates or efficiency wages. A second kind of selectivity is driven by worker sorting. 
Performance oriented and cooperative workers probably prefer working in profit-
sharing firms. These workers are presumably more productive, irrespective of the 
presence of a profit-sharing scheme. Moreover, the strong presence of productive 
and highly skilled employees may increase the productivity of less productive 
employees through mutual and cooperative learning efforts. In this case, these 
employee teams differ from teams in the more traditional firms paying fixed wages. 
This very likely causes differences in any performance measure, including 
innovativeness. Furthermore, it is quite realistic to assume that employees behave 
risk-averse and prefer a fixed wage over a variable, performance-related pay. If, for Chapter 6. Let’s get on the same page!    177
a moment, we set aside the argument raised before, i.e. that profit-sharing usually 
complements the fixed wage, instead of replacing it, firms paying a flexible wage 
presumably attract less risk-averse workers. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
these employees are also more productive. Finally, selectivity in innovation 
activities may arise. It is quite plausible that highly innovative companies also use 
efficient incentive systems, simply because they are managed in a better way. 
Hence, a positive correlation between innovative activity and the use of profit-
sharing in the remuneration policy may be due to an unobserved third factor, while 
actually no causal relation exists. 
If selectivity is at work, any empirical methodology neglecting this problem 
will produce biased results. Using the Heckman estimator, the early study of 
FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) confirms the strong presence of selectivity effects. Profit-
sharing is proved to be endogenous with respect to any outcome measure. Another 
sophisticated method to deal with selectivity is the non-parametric matching 
approach, well known in the so-called treatment analysis. Treatment in our case is 
defined as the use of profit-sharing. This methodology goes back to Roy (1951) and 
Rubin (1974) and has also been labelled the potential outcome approach. A 
matching approach re-establishes the conditions of an experiment and compares 
treated and non-treated observations. The control sample of non-treated companies 
is selected carefully, to maximize its similarity with the population of treated 
companies. Every single treated company is related to non-treated units: 
conditioning on their similarity, a non-treated firm receives a high or low weight, or 
even is omitted. The determination of the control observation’s importance (weight) 
depends on the selected matching estimator (see Heckman et al., 1997).  
Rubin (1974) defines the impact of the treatment as the difference between the 
likely outcome Y of an establishment
65 introducing profit-sharing, Y
1, and the 
counterfactual outcome in the case of non-introduction, Y
0, given D=1: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − = D Y E D Y E D Y Y E θ  ( 38) 
where D  is a binary assignment indicator determining whether the firm has 
introduced profit-sharing (D=1) or not (D=0). Parameter θ measures the average 
                                                             
65 For the sake of readability we omit firm indices in the equations. 
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treatment effect on the treated firms and determines whether the introduction of 
profit-sharing has been beneficial to those establishments that introduced this 
incentive scheme in their remuneration policy.  
The fundamental problem in evaluation econometrics arises from the fact that 
the second term on the right hand side, i.e. the counterfactual outcome E(Y
0|D=1), is 
by definition not observable, since it describes the hypothetical outcome of a firm 
that actually introduced profit-sharing if it would not have done so. In the absence 
of selectivity, the following equality: 
) 0 ( ) 1 (
0 0 = = = D Y E D Y E  (39) 
would hold and the average outcome of firms without profit-sharing would provide 
an estimate for  ) 1 (
0 = D Y E . This assumption is valid in an experiment where 
randomisation of the treatment is given. However, as FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) have 
shown and as we argued before, it is quite unlikely that profit-sharing and non-
profit-sharing firms do not differ with respect to certain characteristics: profit-
sharing is endogenous, which introduces a bias in the estimates. The key to solve 
this evaluation problem is to approximate the counterfactual outcome. We chose to 
follow the potential outcome (i.e. matching) approach with a time dimension, the 
so-called conditional difference-in-differences technique. In the following 
paragraphs we explain the details of this methodology. 
Rubin’s (1977) conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that the 
treatment status and the potential outcome are independent for observations 
exhibiting the same observable set of characteristics X. The validity of the CIA 
depends on whether all determinants influencing the decision to introduce profit-
sharing as well as the potential outcome are known and available for all 
observations. However, the CIA cannot be tested formally and as a result, the 
researcher is obliged to rely on the data quality. We believe that the IAB 
Establishment Panel, which will be described in more detail below, covers a wide 
array of information, ranging from general information on the establishments to 
questions on investment, business policy and development to employment-related 
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Hence, if sample selection is solely due to observable covariates (a vector X), 
the CIA applies and the following equation holds: 
  x) X   0, D | E(Y x) X   1, D | E(Y  
0 0 = = = = = . (40) 
The treatment effect θ in the matching approach can consequently be 
estimated by comparing the outcome means of the two groups (Lechner, 1998): 
) , 0 ( ) , 1 (
0 1 x X D Y E x X D Y E M = = − = = = θ . (41) 
In practice, ensuring the validity of the CIA imposes a major obstacle, since 
every additional exogenous variable in the vector X decreases the probability of 
finding an adequate control group. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed a 
remedy to this dimensionality problem. As an alternative to matching on a large set 
of covariates, their idea is to match on one single index. This so-called propensity 
score is estimated with information on the exogenous characteristics X. Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) show that, if the CIA is fulfilled, one does not need to condition 
on all covariates contained in X, but only on the propensity score. In our case, this 
index is estimated as the conditional probability to use profit-sharing, i.e. the 
probability to share profits with the employees, given a set of individual 
characteristics of a firm: pr(D=1|X=x). This propensity score is usually estimated in 
a probit model.  
Several matching methods have been proposed in the literature on evaluation 
econometrics. We employ nearest neighbour matching, which comes down to a pair 
wise matching as it tries to select the most similar non-treated observation (ideally a 
“twin”) for every treated observation. If the matching procedure was successful, i.e. 
the establishments that did (treated group) and did not (selected control group) 
introduce profit-sharing are ex ante equally likely to introduce profit-sharing, 
equation (40) holds and the causal effect is computed as indicated in equation (41), 
by comparing the outcome means of the two groups.  
The matching approach accounts for the selection bias caused by observable 
factors. However, as we mentioned before, compliance with the CIA is crucial to 
obtain reliable estimates: all relevant information should be known and available for 
all observations. Although we strongly believe that our data at hand are very rich, 
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This could seriously bias the results. To correct for this potential selection on 
unobservables more strongly, the initial matching method can be extended with a 
time dimension. 
This is exactly what we will do in the empirical part of this chapter, as we 
have a rich two-period panel dataset at our disposal. We present two evaluation 
methods, assessing the evolution of the outcome Y after treatment. Matching and 
difference-in-differences techniques are combined in this method, which is referred 
to as the conditional difference-in-differences (CDiD) or matched difference-in-
differences approach (Heckman et al., 1997).  
The general difference-in-differences (DiD) set-up relates the development of 
an outcome variable of treated observations to the evolution of this outcome 
variable in a control group of non-treated observations. The before-after change in 
the outcome of non-treated firms is subtracted from the before-after change in the 
outcome of the treated firms to obtain the average treatment effect θ: 
) 0 0 ( ) 1 1 (
0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 = − = − = − = = D Y D Y E D Y D Y E t t t t DiD θ , (42) 
where D denotes whether the unit under consideration is treated (D=1) or not (D=0), 
Y is the outcome variable and t represents the moments in time before (t0) and after 
(t1) the introduction of the measure. The DiD estimator thus measures the excess 
outcome growth of the treated as compared to the non-treated group, correcting for 
any macro-economic change over time. If this method is generalized to include 
additional regressors X, the advantages of the matching and the DiD approach are 
combined (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000). This conditional difference-in-
differences (CDiD) approach eliminates time-invariant unobserved individual-
specific effects as well as common macro trends. Several studies evaluating active 
labour market policies make use of this estimator (e.g. Kluve et al., 1999; Eichler 
and Lechner, 2002; Bergemann et al., 2004; Albrecht et al., 2005). The treatment 
and control group are matched on observable characteristics X such that:  
( ) ( )
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To increase the accurateness and quality of the matching process, two 
additional activities were carried out. First, for all treated firms a valid counterpart 
should be found in the non-treated population and every firm should represent a 
potential profit-sharing company. If the samples of treated and non-treated firms 
would have no or only little overlap in the exogenous characteristics X, matching is 
not applicable to obtain consistent estimates. Hence, the so-called common support 
restriction is imposed and all firms exhibiting extreme values and therefore 
complicating the matching process are removed. Second, optimal matching is 
obtained when the control sample to select twin companies from, is as large as 
possible. Therefore, one can opt for matching with replacement. In the current work, 
we employ the conditional difference-in-differences approach with nearest 
neighbour propensity score matching and match with replacement. The average 
treatment effect θ is calculated as follows: 
. ) , 0 0
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We employ two variations of the CDiD method. In the first approach, we 
match firms which introduced profit-sharing between period t0 and t1 to firms which 
have never shared profits, using their respective vectors of exogenous characteristics 
X in period t0. Then, we evaluate how the outcome Y of both groups (treated versus 
non-treated subjects) has evolved over time, comparing static (assessing Y in period 
t1) and dynamic (comparing Y in the periods t0 and t1) variables for the treated and 
non-treated firms in t-tests on mean equality. We will refer to this technique as 
CDiD without control variables.  
In our second variation on the CDiD technique, we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in a more explicit way and additionally include the evolution in the 
control variables. The results of the CDiD analysis are presented as OLS and probit 
models; like in a normal DiD set-up (see also e.g. Aerts and Schmidt, 2008). As 
Wooldridge (2002) suggests, when the treatment effect is equal for each subject and 
constant over time, a fixed effects regression model is more appropriate than the 
random effects model. However, as Halaby (2004) shows, both models are 
frequently used in treatment analyses, so both estimators are employed and the 
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Albrecht et al. (2005) we also point out that a disadvantage of employing probit 
models in this context is that “they do not enable the estimation of the quantitative 
effect of treatment on the employment outcomes. This effect is non-linear and 
depends on the unknown fixed effects. This means that we can only make a 
qualitative evaluation, in the sense that we can only determine the sign and 
significance of the treatment effect.” 
4. The data 
This section describes the data which will be used to empirically investigate 
the interaction between profit-sharing and innovative performance in Germany. 
Bellman and Möller (2006) quantify profit-sharing in Germany: in 2005 about 9% 
of the total population of German firms employed this incentive system in addition 
to the normal wages. The percentage of companies sharing profits with employees 
heavily fluctuates according to size and industry affiliation, though. This percentage 
puts Germany on a mediocre rank, after France (57%), the UK (40%) and Sweden 
(20%). Van Den Bulcke (1999) identifies factors yielding a less favourable 
environment with respect to financial participation (which is more general than 
mere profit-sharing) of German employees: the German tax situation and social 
security, the complex legislation and the lack of a share ownership culture and 
tradition. 
We constructed our database using various waves of the so-called IAB panel. 
Since 1993 (1996 for East Germany) the Institute for Employment Research 
(Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung: IAB) yearly surveys a panel of 
about 16,000 German companies. Based on size and industry affiliation, the sample 
of surveyed companies is randomly drawn from the employment statistics register 
of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). Because 
companies drop out due to non-response or market exit and new companies are 
continuously established, new companies are added to the sample every year, which 
results in an unbalanced panel structure. The survey gathers general company 
information on its establishment, turnover, staffing, investments, etc. but also leaves 
room for very specific questions, e.g. on public funding, innovation, technical 
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Our key issue of interest is whether or not companies allow their employees to 
share in the profit. This information is reflected by the dummy variable PROF. In 
2000, about 10% of the companies in the total IAB-sample used profit-sharing in 
addition to a fixed wage to remunerate their employees. In 2005 about 16% of the 
companies in the sample employed a system of profit-sharing
66. Based on the 
theoretical arguments presented above, we advance the hypothesis that profit-
sharing exerts a positive impact on the innovative capabilities of a company. To test 
our hypotheses, we select all companies from the IAB-sample which introduced 
profit-sharing between 2000 and 2005 and compare them to a control group of 
companies which indicated that they did not employ profit-sharing in their 
remuneration system, neither in 2000 nor in 2005. We eliminate all the differences 
in exogenous variables to counter the selectivity issue, employing the matching 
method. The selected sample of twin companies is then further analysed in a 
conditional difference-in-differences framework. This will enable us to evaluate the 
impact of the introduction of a profit-sharing system on a company’s 
innovativeness.  
The outcome to be evaluated is twofold: we test whether profit-sharing fosters 
process and/or product innovation. In the first CDiD variation we proceed as 
follows. First, we evaluate the company’s innovative strength with respect to 
technological capabilities. TECH measures the condition of a company’s technical 
equipment on a five-point Likert scale, going from fully up-to-date (score = 4) to 
fully outdated (score = 0). As the IAB-survey does not provide any explicit 
information on the process innovation capabilities of a company, we believe that 
this variable is a good proxy. ADVNAR (ADV = advanced; NAR = narrow) and 
ADV indicate whether the company’s technical equipment is fully up-to-date 
(TECH = 4 and TECH = 4 or 3, respectively). As TECH is measured in the 2005 
and 2000 waves of the IAB-panel, we use dynamic variables, reflecting the 
evolution of the condition of the technical equipment. The first dynamic variable is 
TECHch, measuring the difference in the condition of the technological equipment 
between 2005 and 2000 (= TECH05 - TECH00). However, we deliberate about the 
trade off between the econometric inaccurateness of using the difference in an index 
                                                             
66 Pendleton et al. (2005) report a percentage of 18% for Germany. However, their study differs in many respects from the data 
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value on the one hand and the full use of the available information on the other 
hand. That is why we additionally include dummy variables reflecting the evolution 
of the company’s technological equipment. We compute a variable indicating 
whether the company improved its technological strength and became a highly 
advanced technology user (ADVNARch = 1 if TECH00 ≤ 3 and TECH05 = 4). We 
expect all process innovation measures to be affected in a significantly positive way 
by the introduction of a profit-sharing system. 
Second, product innovation is evaluated. This information was taken from the 
2004 wave of the IAB panel, as product innovation was not covered in the 2005 
wave. We assume that the innovative capability of 2004 is a good approximation for 
the innovativeness in 2005. INPDT indicates whether the company improved or 
further developed a product which was already comprised in the company’s 
portfolio, within the two preceding years. NEWFRM measures whether the 
company adopted a product which was new to the firm, within the two preceding 
years. NEWFRMint measures the share of these new-to-the-firm products in the 
turnover. NEWMKT measures whether the company adopted a product which was 
new to the market, within the two preceding years. Parallel to the measures of new-
to-the-firm products, NEWMKTint measures the share of new-to-the-market 
products in the turnover. INNO equals 1 when at least one of the variables INPDT, 
NEWFRM or NEWMKT is 1 and hence labels companies as innovative or non-
innovative in a very broad sense. INNONAR is computed similarly, but narrows 
down the definition of innovativeness, as only NEWFRM and NEWMKT are 
included. As information on product innovations was also covered in the 2001 
wave, we can again include dynamic product innovation variables, computed as the 
difference between 2004 and 2001: INPDTch (INPDT04-INPDT01), NEWFRMch 
(NEWFRM04-NEWFRM01), NEWMKTch (NEWMKT04-NEWMKT01), 
INNOch (INNO04-INNO01) and INNONARch (INNONAR04-INNONAR01). To 
recapitulate our evaluation set-up in this first CDiD variation, the static variables 
measure the outcome in period t1, while the dynamic variables measure the 
evolution of the outcome between the periods t0 and t1. As argued in section 2, we 
expect to find indications that profit-sharing affects a company’s product innovation 
capabilities, in addition to the effect on the technical equipment. The impact on 
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stronger than the impact on the development of totally new (new-to-the-market) 
products. 
We use several control variables which may affect both the probability to 
employ a profit-sharing remuneration system in addition to a fixed wage and 
innovative capability of a company, respectively. To avoid endogeneity we measure 
the value of these covariates in 2000. Including the number of employees (EMP) 
allows controlling for size effects, which are empirically often found to explain 
innovativeness (see e.g. Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Moreover, size may be 
related to the company’s choice for a specific incentive scheme. For example, as 
smaller firms may be better aware of employees’ individual performance, they may 
opt for other financial rewards than a profit-sharing scheme. The logarithmic 
transformation (lnEMP) is used to smooth this variable. In addition, we removed the 
1 and 99 percentile of EMP, to control for extreme size outliers in the dataset. Next, 
we introduce a number of control variables related to the organizational structure of 
the firm: the ratio of qualified employees (QUAL) and dummies indicating a shift in 
responsibilities (SHIFT), the introduction of team work (TEAM) and independent 
work groups (INDEP) as well as positive investments in ICT infrastructure (ICT) 
reflect how a company responds to requirements of its environment. Complex and 
interdependent workflows imply more difficulties in measuring individual output. 
Moreover, information asymmetries and monitoring problems may be more 
pronounced. Also a range of variables characterizing how the company interacts 
with its direct stakeholders is important. First, a high level of trust between 
employees and managers facilitates consultation and fine-tunes cooperation 
engagements. The presence of a works council (COUNCIL) is a good proxy for this 
relationship. Second, the relationship between the company and the unions may be 
important. As we will explain in the following paragraph, Germany is a special case 
and the works council tends to substitute for the strength of the union, so the 
variable COUNCIL also reflects the union’s power to some extent. In addition, we 
include a dummy variable (CAO) indicating whether a collective labour agreement 
is in place. Limited liability may foster the introduction of profit-sharing; LTD has 
value 1 for joint stock companies (AG) and non-public limited liability companies 
(GmbH). Last, some final company characteristics are added. After1990 is a dummy 
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age may interact. Also, firms located in East Germany (EAST = 1) may be less 
likely to introduce profit-sharing (Möller, 2002 as well as Bellman and Möller, 
2006). Finally, industry affiliation may matter. We limit our sample to 
manufacturing firms, excluding agriculture, mining and construction and include 15 
industry dummies (BR) in the analysis.  
Our total sample consists of 1348 companies, of which 206 firms are treated 
(profit-sharing). The first empirical step is the selection of a non-profit-sharing twin 
company for each profit-sharing firm. To this end, a propensity score is estimated in 
a probit model, using the whole dataset and the control variables introduced above. 
The summary statistics of these variables (in period t0) as well as the outcome 
variables (in period t1 or the change (ch) between the two periods t0 and t1) are 
presented in Table 35. We also report the p-value statistics of two-sided t-tests, 
indicating the differences between the profit-sharing firms and the potential control 
group of all non-profit-sharing firms. In the database we constructed, companies 
introducing profit-sharing are typically the larger firms (lnEMP***). The work 
environment seems to be more complex in profit-sharing firms: the share of 
qualified employees (QUAL***) is higher and the firms are more likely to have 
introduced a shift in responsibilities (SHIFT***), team work organisation 
(TEAM***) or independent work groups (INDEP***). Moreover, the introduction 
of profit-sharing is positively correlated with investments in the ICT infrastructure 
(ICT***). Furthermore, profit-sharing firms tend to have a higher level of trust 
between employees and managers, as they are more likely to have a works council 
(COUNCIL***). Also the union is more powerful (CAO***) when the system of 
profit-sharing is employed. The ownership structure (LTD*** and EAST***) as 
well as industry affiliation (not reported here) are relevant, too. The age of the 
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Table 35: Summary statistics before the matching 
Profit-sharing firms  Potential control group  p-value 
two-  Variable period 
Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err.  sided t-test 
OUTCOME VARIABLES          
Process innovation          
TECH t1 2.8398  0.0528  2.6445  0.0227 0.0008 
ADVNAR t1 0.1845  0.0271  0.1200  0.0096 0.0257 
ADV  t1  0.6893 0.0323  0.5814  0.0146  0.0026 
TECHch t1- t0 0.0390  0.0488  0.1060 0.0207  0.2081 
ADVNARch t1- t0 0.1122  0.0221  0.0630 0.0072  0.0354 
Product innovation          
INPDT t1 0.7805  0.0290  0.4416  0.0147 0.0000 
NEWFRM t1 0.3140  0.0323  0.2051  0.0120 0.0018 
NEWFRMint t1 2.6439  0.4835  1.7008  0.1524 0.0640 
NEWMKT t1 0.1546  0.0252  0.0867  0.0083 0.0111 
NEWMKTint t1 1.1520  0.4682  0.7489  0.1457 0.4119 
INNO t1 0.7971  0.0280  0.4939  0.0148 0.0000 
INNONAR t1 0.3865  0.0339  0.2546  0.0129 0.0003 
INPDTch t1- t0 0.0000  0.0318  -0.0388 0.0156  0.2743 
NEWFRMch t1- t0 -0.0531  0.0412  -0.0616 0.0153  0.8481 
NEWMKTch t1- t0 -0.0386  0.0355  -0.0229 0.0119  0.6728 
INNOch t1- t0 0.0000  0.0306  -0.0446 0.0155  0.1947 
INNONARch t1- t0 -0.0483  0.0410  -0.0719 0.0158  0.5920 
CONTROL VARIABLES          
lnEMP t0 4.7344  0.1109  3.2784  0.0482 0.0000 
QUAL t0 0.3149  0.0176  0.1936  0.0065 0.0000 
SHIFT t0 0.2754  0.0311  0.1598  0.0108 0.0005 
TEAM t0 0.2367  0.0296  0.1039  0.0090 0.0000 
INDEP t0 0.1353  0.0238  0.0550  0.0067 0.0014 
ICT t0 0.8213  0.0267  0.5677  0.0146 0.0000 
COUNCIL t0 0.7053  0.0318  0.3031  0.0136 0.0000 
CAO t0 0.6329  0.0336  0.4655  0.0147 0.0000 
LTD t0 0.8309  0.0261  0.5991  0.0145 0.0000 
AFTER1990   0.3865  0.0339  0.4227  0.0146  0.3274 
EAST   0.5990  0.0341  0.4297  0.0146  0.0000 
Number of obs.:  206  1142   
Note: the details of BR are not presented here. 
 
A large body of literature addresses the correlation between a strong union 
presence on the one hand and R&D and innovative activity on the other hand. This 
is highly relevant in the current chapter, as the presence of a strong union may be 
correlated with our treatment as well as outcome variables. Menezes-Filho and Van 
Reenen (2003) survey the literature in this domain and conclude that North 
American studies consistently reveal a strongly negative correlation, while 
European studies cannot substantiate any significant impact of the union on R&D 
and innovation. The studies investigating this issue in Germany are Addison and 
Wagner (1994), Schnabel and Wagner (1992a and b, 1994) as well as Fitzroy and 
Kraft (1990). Schnabel and Wagner (1992b) ascribe the neutral relationship to the 
more cooperative nature of industrial relations in Germany.  
The relevant labour institutions on the plant and firm level are the unions and 
also the works councils (see the Works Constitution Act
67). Addison et al. (1996) 
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point out that the German situation is highly specific, because the workplace 
representation occurs rather through the mechanism of the works council than 
through the union. As the ties between the union and the works council are very 
close, they suggest that the works council substitutes for the union institution in the 
German case. So, we feel confident here to assume that the presence of a works 
council and the union’s bargaining power (variables COUNCIL and CAO) have no 
impact on the innovative activity in German firms. Adversely, these variables are 
expected to have an impact on the propensity to introduce profit-sharing, i.e. our 
treatment variable.  
After the matching, the evolution in the outcome variables (both static and 
dynamic) is evaluated for the subsample of matched pairs. This approach eliminates 
a considerable share of observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity in the treated 
and non-treated firms in the population and mitigates the potential selectivity bias. 
The first CDiD variation conducts two-sided t-tests to compare the means of the two 
groups after the matching. In the second CDiD approach, we also start off with the 
results obtained from the matching analysis, but then regress the outcome variables 
in a common DiD set-up on the treatment and exogenous variables. In this way, we 
also control for the change over time in the control variables. The variables which 
will be used to assess companies’ innovative capabilities in the second CDiD 
variation are similar to the variables described above. Process innovation will be 
assessed with the variables TECH, ADVNAR and ADV. Product innovation will be 
evaluated on the variables INPDT, NEWFRM and NEWMKT. So, the difference in 
innovative capabilities is regressed on the treatment variable (PROF = introduction 
of profit-sharing between t0 and t1), the evolution of the exogenous characteristics 
(lnEMP, QUAL, SHIFT, TEAM, INDEP, ICT, COUNCIL, CAO and LTD) as well 
as dummy variable YEAR, indicating the year of the observation. By definition, this 
dataset consists of a balanced panel, with information on 404 companies (resulting 
in 808 observations, as two periods of data are available).  
5. Estimates 
The potential presence of selectivity in this evaluation exercise was 
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simple comparison of the outcome variables between companies with and without 
profit-sharing (as presented in Table 35) does not provide an adequate answer in 
this evaluation research; the introduction of profit-sharing may be induced by 
innovativeness. We observe significant differences in the innovative strength 
between profit-sharing companies and the potential control group. However, the 
control variables differ significantly as well and these differences may also explain 
differences in innovativeness. We address this potential selection bias empirically 
starting from nearest neighbour propensity score matching with replacement. Then 
we take two variations on the CDiD approach to assess the evolution of the outcome 
variables over time. This technique ensures that both observable and unobservable 
differences between treated and non-treated companies are taken into account, as 
well as any macro-economic change over time. We believe that the data at hand is 
sufficiently rich and that the matching procedure significantly curtails the selection 
bias. As a result, any potentially remaining difference in the outcome variables can 
be attributed to the introduction of profit-sharing.  
To select a non-profit-sharing twin company for each profit-sharing company, 
we first estimate the propensity score, which reflects the probability that a company 
remunerates its employees with a system of profit-sharing in addition to a fixed 
wage. This model is presented in Table 36. In the probit model, size (lnEMP**), the 
share of qualified employees (QUAL***) and the presence of a works council 
(COUNCIL***) are significant. Also industry affiliation (BR**) matters. These 
estimates confirm expectations formulated in the section on selectivity. Smaller 
companies rather opt for other incentive schemes than profit-sharing. Companies 
employing large shares of qualified people are more likely to adopt profit-sharing. 
The presence of a works council, reflecting a high level of trust between company 
owners and employees as well as the bargaining power of the union, also create a 
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Table 36: Propensity to employ profit-sharing 
   Probit estimates  Marginal effects 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  dy/dx  Std. Err. 
lnEMP  0.1059 **  0.0461  0.0196 **  0.0085 
QUAL 0.6677  ***  0.1999  0.1235 ***  0.0369 
SHIFT°  0.0403   0.1195  0.0076   0.0228 
TEAM°  0.0721   0.1321  0.0138   0.0261 
INDEP°  0.1656   0.1647  0.0334   0.0361 
ICT°  0.1545   0.117  0.0280   0.0207 
COUNCIL° 0.5412  ***  0.1413 0.1098  ***  0.0312 
CAO°  -0.0917   0.1134  -0.0170   0.0209 
LTD° 0.1933    0.1191  0.0346    0.0205 
AFTER1990° 0.1762    0.1252  0.0332    0.0239 
EAST° 0.1507    0.1266  0.0281    0.0238 
constant -2.4041  ***  0.2332      
BR  χ²(14) = 28.39**    
Log-Likelihood -475     
Pseudo R²  0.1790   
# obs.  1352    
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The marginal effects on subsidies are 
calculated at the sample means for continuous variables and for a discrete change of dummy 
variables (indicated by °) from 0 to 1. Their standard errors are obtained by the delta method. 
 
The probit model provides estimated propensity scores and enables us to 
select
68 similar companies. After the matching process, any difference in the control 
variables is eliminated and the remaining differences in outcome variables can be 
attributed to the introduction of a profit-sharing system. In the first analysis, we 
evaluate how the outcome has evolved over time in the profit-sharing firms and 
their selected twin partners, respectively. Table 37 shows the difference in outcome 
variables, which reflect innovative capabilities. Profit-sharing companies are more 
likely to have a fully up-to-date technical equipment after the introduction of profit-
sharing (TECHch**). Also in the same time period, profit-sharing companies are 
more innovative than their non-profit-sharing twin companies (TECH**). They are 
significantly more eager to use advanced technologies (ADV** and ADVNAR**) 
and companies introducing profit-sharing have become more advanced technology 
users (ADVNARch**). Our hypothesis on the impact of profit-sharing on a 
company’s technological strength is confirmed. 
 Also the outcome variables measuring product innovation significantly differ 
after the matching. We notice that profit-sharing companies are more likely to have 
improved a product in the company’s existing portfolio (INPDT***) or introduced a 
new-to-the-firm product (NEWFRM***). Also, profit-sharing enables companies to 
realize a higher share of their turnover based on new-to-the-firm products 
                                                             
68 The selection process is based on a minimization of the Mahalanobis distance between companies. We match with 
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(NEWFRMint***). The general measures on product innovativeness show that they 
are more innovative in comparison with companies that did not introduce profit-
sharing (INNO** and INNONAR**). However, as expected as well, this increased 
performance in product innovation is limited to the improvement of existing 
products and the introduction of products which are new to the company, but not to 
the market (NEWMKT and NEWMKTint do not differ significantly between the 
two matched samples). As profit-sharing increases employee involvement in the 
innovation process, they are more likely to disclose relevant and valuable 
information. This information is important, but the knowledge captured in the 
company’s human resources, is relatively ‘straightforward’. The information does 
not contribute to the development of radical innovations, or, as measured here, 
innovations which are new to the market. Another expectation was that the impact 
of profit-sharing is larger with respect to process than product innovation. The 
dynamic variables reflecting the change in companies’ product innovation 
capabilities are not significantly different after the matching (INPDTch, 
NEWFRMch, NEWMKTch, INNOch and INNONARch). This result seems to 
indicate that the companies which introduced profit-sharing already were more 
innovative before the introduction. Hence, companies which have higher product 
innovative capabilities are more likely to employ better remuneration systems. We 
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Table 37: Outcome variables matched samples 
  Profit-sharing firms  Selected control group 
  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
θ 
Process innovation                   
TECH 2.8439  0.0529  2.6634  0.0503  0.1805  ** 
ADVNAR 0.1854  0.0272  0.1073 0.0217 0.0781  ** 
ADV 0.5854  0.0345  0.6927 0.0323 0.1073  ** 
TECHch -0.0390  0.0488  -0.1902  0.0512  0.1512  ** 
ADVNARch 0.1122  0.0221  0.0537 0.0158 0.0585  ** 
Product innovation             
INPDT   0.7833  0.0290  0.6517  0.0337  0.1315  *** 
NEWFRM   0.3122  0.0324  0.1832  0.0273  0.1290  *** 
NEWFRMint 2.6650  0.4880  1.2165  0.2661  1.4485  *** 
NEWMKT 0.1512  0.0251  0.1188  0.0228  0.0324   
NEWMKTint 1.1485  0.4727  1.3366  0.5467  0.1881   
INNO 0.8000  0.0280  0.7129 0.0319 0.0871  ** 
INNONAR 0.3854  0.0341  0.2772  0.0316  0.1081  ** 
INPDTch  0.0322   0.4571  0.0371   0.5177  0.0491   
NEWFRMch  -0.0537   0.0416  -0.0896   0.0406  -0.0359   
NEWMKTch  -0.0439   0.0355  -0.0297   0.0336  0.0142   
INNOch 0.0000    0.0309  0.0347   0.0347  0.0347   
INNONARch  -0.0488   0.0414  -0.0792   0.0429  -0.0304   
# obs.  205  205     
Note: the control variables (lnEMP, QUAL, SHIFT, TEAM, INDEP, ICT, COUNCIL, CAO, LTD, AFTER1990, 
EAST and BR) as well as the propensity score are not significantly different after the matching and therefore not 
reported here. The common support restriction was imposed, but no treated firms had to be removed; some 
observations were lost because of missing values, though. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%) of 
the t-tests on mean equality between the sample of funded firms and the selected control group. θ is the average 
treatment effect of profit-sharing.  
 
To complete the first CDiD variation, we now conduct a second variation: in 
the matched panel, constructed with the matching procedure, we regress the 
outcome variables on our treatment variable (PROF), a year dummy (YEAR) and 
the exogenous time-varying characteristics (lnEMP, QUAL, SHIFT, TEAM, 
INDEP, ICT, COUNCIL, CAO, LTD). In this set-up, both observed and unobserved 
differences in exogenous characteristics are explicitly controlled for, as well as 
different reactions to macro-economic changes over time from firms which do and 
do not share profits with their employees. The reader is reminded here that the 
probit models only allow a qualitative evaluation, as only the sign and significance 
of the treatment effect can be determined. The results are presented in Table 38. 
Compared to the first approach, the conclusions are less strong, but by and large still 
hold. The panel regression on the variable TECH is significant in the random effects 
model, but not in the fixed effects model, which is most appropriate in treatment 
analysis according to Wooldridge (2002) and the Hausman test. The sign of the 
coefficient is negative, which is in line with our expectations. The estimates for the 
dummy variables ADVNAR and ADV are significantly positive and confirm our 
previous findings. With respect to process innovations, we therefore conclude that 
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without profit-sharing. Turning to the measures for product innovation, a positive 
effect can be found on the likelihood to introduce new-to-the-firm products 
(NEWFRM***), which are however not new-to-the-market (NEWMKT). The 
estimate for INPDT is not significant (the p-value of the estimated coefficient is 
0.120). The first CDiD variation (see Table 37) did not provide evidence to support 
our hypothesis that companies improve their product innovative capabilities after 
the introduction of profit-sharing; it seemed that mainly the better performing 
companies introduce profit-sharing, explaining the insignificance of changes in 
product innovativeness over time. However, our estimate for NEWFRM*** now 
suggests that profit-sharing firms outperform non-profit-sharing firms, but that 
profit-sharing firms also enhance their performance with respect to product 
innovation once they introduce this remuneration scheme. To conclude, our 
analyses provide substantial support in favour of the hypotheses we built based on 
theoretical arguments. We conclude that profit-sharing enhances companies’ 
innovative capabilities, both on the level of product and process innovations. 
Table 38: CDiD regressions 
  -------------------------------------Process innovation-------------------------------------  --------------------Product innovation-------------------- 
  TECH
a 






PROF  0.1328     0.1583 **  0.3770 **  0.4449 **  0.3060     0.5182 ***  -0.0366    
 (0.0860)  (0,0707)  (0.1911)  (0.1844)  (0.1969)  (0.1759)  (0.1765) 
YEAR  -0.2457 ***  -0.2239 ***  -2.0709 ***  -0.5066 ***  -0.0177     -0.5325 ***  -0.0965    
 (0.0650)  (0.0576)  (0.2127) (0.1529) (0.1597)  (0.1551)  (0.1537) 
lnEMP  -0.1294     0.0326     0.0795     0.1078     0.2346  ***  -0.0965     0.0018    
 (0.1039)  (0.0281)  (0.0608) (0.0728) (0.0760)  (0.0612)  (0.0589) 
QUAL  0.1389     0.2805 **  0.7190 ***  0.4732     0.1885     0.1952     0.5643 ** 
 (0.2036)  (0.1161)  (0.2620) (0.3107) (0.3046)  (0.2582)  (0.2435) 
SHIFT  0.1266     0.0768     0.0994     0.3211 *  0.4052 **  -0.1009     -0.0307  
 (0.0891)  (0.0645)  (0.1536) (0.1737) (0.1899)  (0.1478)  (0.1438) 
TEAM  0.0848     0.0069     0.3155 *  0.1859     0.4647 **  0.1190     -0.1595    
 (0.0938)  (0.0674)  (0.1638) (0.1829) (0.2024)  (0.1528)  (0.1599) 
INDEP  -0.0550     0.0787     -0.0604     0.0150     0.1544     0.5197  ***  0.3991  ** 
 (0.0936)  (0.0746)  (0.1810) (0.2013) (0.2318)  (0.1683)  (0.1629) 
ICT  -0.1182     -0.0562     -0.2221    -0.3665 **  0.3770 **  0.2503     0.3599 ** 
 (0.0832)  (0.0657)  (0.1635) (0.1797) (0.1705)  (0.1620)  (0.1735) 
COUNCIL  0.0432     -0.1479 *  -0.3853 **  -0.3173     -0.0911     0.0118     0.0670    
 (0.1622)  (0.0867)  (0.1959) (0.2223) (0.2219)  (0.1894)  (0.1855) 
CAO  0.1689     0.1180 *  0.2603 *  0.2453     0.3782 **  -0.1583     0.0887    
 (0.1142)  (0.0679)  (0.1546) (0.1770) (0.1823)  (0.1513)  (0.1494) 
LTD  0.3683 ***  0.1768 **  0.1917     0.1299     -0.0028     0.3667 *  0.1627    
 (0.1309)  (0.0869)  (0.1885) (0.2227) (0.2271)  (0.1976)  (0.1982) 
Constant  3.0670 ***  2.5368 ***  0.0473     0.2104     -0.9863 ***  -0.7769 ***  -1.7741    
 (0.5168)  (0.1163)  (0.2534) (0.2943) (0.2978)  (0.2549)  (0.2853) 
R ²                          
within  0.0656  0.0426                 
between  0.0014  0.0438                 
overall  0.0027  0.0433                 
Log-likelihood         -376.419  -452.132  -379.566  -407.860  -301.625 
# obs.  808  808  754  754  754  754  754 
# companies  404  404  386  386  386  386  386 
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). The standard errors (between brackets) are heteroskedasticly consistent. 
a OLS regression with RE: random effects and FE: fixed effects. The Hausman test rejects the Null Hypothesis, i.e. that RE is consistent and efficient, at the 10% level. 
This is a weak indication that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model. Therefore, we include both models.  
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6. Conclusion 
We empirically investigated the impact of profit-sharing on the innovative 
capabilities of German manufacturing companies. Since the introduction of a profit-
sharing system may be endogenous, we employ two variations of the CDiD 
approach. Once the potential selection bias is eliminated, companies with and 
without a profit-sharing system still differ significantly in their innovativeness. 
Profit-sharing companies outperform non-profit-sharing companies on both process 
and product innovativeness. The introduction of profit-sharing increases the strength 
of a company’s technological equipment.  
In Bellman and Möller (2006) two profiles of companies introducing profit-
sharing emerge. On the one hand profit-sharing companies are the larger companies 
with a complex working environment, introducing profit-sharing to motivate the 
workforce. On the other hand also small and young, technology-oriented firms 
introduce profit-sharing as they do not have substantial resources to attract and keep 
highly qualified employees; the profit premium is treated as a bonus to the regular 
pay slip. The firms in our sample, introducing profit-sharing, are mainly the larger 
firms, with a more complex work environment, a high level of trust between 
employees and managers and a powerful union. The ownership structure as well as 
industry affiliation is relevant, too. The age of the company does not seem to matter. 
Therefore, the firms in our sample seem to belong mainly to the first profile. Hence, 
the impact of profit-sharing on innovativeness may be different in smaller high-tech 
firms. 
The results presented in this chapter establish valid proof supporting the 
hypotheses developed on the impact of profit-sharing on a company’s innovative 
activity. However, as new survey waves will become available and existing datasets 
may be extended, robustness checks, e.g. with different specifications of the 
moment when the economic return becomes apparent, different measures of 
innovativeness, etc. will provide valuable additional insights into this domain. An 
interesting point of view was advanced by Lerner and Wulf (2007), who link 
different incentive schemes to reward R&D managers to patenting activity. Also the 
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of this remuneration scheme, could yield an interesting path for further research, as 
the impact of profit-sharing may be heterogeneous in size. 
Although our results suggest that profit-sharing adds to companies’ innovative 
capacity, the share of German companies actually employing this system is rather 
limited in comparison with other countries (especially France and the UK). 
Research on the obstacles hampering German employers to let employees share in 
the profit indicates an unfavourable taxation system, the complex legislation system 
as well as a bad fit with the cultural background as key problems (Van Den Bulcke, 
1999). Therefore, German policy makers may consider designing a more profit-
sharing friendly environment for German companies. Besides the potential positive 
productivity and employment gains, also the national innovative capacity may 
benefit from this remuneration system. 
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Epilogue 
This dissertation attempts to advance the literature on the economics of 
evaluation on the level of both methodology and content. Public as well as private 
measures to foster private R&D activity are evaluated in a bundle of essays. The 
first part (chapters two to five) entails an assessment of public R&D funding of 
companies; in the second part (chapter six) the impact of a particular private 
remuneration system, i.e. profit-sharing, is evaluated. In this epilogue, the main 
results are briefly summarized and their contributions to the existing literature are 
highlighted. To finish, some limitations are mentioned, which at the same time give 
rise to new and promising research questions. We also devote attention to some 
policy implications. 
Public innovation policy 
Public R&D funding in Flanders is subjected to an evaluation exercise in the 
first part of this dissertation. We thoroughly investigate its impact on private R&D 
activity in Flanders. Different indicators are evaluated using different techniques 
and careful attention is paid to heterogeneity in the population of funded firms, 
potentially inducing heterogeneity in additionality effects. Extensive data sources 
are exploited to this end. Key information on the funding status and on companies’ 
R&D and innovative activity was obtained from the biannual R&D and CIS 
(Community Innovation Survey) surveys. These surveys are embedded in a large 
harmonization effort in European and some other countries, managed by Eurostat 
and the OECD. The Steunpunt O&O Indicatoren (formerly the Steunpunt O&O 
Statistieken) holds responsibility for the data collection in Flanders. The CIS 
collects mainly qualitative information on the innovative effort and performance in 
a sample of firms which is randomly drawn, according to size and sector, from the 
total population of Flemish firms with more than ten employees. The R&D survey 
gathers more quantitative data on the inputs of companies’ R&D process. In 
contrast to the CIS, the set-up of the R&D survey is inventory-based: all potentially 
R&D active companies are identified and surveyed. In terms of R&D expenditure, 
the collected data cover a sample of companies which are, in total, responsible for   Essays on the economics of evaluation  202 
about 80% of the total R&D expenditure in Flanders. Hence, the R&D sample is 
close to the population of all R&D active companies in Flanders. These surveys are 
the starting point of the empirical analyses presented in this work. To optimize the 
quality of our results, the survey data were supplemented with data stemming from 
other sources. First, information on the amount of funding and on companies’ 
subsidy history was obtained from IWT (the Institute for the Promotion of 
Innovation through Science and Technology in Flanders and the main funding 
agency for private R&D activities). Next, in collaboration with the Steunpunt O&O 
Indicatoren, information on patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
was linked to our dataset. Last, financial data from companies’ balance sheets, 
collected by the National Bank of Belgium (Belfirst) were added. The combination 
of several rich data sources added a substantial surplus value to the empirical 
results. Similar data are available in Germany. Different methodologies, assessing 
both discrete and continuous treatment, could be employed and different 
additionality issues were investigated. A concise summary is given in the following 
paragraphs. 
Chapter 1 introduces the reader in the domain of treatment effects research 
and more specifically the issue of selectivity. Chapter 2 provides an introduction 
on additionality research and sketches a concise image of the Flemish public R&D 
funding system. 
Chapter 3 rejects full crowding-out effects in Flanders and Germany: R&D 
subsidies induce additional private R&D investment, measured in absolute terms 
and in R&D intensity. We use pooled cross-sectional data from the Community 
Innovation Survey, supplemented with patent and balance sheet data as well as the 
company’s subsidy history. The traditional matching approach is extended in a 
conditional difference-in-differences framework for repeated cross-sections, to 
control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. It is concluded that public 
subsidies induce increased private R&D spending.  
However, increased R&D budgets may still hide crowding-out effects, as the 
actual R&D effort may not be increased, e.g. because the subsidy and induced R&D 
investments are allocated to mere wage increases. Hence, in Chapter 4, I introduce 
labour market dynamics into the traditional additionality research and analyze the 
effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D investment, employment and wages Epilogue    203
in Flanders. The main data source is the Flemish R&D Survey. Financial data were 
added, as well as information on companies’ patenting behaviour and subsidy 
history. Parametric treatment effects models and IV regression methods show that 
R&D subsidies increase private R&D activity: funded companies allocate larger 
budgets to R&D activities and employ more R&D personnel. Partial crowding-out 
cannot be rejected, though. The impact on the wage structure is found to be 
significant: in addition to an increase in R&D expenditure and staffing, R&D wages 
are higher in companies receiving a subsidy. Further analysis learns that the main 
explanation seems to lie in an upskilling process: the subsidy allows companies to 
recruit more qualified personnel.  
Chapter 5 digs into the potential presence of heterogeneity in additionality 
effects with respect to the funding recipient. The matching procedure is employed, 
pooling two cross-sectional datasets from the Community Innovation Survey, 
supplemented with patenting, financial and subsidy information. It appears that 
foreign firms are less likely to receive public R&D funding in Flanders, but if they 
do, the amount of funding typically is larger than what domestic firms receive. It is 
found that foreign ownership does not induce any difference in the impact of public 
R&D funding on private R&D budgets: both domestic and foreign-owned 
companies increase their R&D budgets to the same extent when an R&D subsidy is 
granted. However, when turning to the output side, the estimates show that foreign-
owned companies outperform domestic companies when it comes to innovativeness 
and the creation of economic value, realized with the publicly induced, additional 
R&D expenditure. 
Each of these chapters has its merit and advances the literature on 
additionality effects of R&D subsidies. This advancement is a mixture of 
methodological and content-wise extensions. In the third chapter, the conditional 
difference-in-differences methodology for repeated cross-sections is applied for the 
first time in this domain. Also, the availability of identical datasets for Flanders and 
Germany enabled us to take some first steps towards an internationally harmonized 
evaluation of public R&D subsidies. The fourth chapter extends the set of outcome 
variables in additionality research (traditionally mainly R&D expenditure) towards 
labour economics and assesses the impact on R&D employment and the wage 
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effectiveness of an R&D policy measure in terms of both the funding status and the 
grant size. The treatment effects and IV regression estimates indicate that full 
crowding-out is rejected, but that partial crowding-out cannot be ruled out. The fifth 
chapter addresses potential heterogeneity in the treatment effects of public R&D 
subsidies. Moreover, the link with innovative and economic output is established, 
relating the counterfactual and induced private R&D spending to the output side of 
the R&D process.  
Different data and research questions give rise to different methodological 
approaches. By and large, the overlapping findings tend to point in the same 
direction. An actual assessment of this convergence would require constructing 
confidence intervals for the treatment effects. This goes beyond the set-up of this 
dissertation, though. It is rather suggested to bring all conclusions together and to 
build a broad, coherent, rich and nuanced view on the assessment of public R&D 
policy. 
I want to put forward some caveats here, which at the same time give 
occasion to more profound and refining research. First, public R&D funding is 
provided by many governmental institutions, at the regional, national and European 
level. The research presented in this dissertation evaluates the general impact of 
public funding, irrespective of the provider. Different governments could 
demonstrate different preferences, though, which may result in heterogeneous 
additionality effects. Therefore, it would be interesting to distinguish between 
different funding schemes (see e.g. Aschhoff, 2008, and Wallsten, 2000, for an 
evaluation of the German DPF scheme and the US SBIR program, respectively) and 
their mutual interaction. For example, in 2000, the Flemish government introduced 
a new SME program, uniting the complicated structure of different funding schemes 
under one single denominator. Detailed information about this single funding 
scheme recently became available and will be employed in future research to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this specific SME program. Also, the way in which 
public funding is provided yields an interesting research topic. For example, the US 
SBIR program is two-phased. In a first phase, the concept is assessed. Only projects 
which prove they may offer significant added value (on average 30% of the 
proposed projects) can then proceed to the second phase, in which the project is 
actually implemented. The funding amount is significantly larger in the second Epilogue    205
phase. A comparison of the effectiveness of the US and Flemish system in terms of 
additionality is definitely meaningful and could raise important policy implications.  
Second, in this dissertation, the application and granting process have been 
regarded as a black box. However, an analysis from the perspective of, on the one 
hand, (non) applying companies and on the other hand, the government, providing 
subsidies, may give interesting insights. Blanes and Busom (2004), Takalo et al. 
(2005), Tanayama (2007) and Aschhoff (2008), investigate this aspect of the public 
R&D funding process. For Flanders, very recently a rich dataset has become 
available, which is well suited to dig into the selection process of public R&D 
funding. Through government mediation, Flemish companies can appeal to an 
external advisor, who assists them in the subsidy application. Also, the Flemish 
government recently started assessing the scientific added value and the valorisation 
potential of submitted projects. This information can be linked to details on the 
subsidy project as well as company information. This dataset can then provide 
evidence on e.g. whether the advisor generates added value for the company.  
Third, heterogeneous additionality effects could stem from different types of 
research. Little research has been undertaken to disentangle the components of 
R&D budgets, and to address the crowding-out hypothesis on research versus 
development activities. Notable exceptions are Clausen (2007) as well as Aerts and 
Thorwarth (2008). They distinguish between the impact of public funding on 
research on the one hand and development activities on the other hand. The 
crowding-out hypothesis tends to be rejected only for the latter.  
Fourth, the funding system is based on projects, while here the impact is 
evaluated at the company level. It is not unlikely that one funded project is 
complementary to other projects and that positive spillovers between projects are 
generated. Therefore, additionality effects at the firm level may be induced by a 
funded project but originate from other projects within the company. It is not my 
aim to evaluate additionality effects at the project level, though, as the government’s 
aim is to increase companies’ R&D activity, irrespective of how this increase is 
generated.  
Fifth, this dissertation also illustrates the value of international R&D activity 
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may unravel why these companies outperform domestic companies in the creation 
of R&D output and economic value. Moreover, also within the population of 
foreign-owned companies, heterogeneous effects may be found. For example, 
strongly locally embedded foreign affiliates may realize more (social) value to the 
host country and more knowledge may spill over to local companies. This would 
have important policy implications. A profound analysis of local embeddedness and 
knowledge flows within MNEs and between foreign-owned and domestic 
companies seems to be worthwhile. Aerts and Sofka (2008) provide a first study in 
this respect: they assess whether publicly funded R&D intensifies or relaxes a firm’s 
knowledge protection strategy. Conversely, simple economic logic in MNEs’ 
accounting procedures may provide an additional explanation as to why MNE 
affiliates realize more economic value. This deserves further investigation.  
Last, this dissertation addresses the direct, short term effect of public R&D 
funding. However, also the long term effect is an important evaluation criterion to 
policy makers. Time-series data on public funding, R&D activity, innovative 
performance and economic value would provide deeper insights and would allow 
testing different lag specifications. In recent years, special attention has been 
devoted to the careful construction of a panel structure in the Flemish Community 
Innovation and R&D Surveys. As more survey waves will become available, the 
long term impact of public R&D funding will develop into a challenging, but 
valuable and promising research issue.  
In the first part of this dissertation, the effectiveness of a public intervention 
tool in the market for R&D was investigated. More specifically, I focussed on the 
impact of public R&D funding in Flanders. In the following paragraphs I proceed 
with some policy implications of this research. IWT acts as the single counter in 
Flanders where companies can submit a dossier and apply for a subsidy and 
therefore manages all corporate R&D subsidies, at the Flemish and Belgian level, as 
well as certain EU-funded projects
69. Vital policy issues for IWT are the 
significance of the additionality of the public money they redistribute and the 
valorisation of the outcome of the research effort which is induced by their R&D 
grants.  
                                                             
69 The Framework Program projects are not managed through IWT. However, typically the scale of these projects is very large 
because these projects are often managed in international company consortia. As a result, the number of Flemish firms 
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The research bundled here rejects the full crowding-out hypothesis; it is 
however also found that R&D grants crowd-out private R&D activity to some 
extent. Nevertheless, this is a positive result for the Flemish R&D policy: funded 
firms spend more on R&D activities, employ more R&D personnel and realize 
innovative output with subsidised R&D budgets. Our findings show that the public 
money which IWT provides for R&D activities indeed induces additional private 
R&D activity, both at the input and output side. However, IWT judges the fear for a 
leakage of the valorisation value and brain drain as highly relevant, especially with 
respect to MNEs. Ideally, IWT wishes to see that the innovative and economic 
value which is generated through funded research is kept and valorised in Flanders. 
However, foreign multinationals signal that they come to Flanders because of the 
strong pool of knowledge, which is embedded in the Flemish research institutions 
like IMEC, VITO, VIB and IBBT. The financial support from the government is of 
minor importance (typically only up to 5% or 10% of their total R&D budget). 
Although our research tends to point out that the foreign-owned subsidiaries 
generate innovative and economic value in Flanders, even more than the domestic 
firms do, the answer to the question whether the knowledge they generate is 
sufficiently appropriated by the Flemish economy, remains unclear to a large extent. 
Knowledge is volatile and extremely hard to retain in a world of increasing 
globalisation. 
Furthermore, from interviews with IWT officials, it became apparent that the 
government is still puzzled by another essential question: are all potentially 
interested companies covered by the subsidy system? Innovation is a top priority of 
the Flemish government and the budget to support and stimulate innovative activity 
in the private sector is substantial. However, IWT finds itself faced with the ‘luxury 
problem’ that many companies, especially SMEs and start-ups, are not familiar with 
IWT nor with the measures they qualify for, despite numerous initiatives like 
specific promotion actions, advisors assisting in the application process, 
collaboration with polytechnic schools, etc. This may entail implications for the 
assessment of the Flemish public R&D policy. 
It was found that R&D subsidies induce additional R&D expenditure and the 
employment of more R&D personnel (Chapter 4). At the same time, an increase of 
the R&D wages was observed, which can mainly be ascribed to an upskilling   Essays on the economics of evaluation  208 
process: funded companies are able to attract and to employ higher-skilled 
personnel. However, an often heard complaint uttered by R&D active companies is 
that they experience heavy difficulties in finding adequate personnel. This seems to 
constitute a severe bottleneck for innovative activity (also in many other countries; 
see e.g. Mohnen et al., 2008). Therefore, it is called for a general policy framework, 
in which all public measures (a strong education system, adequate knowledge 
protection measures, stimulating measures, a good balance between basic and more 
applied research, an efficient transfer of knowledge between the public and private 
sectors, etc.) are fine-tuned and geared to each other and jointly create an innovator-
friendly environment for the business sector. Moreover, current statistics indicate 
that the decrease and subsequent stagnation in R&D expenditure in Flanders (and in 
many other EU-countries) mainly result from the evolution of the private R&D 
spending (see e.g. Debackere and Veugelers, 2007). Public R&D expenditure 
remained at the same level or even increased a little bit. This has not been 
investigated in the framework of this dissertation, but especially in times of 
decreasing private R&D expenditure, additionality effects could be high. The 
counter-cyclical support of private R&D activity could help companies standing up 
to this evolution. 
This dissertation mainly looks into the impact of direct R&D funding on 
private R&D activity. Fiscal measures were only limitedly popular until recently. 
However, in 2007 the fiscal support system has been redesigned and first evaluation 
exercises reveal that the new system seems to be very popular, especially due to tax 
reduction measures for R&D employees. In this work these fiscal measures were 
not yet relevant; they are expected to become so in the near future, though. IWT 
officials expect that the fiscal measures predominantly provide additional incentives 
to conduct R&D and they do not expect to see a decline in the number of 
applications for R&D subsidies. However, as raised before, fiscal measures carry an 
implicit relabeling danger: to maximise the benefit from these tax credits, 
companies may relabel activities as being an R&D activity, while before the same 
activity was not accounted for in the company’s R&D budget. This implies an 
artificial increase in R&D expenditure which actually did not take place. Then 
obviously this evolution becomes highly relevant in evaluation exercises, also of 
direct R&D support, as it may seriously bias the evaluation exercises. The Epilogue    209
interaction of direct and indirect support measures for private R&D activity 
provides an interesting path for further research. 
Corporate strategies in innovation 
In Chapter 6 we employ evaluation econometrics to assess the impact of 
profit-sharing on a company’s innovative performance. Profit-sharing aligns the 
mutual interests of company employees and owners. As a result, potential obstacles, 
impeding employees to share their information advantage with the company, may 
be alleviated. Therefore, we advanced the hypotheses that profit-sharing companies 
employ better and more up-to-date technological equipment and also realise more 
product innovations. The application of conditional difference-in-differences 
methods on a rich dataset on German manufacturing companies reveals that indeed, 
profit-sharing strengthens the company’s product and process innovative 
capabilities.  
To the best of our knowledge, this research provides the first empirical testing 
of the relationship between profit-sharing and innovativeness. More recent survey 
waves will become available and existing datasets may be extended. This may yield 
new possibilities to test different time lags, different measures of innovativeness, 
etc. For example, Lerner and Wulf (2007) link different remuneration schemes of 
R&D managers to a company’s patenting activity. An extension of the measure of 
profit-sharing is possible: one could not only take the mere presence of profit-
sharing into account, but use information on the size of the profit premium; 
heterogeneous additionality effects may become apparent.  
 
 
Innovation has become the driving force in the current increasingly 
knowledge-based society. Private as well as public efforts are vital to maintain a 
significant degree of competitiveness. This is reflected for example in the so-called 
Lisbon agenda: in 2000, the European Union designed an ambitious strategy to 
strengthen the EU’s innovativeness. It was postulated that by 2010, 3% of the GDP 
should be allocated to R&D activities. One third should be financed publicly; the   Essays on the economics of evaluation  210 
remaining two thirds should be financed privately. However, intermediate 
evaluations show that this goal is far from being reached: in 2005 only 1.77% of the 
EU25 GDP was spent on R&D. Conversely, the EU’s main competitors performed 
significantly better in this respect: the US R&D expenditure amounted to 2.62% of 
the GDP and in Japan this number rose to 3.33% (OECD, 2007). As a consequence, 
very recently an integrated innovation/research action plan was initiated, which calls 
for a major upgrade of the research and innovation conditions in Europe. Mobilizing 
EU funds and further development of instruments to support research and 
innovation are key objectives formulated in this plan.  
This dissertation illustrates that both public and private measures aiming at 
stimulating private innovative capabilities have their merit. Further research, as 
outlined above, will allow digging further in the specificities of how these measures 
affect innovativeness. However, already now it is clear that public R&D funding 
and private incentive measures unmistakably have a noteworthy potential to 
contribute in reaching the 3% target. To conclude, I urge for a fine-tuning effort 
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No future behind us, so let us move forward! 
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